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This PhD thesis addresses one of the most pressing problems in developing countries: labour infor-
mality. The overall objective of the thesis is to illustrate the capacity of microsimulation techniques 
to analyse a broad range of topics related to this problem. To highlight the potential of the meth-
odology we pose a motivating question: what are the barriers that informal workers face to becom-
ing formal? Job contact networks and workers’ social insurance contributions are analysed alongside 
other usual suspects such as the lack of human capital. The first chapter proposes a tax-benefit 
microsimulation exercise for Ecuador and Colombia in which we move informal workers to the 
formal sector. We found that a considerably high proportion of formalization income gains would 
be taxed away in both countries. The second chapter presents different behavioural models built 
on the static tax-benefit model for Colombia and considers labour supply responses and job avail-
ability constraints. A simulation exercise of pro-formality policies results in a modest to null effect 
on the composition of the pool of workers between the formal and informal sectors. Lastly, the 
third chapter presents an agent-based macroeconomic model with an informal sector that intro-
duces the formation of job contacts on the job as a novel feature. After estimating several of the 
parameters for the Colombian labour market, our exploratory exercise indicates that a high degree 
of sectoral homophily in contact networks does not seem to contribute to labour market segmen-
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This PhD thesis addresses one of the most pressing problems in developing countries: labour infor-
mality. Within this broad term we encompass labour activities of low productivity and scale, and 
out of sight from the government; these features translate into precarious earnings and a lack of 
the social protection benefits that the law traditionally provides to workers. Informality matters 
because it affects around half of the workforce in most Latin American economies and it curtails 
efforts to increase tax revenues and to provide the kind of public goods most developed economies 
offer to their citizens.  
Given the scope of the concept, many definitions are proposed in the literature to identify formal 
and informal activities in household, firm, and aggregate data. In the thesis we follow the legalistic 
view which characterises formal jobs as those that comply with all legal rules in the labour law of 
each country (e.g. affiliation to social security, minimum wage, employment protection legislation). 
Considering the difficulties of identifying compliance with all the rules in the household data that 
we use, we operationalise this definition using each worker’s reported affiliation to the contributory 
social security system.1 This approach provides a direct link between informality and the design of 
tax-benefit systems that we use in the first two chapters. 
The overall objective of the thesis is to contribute with a methodological approach – microsimula-
tion – to the analysis of informality in developing countries. This modelling technique allows us to 
(i) capture population heterogeneity, and (ii) use ex-ante counterfactual simulations (policy exper-
iments) for policy evaluation. In this sense, microsimulation offers the possibility of expanding the 
scope of research on informality in developing countries, for which cross-sectional microdata is 
typically available. The three chapters of the thesis could be thought of as case studies that attempt 
to move the economic study of informality away from the effects of payroll taxes on formal labour 
demand, and the use of general equilibrium models, which have proven limited in terms of effective 
policymaking.  
 
1 Here we focus on the first job of the worker. In our data 6.3% of workers have a second job, 1.7% have a second job 
and are formal in the first job, and 1.1% have a second job and are formal in both jobs.  
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The thesis is composed of three interlinked chapters focusing on Colombia, a country that, despite 
abundant research and policy reforms, has a labour informality rate which is stubbornly high at 
values ranging from 60 to 65 percent. Additionally, firm informality, measured as firm registration, 
has been relatively constant over time at around 70 percent.2 3 As highlighted in the different 
chapters of the thesis, informality in Colombia is associated with earnings precariousness and pov-
erty, with formal workers receiving 30 percent higher income than informal workers after controlling 
for other determinants of earnings, and with poverty incidence 20 percentage points (pp) higher 
for workers in the informal than in the formal sector. 
A motivating question that we try to answer using microsimulations is: what are the barriers that 
informal workers face to becoming formal? Job contact networks and workers’ social insurance 
contributions are analysed alongside other usual suspects such as the lack of human capital.  
The three chapters extensively use publicly available Colombian household data. For two of these 
datasets, we developed a tax-benefit model for Colombia, COLMOD, which is based on the EU-
ROMOD software and its modelling conventions.4 The first chapter’s tax-benefit microsimulation 
exercise is of a static nature. The second chapter builds on the static tax-benefit model for Colombia 
and considers labour supply responses. Lastly, the third chapter departs from the tax-benefit policy 
analysis and develops an agent-based model (ABM), which is basically a dynamic microsimulation 
environment for the whole economy.5 For the latter, we study job contact networks as a potential 
driver of labour segmentation in Colombia.  
The first chapter studies the monetary incentives to engage in formal employment implied by the 
tax-benefit systems in Ecuador and Colombia. The aim of the chapter is twofold. First, to quantify 
the financial costs that informal workers incur in the event of entering formality. Second, to assess 
the effect of a hypothetical scenario in which the economy would be fully formalized. From an 
 
2 Note that for formal workers the share of social contributions paid with respect to the theoretical level is around 100% 
implying that on average workers are contributing to social insurance based on their reported earnings. 
3 Despite the fact that the intensive margin of informality (the labour informality rate inside each firm) has been recently 
studied and found to be important in countries such as Brazil (Ulyssea, 2018), currently there is no firm survey in 
Colombia that allows us to dig deeper into this issue. The firm data presented is obtained from employers responding to 
a household survey. 
4 Additional information for the model can be accessed at www.uexternado.edu.co/economia/colmod. This includes ex-
ternal validation and description of the tax-benefit rules.  
5 See Richiardi (2013) for a discussion on the convergence of ABMs and Microsimulation. 
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individual perspective we quantify the financial cost that each informal worker would incur in the 
event of entering formality. We build on previous work from Koettl (2013) and Koettl and Weber 
(2012) which propose a Formalization Tax Rate (FTR) indicator to measure formal work incentives 
in some Eastern European countries. Considering that this previous literature mainly focuses on 
compliance with the tax-benefit system and not on earnings and uses hypothetical households, we 
propose an alternative definition of FTR to account for potential changes in earnings after formal-
ization using real household data. More precisely, in our exercise we estimate the change in earnings 
of each informal worker that moves to the formal sector based on individual characteristics and we 
then calculate the share of this change in earnings that is taxed away. Our results show that this 
share is considerably high, at around 60 and 92 percent on average in Ecuador and Colombia, 
respectively. This figure is also considerably higher for informal self-employed workers at the bot-
tom of the earnings distribution because of a requirement that workers contribute to social security 
at least on the basis of the minimum wage in both countries. The results arise even as each worker’s 
counterfactual earnings in the formal sector are higher on average than baseline earnings, with 
increases in excess of 100 percent for workers in the first decile of the baseline earnings distribution.  
The hypothetical scenario of a fully formalized economy allows us to assess the budgetary and 
distributional implications of formalization. Despite the fact that such an exercise clearly omits 
general equilibrium effects, it gives us an important picture of the burden of labour informality on 
poverty, inequality, and the finances of the social protection system. We found important reduc-
tions in market income inequality of between 4 and 6 pp in the Gini coefficient resulting from 
earnings gains at the bottom of the distribution. However, more than three-fifths of the Gini gains 
are offset by high social contributions for workers entering formality. Moreover, the improvements 
in the poverty headcount of between 5 and 10pp after moving workers to the formal sector are 
more than reversed when we take into account the tax-benefit system: poverty is between 2 and 6 
pp higher than in the baseline. Given the high levels of informality in Ecuador and Colombia, 
aggregate revenue from social insurance contributions would increase considerably: around 70 per-
cent in both countries. On the contrary, the increase in tax revenue would be modest, between 1.3 
and 5.8 percent, due to the high non-taxable thresholds and deductions from personal expenditures 
characterising the design of personal income tax in the two countries.  
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The second chapter seeks to contribute to the methodologies used in the informality literature by 
introducing different structural labour supply models that allow behavioural simulations at the 
micro level. In the first part, we present a detailed review of two kinds of models: a discrete choice 
model (DC) proposed by van Soest (1995) and a Random Utility Random Opportunity model of 
job choice (RURO), proposed by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995). Whereas the DC assumes 
full availability of jobs at a fixed wage, the RURO can be thought of as a generalisation of the DC 
framework in which wages are not fixed and job availability is restricted. Moreover, for the RURO 
model we present a standard version and an alternative version involving sectoral (formal-informal) 
choice following Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and Aaberge and Flood (2013). We present the speci-
ficities of estimating the three models using Colombian microdata and the Colombian tax-benefit 
model.  
To illustrate the scope of potential counterfactual simulations, in the second part we focus on the 
RURO model with occupational choice and analyse the behavioural responses of informal workers 
to exogenous changes in disposable income, social insurance contributions, and educational achieve-
ment. In line with the hypothesis of labour market segmentation, simulation of pro-formality poli-
cies results in a modest to null effect on the composition of the pool of workers between the two 
sectors. For instance, an increase in the share of informal workers with higher education from 14.5 
to 67.5 percent increases wages and job availability in the formal sector. However, only 6.5 percent 
of informal workers are observed to make a transition to formality, implying that there are im-
portant unobserved variables determining the availability of formal jobs for informal workers. The 
analysis does not aim to be representative of the Colombian labour market as we focus on single 
individuals and omit non-pecuniary differences between sectors. However, the proposed exercise 
highlights the advantages offered by structural labour supply models to study informal labour 
markets in the context of developing countries.       
The last chapter presents an exploratory exercise which expands a macroeconomic ABM (Lengnick, 
2013) to study the relationship between labour informality and the formation of job contacts on 
the job. The proposed framework could be useful when model intractability at the micro level 
prevents the analysis of certain phenomena at the macro level. We resort to an existing ABM for 
three reasons: a) the model allows us to include “general equilibrium” feedback specially arising 
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from the goods market; b) given that the Lengnick (2013) model is relatively simple yet compre-
hensive, its recycled use could increase the chances of future implementations; c) most of the rele-
vant literature in informality (Ulyssea, 2018, Meghir et al., 2015, Albrechtet al., 2009) has moved 
to a general equilibrium approach making the various methodologies more comparable.      
The model features a two-market exchange economy in which firms of heterogeneous productivity 
labelled formal or informal produce a single physical commodity using homogenous labour as input. 
Households offer labour to firms in exchange for a wage that allows them to buy the physical 
commodity. Firms and households are fixed in number and only relate to a small network of agents 
from which they obtain information about current prices or jobs: households and firms are con-
nected to exchange labour and the physical commodity, and households are connected between 
them to obtain information on job openings. Connections are modified in the search for economic 
advantages or alternatively if the links between households age and die.  
We assume that direct and indirect job search (i.e., using contact networks) are perfect substitutes, 
and focus on how the propensity of using job contacts affects the informality divide and the aggre-
gate outcomes of the model. We estimate the most important parameters for the production and 
the labour market of the model using information from Colombian household surveys and find a 
high degree of sectoral homophily in contact networks: informal and formal workers have on average 
70.3 and 81.5 percent of connections in their sectors, respectively. However, the current propensity 
of use of contacts does not seem to contribute to labour market segmentation: these conditions do 
not prevent workers from moving between sectors in search of better job opportunities because the 
observed propensity of using contacts is not relatively high. We also find that marginally increasing 
the propensity to use contact networks increases the proportion of jobs found through contacts, 
although, there are diminishing returns to using contacts because of congestion in the use of net-
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Chapter 1: Financial disincentives to 
formal employment: evidence from 
Ecuador and Colombia1 
(Co-authored with Xavier Jara) 
Abstract 
Despite recent formalization policies, labour informality remains high in Latin American economies. 
In this paper we explore the effect of the tax-benefit system on the supply of informal labour. To 
do so, we quantify the financial cost informal workers would incur in the event of entering formality. 
We use representative microdata from Ecuador and Colombia, together with detailed tax-benefit 
models, and simulate transitions to the formal sector for all workers observed in informality in the 
data, where informality is defined as non-affiliation to social security. Our analysis takes into ac-
count potential earnings gains on entry to formality and redefines the formalization tax rate as the 
proportion of the change in earnings that will be taxed away in the form of increased taxes and 
social insurance contributions or reduced cash transfers when a worker enters formality. Our results 
point to strikingly high formalization tax rates, with 60 and 92 percent of worker’s change inearn-
ings taxed away on average in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. Costs are particularly high for 
self-employed informal workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution. The results are mainly 
driven by the design of social insurance contribution, and in particular, the requirement that work-
ers contribute to social security at least on the basis of the minimum wage in both countries. 
JEL: J42, H22, H55 
Keywords: Informality, microsimulation, formalization tax rate. 
 
1 The results presented here are based on ECUAMOD v1.4 and COLMOD v1.1. ECUAMOD is developed, maintained 
and managed by UNU-WIDER in collaboration with the EUROMOD team at ISER (University of Essex), SASPRI 
(Southern African Social Policy Research Institute) and local partners in selected developing countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Ecuador and Vietnam) in the scope of the SOUTHMOD project. The local partner for 
ECUAMOD is Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN). We are indebted to the many people who have contributed 
to the development of SOUTHMOD and ECUAMOD. COLMOD is developed, maintained, and managed by the Faculty 
of Economics at Universidad Externado de Colombia. The authors are grateful to participants at the Public Economics 
Seminar at KU Leuven, the Euromod Research Group at Essex and the UNU-WIDER microsimulation conferences at 




In Latin American economies, characterised by highly concentrated capital income and limited 
social protection, labour income represents the main alternative for families to overcome poverty. 
A particular feature of labour markets in the region continues to prompt interest among academics 
and policy makers, namely, informality, a concept that has evolved over time due to the complexity 
of its definition. Over recent years, the region has experienced important economic growth and a 
number of formalization policies have been introduced in different countries. However, informality 
remains prevalent and further research is needed to analyse its underlying causes. 
The coexistence of two very dissimilar productive sectors, formal and informal, is usually studied 
within two perspectives: exclusion and exit (Perry et al. 2007). The former assumes that being 
formal is expensive for small companies and workers whose productivity is low relative to the 
burden of regulation and taxes; therefore, they are excluded from the formal sector (de Soto, 1989). 
The latter suggests that firms and workers optimally choose whether to be formal and contribute 
to taxes and social insurance or not, having both options available (Maloney, 1999).  
Under these two perspectives, the role played by taxes, and more generally by the tax-benefit 
system, is central to the discussion. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to quantify the cost that 
informal workers would incur in the event of entering formality. For this, we make use of household 
microdata from Ecuador and Colombia and simulate transitions from informal to formal employ-
ment by means of multi-country tax-benefit microsimulation techniques in order to elucidate the 
financial disincentives to formality embedded in the tax-benefit system. We take into account 
potential income gains of informal workers when entering the formal sector, as well as compliance 
with minimum wage legislation in place in each country. As such, we revise the concept of formal-
ization tax rates and redefine it as the proportion of the change in earnings that would be taxed 
away in the form of increased taxes and social insurance contributions or reduced cash transfers 
when a worker enters formality. 
Our analysis provides a number of interesting findings. First, formalization costs are very high in 
Ecuador and Colombia, and would outweigh most of the potential monetary gains on entry to 
formal employment. On average, around 60 and 92 percent of workers’ change in earnings in 
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formality would be taxed away in the form of increased taxes and social insurance contributions in 
Ecuador and Colombia respectively. Second, the high formalization costs are mainly driven by the 
payment of social insurance contributions, with income taxes playing only a marginal role due to 
high non-taxable thresholds and deductions from personal expenditures applied to taxable income. 
Third, formalization tax rates vary greatly between employees and self-employed workers in the 
informal sector and are particularly high at the bottom of the self-employed earnings distribution. 
Fourth, assuming informal workers would face similar earnings as their formal counterparts upon 
entry to formality, a full formalization of informal workers would reduce income inequality in both 
countries and would increase total revenue from social insurance contributions by around 71 per-
cent. However, the largest burden of the increase in revenue would be borne by workers. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, our 
analysis represents the first attempt to give a comprehensive estimate of the financial disincentives 
to formal employment based on microdata from Latin American countries thanks to the recent 
development of detailed tax-benefit microsimulation models. Previous studies have mainly focused 
on European countries, and used models based on hypothetical households rather than microdata. 
Second, we consider the fact that informal workers would not necessarily face the same earnings 
on entry to the formal sector, and this has implications for the measurement of formalization tax 
rates.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the definition of informality and reviews 
the literature on its causes, and in particular the role of tax and benefit systems. Section 1.3 
presents the methodology of the Ecuadorian and Colombian microsimulation models and the sim-
ulation exercise. Section 1.4 presents a brief quantitative overview of informality in Colombia and 
Ecuador and focuses on the estimations of the cost of formalization for informal workers. The last 
section concludes with some recommendations. 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Labour informality: definition and causes 
Informality is a complex concept that has been defined in multiple ways. Originally, the term 
referred to small-scale economic activities hidden from government supervision; often denoted as 
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the "underground", "unrecorded", "non-protected" or "grey" sector of the economy.2 The concept of 
informality first appeared in an International Labour Organization (1972) publication describing 
the employment situation in Kenya (Guerguil, 1988).  
The complexity of defining informality is reflected in the existence of different approaches to its 
measurement. Empirical studies have mainly considered two alternatives: the productivity view 
and the legalistic view. The productivity view defines informality according to the size of the estab-
lishment where the individual works (hereinafter ES). Following the ILO and the Delhi Group on 
Informal Sector Statistics, small firms (of five or fewer workers) are considered to be of low produc-
tivity and therefore part of the informal sector. The legalistic view characterises formal jobs as 
those that comply with all legal rules in the labour law of each country (e.g. affiliation to social 
security, minimum wage, employment protection legislation). Considering the difficulties of identi-
fying compliance with all the rules, this view is operationalised using each worker’s reported affili-
ation to the contributory social security system (hereinafter SS). One less frequent and simplistic 
view considers as informal solely self-employed workers (hereinafter SE). As Henley et al., (2008) 
pointed out, the definition employed matters a lot as they are not observationally equivalent. 
In addition to the lack of consensus in its definition, the causes of informality are also a matter of 
dispute. In its origins, it has been considered as the result of low productivity and high labour 
market regulations. This mix excludes certain workers from the formal sector therefore creating a 
segmented labour market. In that sense, early economic analyses of informality have been based on 
the insights of the two-sector model of Harris and Todaro (1970) popularised for the informality 
literature by de Soto’s (1989) work, which argued that regulations hamper informal firms from 
formalizing. More recent literature moves beyond this exclusion view by pointing out that workers 
and firms choose optimally to be in one or another sector, by analysing expected returns and costs, 
considering taxes and social contributions to be made, low government's enforcement capacity, and 
availability of non-contributory social security and conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. 
Informality is, therefore, the result of a comparative advantage for a segment of activities or 
 
2 Such activities were mainly focused on creating employment rather than profits. 
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workers. The pioneer work in this regard is that of Portes et al., (1989), which highlights, among 
others, that informality is not “solely a province of the poor”.  
1.2.2 Labour market informality in Ecuador and Colombia 
In reference to Ecuador and Colombia, the literature has studied informality not only from the 
perspective of workers but also from firms. This section briefly summarises some relevant studies 
analysing the determinants of informality in these countries, highlighting the different definitions 
of informality used. 
The first analysis of informality for Ecuador dates back to Klein and Tokman (1993). They em-
ployed an OECD survey of micro and small enterprises in Ecuador and Jamaica to explore the 
determinants of compliance with regulations. They found that activity sector was not an important 
determinant, but firm size and location were important predictors of formality, measured as firm 
registration. Another study involving a survey of firms in Ecuador is that of Medveded and Oviedo 
(2015) which explores the relation between informality (measured as firm compliance with a set of 
regulations) and profits. Using data on compliance they found a strong positive relation indicating 
that formalization allows for firm growth and higher profits.  
Regarding studies from the workers’ perspective, Vega (2017) constructs transition matrices be-
tween formal and informal (ES and SS) sectors, and out of the labour force for Ecuador to assess 
the level of mobility across sectors. She makes use of multinomial logit models to analyse determi-
nants of transitions between these states and finds a high level of mobility, with income differences 
being one possible source of movement from the informal to the formal sector. Additionally, it is 
found that movements towards formality increase with education but decrease with age. Moreover, 
Canelas (2014) analyses the effect of minimum wage increases on informal and formal employment 
(ES, SS, and SE) for Ecuador, employing a panel of provinces and finding no effects on formal 
employment or wages in the formal sector, possibly because of the high level of non-compliance 
with minimum wage legislation in the country.  
For Colombia, informality has also been considered from the perspective of workers and firms. 
Kugler (2004) uses microdata from household surveys to analyse the effect of a reduction in firing 
costs on formal (ES and SS) worker transitions in and out of employment. The study shows that 
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relative to informal workers (not covered by the reform) formal turnover increased, especially for 
younger educated workers. Updating her previous work but using a panel of formal firms for the 
period 1982-1996, Kugler and Kugler (2009) find that a 10 percent increase in payroll taxes de-
creased wages by up to 2.3 percent (pass-through effect) and employment up to 5 percent.  
On the other hand, Mondragón-Vélez et al., (2010) find that a 10 percent increase in the ratio of 
minimum wage to each city’s median wage increases the probability of a worker being informal by 
1.1 pp. Moreover, a 10 percent increase in non-wage costs relative to each workers income increases 
the probability of being informal (ES) by 8 pp. These results are statistically significant but dra-
matically change with the alternative definition of informality as contributory health. Lastly, Gar-
cía (2011) estimates determinants of the labour informality rate at the city level. Using data for 10 
Colombian cities across 16 years, he finds that higher education and industry participation in value-
added reduces informality (ES). Furthermore, enforcement, measured via government expenditure 
on compliance, reduces the informal (SS) sector, but government size increases it. 
1.2.3 The effects of taxes and benefits on informality 
Previous research on labour informality has mainly focused on the effect of specific cash transfer 
programmes, instead of assessing the effect of the tax-benefit system as a whole. From a theoretical 
point of view, assuming workers are free to move between sectors, if CCT are too low to live on 
and are not compatible with a formal job or, alternatively, if benefits from a formal job are not 
high enough, a worker could decide to work in the informal sector.  
Empirical findings of the effects of CCT on informality are recent and have been inconclusive. For 
instance, Garganta and Gasparini (2015), using a rotating panel find that Asignación universal por 
hijo, a CCT programme in Argentina, creates disincentives for labour formality (SS). Ribas and 
Soares (2011) create a panel of neighbourhoods from the Brazilian Household Survey and find that 
an increase of 1 percent in coverage of Bolsa Familia (a CCT in Brazil) leads to a switch to the 
informal sector (SS and SE) of 0.13 percent. De Brauw et al., (2013) use a panel of households and 
find that the Brazilian programme contributed to a significant movement of workers from the 
formal sector to the informal sector (SS). On the other hand, Azuara and Marinescu (2013) employ 
a panel of municipalities and find that Oportunidades (a CCT in Mexico) did not increase labour 
informality (SE and SS). Neves and Leite (2014) use a discontinuity in Bolsa Familia’s eligibility 
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rules regarding children’s ages to estimate the effect of the programme on informality and find that 
it did not affect the occupational choice between formal and informal (SS) of Brazilian households. 
In the case of Colombia most evidence points to a negative effect of social programmes on infor-
mality. For instance, Núñez (2002) uses a household survey to calculate the effect of each worker’s 
marginal income tax rate (constructed using reported income) on the probability of being informal 
(ES), defined according to firm size, and finds a positive and significant effect. Camacho et al., 
(2014) analyse the effects of a programme that determines eligibility for subsidised health care on 
labour informality (SS). Carrying out an analysis at the municipal level, they find that informal 
employment would be 4 pp higher after the introduction of the programme.  
Using data on Familias en Accion, a CCT programme aimed to increase human capital accumula-
tion in Colombia, Ospina and Saavedra (2013) find that being beneficiary increases informality 
(SS, SE, ES). Finally, Farné et al., (2016) employ a longitudinal household survey to estimate the 
effects of several CCT programmes and non-contributory health care on labour participation and 
informality ES. They use difference-in-difference estimators after propensity score matching and 
find no important effects on participation but important effects of programmes such as subsidised 
health care and Familias en Accion on labour informality. 
For Ecuador, evidence of the effect of tax-benefit systems on informality is scarcer. Wong (2015) 
analyses the labour market effects of a formalization programme for domestic workers in 2010. She 
estimates the average treatment effect on-the-treated after propensity score matching for wages 
and hours worked using data from the National Survey on Employment, Unemployment, and Un-
deremployment (ENEMDU in Spanish). While the programme increased social security coverage 
from 10 percent in 2006 to 33 percent in 2012, it also reduced both wages and hours worked. 
Important efforts to quantify the financial disincentives embedded in the tax-benefit system and 
faced by informal workers are the studies by Koettl and Weber (2012), Koettl (2013) and Weber 
(2015); these are in line with the approach taken in this paper.  
These authors use an OECD tax-benefit model to quantify the tax wedge for transitions to formal-
ity, based on hypothetical households. Contrasting experiences of two transition economies (Bul-
garia and Romania) with two high-income economies (Australia and the USA), they find that, for 
transition economies formalization tax rates (defined as the proportion of earnings in the informal 
sector that would be taxed away after entry to formality) are as high as 70 percent for lower wages 
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(10 percent for the average) whereas the highest formalization tax rate for higher-income economies 
is 40 percent which applies to incomes that are about 45 percent of the average. 
Improving on the last two studies, our paper uses representative household microdata together with 
microsimulation models to analyse the distribution of financial disincentives to formality at the 
population level in Ecuador and Colombia. Moreover, we propose a definition of formalization tax 
rates which accounts for potential changes on earnings upon entry to formal employment, as de-
scribed in the following sections. 
1.3 Methodology   
Our approach to assess the effect of the tax and benefit system on incentives to enter formality 
makes use of detailed tax and benefit microsimulation models combining country-specific policy 
rules with nationally representative household microdata to estimate, for each informal worker in 
the data, the proportion of income that will be lost as a result of higher taxes, higher social insur-
ance contributions and lower benefits after an eventual transition to formal employment.  
Our analysis takes into account that these transitions might involve a change in earnings and we 
therefore impute counterfactual earnings for each worker in the event of a transition to formality. 
Notice that benefits in both countries (mainly conditional cash transfers) are proxy-means tested. 
This implies that we are not able to simulate how each worker’s household is affected in the medium 
run if the formalization exercise translates into changes in the score used in each country to assign 
benefits. This means that our estimates of the tax-benefit burden of formalization have to be con-
sidered as a lower bound of the actual ones given that formalization could potentially reduce ben-
efits received. 
We start this section with a brief discussion of the definition of informality used in this paper. 
Then, we present the data and tax-benefit microsimulation models used in the analysis. We describe 
our approach to simulate transitions into formal employment and finally we present our indicators 
to measure financial incentives to formal employment. 
1.3.1 Definition of informality  
Our paper follows the legalistic view proposed in the literature and defines informality in terms of 
non-affiliation to the contributory social security system. This definition is particularly suited to 
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our analysis because it is directly linked with the effect the tax-benefit system would have in the 
event of a transition to the formal sector. More precisely, we make use of the detailed information 
available in the household survey data for each worker about affiliation to social security and define 
as informal workers those reporting non-affiliation. 
In Ecuador, effective affiliation requires formal registration at the Ecuadorean Institute of Social 
Security. Therefore, we consider formal workers those individuals who report being affiliated to 
social security in the data. Affiliation offers entitlement to, among others, health and pension 
insurance, severance pay, and disability and occupational risk insurance. In Colombia, effective 
affiliation is achieved first by registering with a Health Promoting Entity (EPS in Spanish) and a 
pension fund, and second by a monthly payment of social insurance contributions (SICs). We 
consider formal workers those who declare making pension contributions to a pension fund in the 
survey; therefore, non-contributing registered workers are considered informal. Affiliation offers 
entitlement to, among others, health insurance, sickness, maternity, and paternity leave payments 
and an old-age pension under some conditions.3  
It is important to note that, for the purpose of our simulations, when a worker is defined as infor-
mal, we assume that the person does not pay SICs or personal income tax. After formalization, we 
assume both payments are made and calculate SICs and income tax liabilities for each worker 
entering formal employment with our microsimulation models, as discussed in the following sec-
tions.  
1.3.2 Data and simulations 
Data. Our analysis is based on representative household survey data from Ecuador and Colombia. 
Data from Ecuador come from the National Survey of Income and Expenditures of Urban and 
Rural Households (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares Urbanos y Rurales, 
ENIGHUR) 2011-2012. Data from Colombia come from the Quality of Life National Survey for 
2014 (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida, ENCV). The surveys contain detailed information 
on employment, earnings, income from different sources and expenditures, as well as household and 
personal characteristics needed for tax-benefit simulations. Most importantly, both surveys contain 
 
3 In Colombia those not contributing to social security are covered by a subsidised health insurance with the same benefits 
as the contributory scheme.  
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detailed information about affiliation to contributory social security, which we use to define infor-
mal workers in our analysis. Income concepts have been harmonized in both datasets with the 
purpose of cross-country analysis (see Jara et al., 2019; Rodriguez, 2019). The sample for our 
simulations contains 153,341 individuals for Ecuador and 67,332 individuals for Colombia.  
Tax-benefit simulations. Our study makes use of the recently developed tax-benefit microsim-
ulation models: ECUAMOD for Ecuador, and COLMOD for Colombia. Both models combine de-
tailed country-specific coded policy rules with microdata in order to simulate direct taxes, social 
insurance contributions and cash transfers for the household population of Ecuador and Colombia. 
The models have been implemented under a common modelling language using the EUROMOD 
platform, to ensure comparability of tax-benefit policy simulations.4 Both models are static in the 
sense that tax-benefit simulations abstract from behavioural reactions of individuals and no adjust-
ments are made for changes in the population composition over time. Simulated income components 
obtained with ECUAMOD and COLMOD have been validated against external statistics (Jara et 
al., 2019, Rodriguez et al., 2018). 
Our analysis takes 2014 policies (as on June 30th) in Ecuador and Colombia as the starting point. 
In the case of Ecuador, market incomes and non-simulated tax-benefit variables in the data are 
adjusted to 2014 levels using source-specific updating factors (Jara et al., 2019). In what follows, 
we present a brief discussion of the main income components simulated in our models. For detailed 
information see Jara et al., (2019) and Rodriguez et al., (2018). 
In both countries, employee and self-employed SICs are simulated for formal workers, that is, 
individuals who report affiliation (contribution in Colombia) to social security in the survey. Some 
differences in the design of SICs between Ecuador and Colombia can be highlighted. First, all self-
employed workers are liable to pay SICs in Colombia, whereas payment is voluntary for this group 
in Ecuador. Second, the contribution base for the self-employed corresponds to all self-employment 
income in Ecuador, whereas only 40 percent of it is considered in Colombia. In Ecuador, employee 
contribution rates vary between 9.45 percent and 11.45 percent depending on the sector of work, 
whereas the self-employed contribute at a rate of 20.5 percent. In Colombia, contribution rates for 
 
4 EUROMOD is the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union. For more information see Sutherland 
and Figari (2013). 
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employees are between 8 percent and 10 percent, and 28.5 percent for the self-employed. Finally, 
a minimum contribution equal to the rates applied to the minimum wage applies for the self-
employed in Ecuador and to all workers in Colombia. In Ecuador, a minimum contribution of 9.45 
percent or 11.45 percent of the minimum wage applies to full-time employees; part-time employees 
pay a minimum contribution based on a proportion of the minimum wage according to the number 
of days they work. 
Baseline simulation results from ECUAMOD and COLMOD, as well as previous studies based on 
these models have simulated personal income tax under the assumption of full compliance (Jara et 
al., 2019, Rodriguez 2019, Bargain et al., 2017, Jara and Varela 2017). Our study departs from this 
assumption and simulates personal income tax only for those individuals reporting affiliation to 
social security in the survey. This assumption is made with the aim of assessing the effects of 
personal income tax when an individual enters the formal sector. However, it is important to note 
that this might overestimate the financial cost of formalization as individuals not affiliated to social 
security might already be paying taxes, particularly so in Ecuador, where the self-employed can 
opt for affiliation on a voluntary basis but are required to file income tax.5 In terms of design, in 
both countries, personal income tax is characterised by the presence of deductions from personal 
expenditures. In Ecuador the tax schedule is formed of nine bands with rates from 0 to 35 percent, 
whereas in Colombia two alternative tax regimes co-existed in 2014 in addition to the standard tax 
regime, with different bands applying to each regime and marginal rates between 0 and 33 percent.  
In terms of benefits, our models simulate the main cash transfers available in the two countries: 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano and Bono Joaquin Gallegos Lara in Ecuador and Familias en acción 
and Colombia Mayor in Colombia. These programmes are proxy means-tested CCT that do not 
depend on formality status, with the minor exception of the elderly and disabled in Ecuador.  Fi-
nally, tax-benefit instruments, which cannot be simulated in our models due to data limitations, 
are taken directly from the data. This is the case of contributory public pensions, which cannot be 
 
5 In practice, however, we would expect only a marginal effect of personal income tax on financial incentives to formality. 
This is the case because of two main factors associated with the design of personal income tax in Latin American 
countries. First, the non-taxable threshold is rather high in most Latin American countries. It represents 2.54 times and 
4.17 times the annualised minimum wage in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. Second, deductions from personal 
expenditures can be made from taxable income. Therefore, most informal workers, who are usually low-earners, would 
not be liable to pay income tax after formalization, as shown in our results. 
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simulated given the lack of information on contribution records in the surveys. Non-simulated 
instruments also include disability benefits, severance payments, and property and motor vehicle 
taxes, among others. Besides contributory pensions, all other non-simulated instruments represent 
a minor part of tax-benefit systems in Ecuador and Colombia. 
1.3.3 Simulating transitions from informal to formal work  
Our strategy to quantify the financial cost of formalization consists of moving informal workers in 
the data into the formal sector and comparing their household disposable income before and after 
the transition. The effects of a transition to formal employment are simulated for all those currently 
in work and reporting non-affiliation to social security in the data (that is, informal workers), aged 
18-60, to exclude those in mandatory education or retirement. Table A1 in the Appendix presents 
the characteristics of the samples in each country. 
Importantly, transitioning to formal employment might not only entail starting to contribute to 
social security and being subject to personal income tax, at the same level of earnings. It is quite 
likely that the earnings a worker would receive when moving from informal to formal employment 
would change. From the exclusion point of view, the segmentation of the labour market implies 
that workers in the formal sector face higher wages. This is a result of labour demand rationing 
due to the burden of legislation, especially minimum wage and non-wage costs for formal activities. 
On the other hand, from the exit perspective, a worker is formal/informal because there is a com-
parative advantage to being in that specific sector. Therefore, allocating the person in the alterna-
tive sector would possibly represent a disadvantage given the worker’s characteristics.  
More formally, our approach to simulating transitions from informal to formal employment pro-
ceeds as follows. First, household disposable income is calculated for all informal workers in the 
data before any transition takes place. Then, for each informal worker in the household, we impose 
affiliation to social security and estimate counterfactual earnings under their new status of formal 
workers. Lastly, with our tax-benefit models, we simulate the amount of SICs and personal income 
tax they would be liable to pay, as well as their corresponding household disposable income under 
formalization. In case there is more than one informal worker in the household, we simulate tran-
sitions to formal employment for each of them separately assuming that the status of any other 
informal workers remains unchanged.  
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Accounting for earnings differentials. We use a simple strategy to account for potential 
changes in earnings from moving to formality. The strategy consists of estimating log hourly earn-
ings for formal workers to predict earnings for informal workers based on their characteristics and 
the estimated coefficients in the regression. More formally, consider a Mincer equation for formal 
workers: 
log(w ) = α + X β + Z δ + ε   (1) 
where log(w ) represents the log of hourly earnings of workers in the formal sector (sector f), X  a 
vector of worker attributes and Z  is a vector of job attributes, and ε  is an idiosyncratic error term. 
The estimated parameters of this regression (α , β , δ ) are used together with the vector of attrib-
utes of informal workers to predict the earnings they would face in the formal sector. 
We use a large set of regressors, including observable demographic and job attributes for each 
worker, which we assume sufficient to determine unbiased hourly earnings estimates in the formal 
sector. Personal attributes include dummies for age groups, education, gender, rural area, region, 
and ethnicity. Job attributes include work history (in years) and dummies for industry and occu-
pation. Ideally, one would estimate this equation separately for employees and self-employed. How-
ever, there are only a few formal self-employed observations in our sample making counterfactual 
earnings for this group unreliable. Therefore, we pool employees and self-employed but include 
dummies for this category. If one is willing to assume some sorting of workers into each sector, this 
simple counterfactual exercise provides an upper bound of the income of informal workers in the 
formal sector, that is, without the penalty of being in a disadvantaged sector. 
An alternatively to the strategy described above would be to estimate a selection correction model 
à la Heckman, which has been applied to the formal/informal sector setting in very few papers 
(Marcouiller et al., 1997; Carneiro and Henley, 2002; Pratap and Quintin, 2006). Under this ap-
proach, a sector selection model is estimated in a first-stage regression, and then a correction term 
is included in the log hourly earnings equation in the second-stage to account for potential selection. 
We applied this second approach to our data but favoured the simpler model for two main reasons. 
First, previous literature has found contrasting evidence on the sign of the estimated parameter for 
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the correction term in the second stage equation.6 Our own estimates are in line with the contrasting 
evidence. The sign depends on the sample used with large difference between employees and self-
employed in both countries. When combining the two groups the coefficient becomes statistically 
insignificant. This implies that instead of a comparative advantage there could be a penalty of 
being in the formal sector for some workers, which is inconsistent with the underlying assumption 
of free movement between sectors in the model. Second, we found that counterfactual earnings are 
extremely sensitive to the set of exclusion variables employed and, admittedly, is difficult to come 
up with variables that exclusively affect the probability of being in the formal sector but do not 
affect earnings.  
Minimum wage enforcement. An important aspect of formalization relates to the enforcement 
of minimum wage legislation. By law, formal workers are required to be paid no less than the 
minimum wage in each country. In 2014, the national minimum wage was set at USD 340 per 
month in Ecuador and COP$616.027 in Colombia.7 Our analysis considers the enforcement of the 
minimum wage to provide an idea of its effect on financial incentives to formalization. More pre-
cisely, we first predict earnings for informal workers as described in the previous section. Then, in 
case a worker’s predicted hourly earnings fall below the threshold in each country, we apply the 
hourly minimum wage.8 
1.3.4 Measuring financial incentives to formal work 
There is only limited research analysing the financial incentives to formalization embedded in tax-
benefit systems (Koettl 2013; Koettl and Weber 2012; Weber 2015). Previous studies have mainly 
used hypothetical data to measure the burden of formalization created by the tax-benefit system 
and for this reason they have assumed no change in earnings when moving from one sector to the 
other.  
 
6Yet the implications are rarely discussed. The only exception is that of Pratap and Quintin (2006). 
7 $USD 326. (exchange rate of 20/June/2014) 
8 In both countries the monthly minimum wage is related to full time (48 hours per week in Colombia and 40 hours in 
Ecuador). Less than full time hours of work are paid proportionally to the minimum wage.  Although the majority of 
workers in our sample work full time, we account for different time regimes by using hourly minimum wages to not 
overestimate counterfactual earnings. 
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Koettl and Weber (2012) introduce the concept of Formalization Tax Rates (FTR) defined as the 
proportion of earnings in the informal sector that would be taxed away after entry to formality. 
More formally, FTR of individual i is defined as: 
FTR = , , , (2) 
where w  represents worker i’s earnings in the informal sector and y ,  represents household dispos-
able income for worker i. The superscripts 0 and 1 represent time, that is, before and after simulated 
formalization takes place, respectively. Koettl and Weber (2012) assume that the employer has a 
very strong bargaining position or alternatively that the labour supply curve is infinitely inelastic. 
This implies that any worker must generate the same total labour cost to the employer in the 
formal or informal sectors and consequently, the entire formalization cost is assumed by the for-
malizing worker.  
However, as stated by the authors, the fixed earnings assumption is not supported by the evidence, 
with most studies indicating the existence of an earnings gap between the two sectors (see for 
instance Figure 1.3). This assumption could have limited a wider use of the FTR indicator in the 
informality literature. In that sense, our measure of formalization costs departs from that of Koettl 
and Weber (2012) and draws from the literature on work incentives to account for potential changes 
in earnings following a transition between the informal and formal sector. In particular, we redefine 
FTRs as the proportion of the change in earnings that would be taxed away in the form of increased 
taxes and social insurance contributions or reduced cash transfers when a worker enters formality. 







y , − y ,
w − w
 if w > w
 
− 1 −
y , − y ,
w − w
 if w < w
 (3) 
where w  represents labour earnings of worker i and y ,  represents disposable income of household 
h, to which worker i belongs. The superscripts 0 and 1 represent the worker states: 1 represents 
the situation in which worker i is in the informal sector, and 0 the situation where she is in the 
formal sector. As previously mentioned, in the case that there are multiple informal workers in the 
22 
household, transitions to formal employment are simulated for each of them separately, assuming 
the situation of other informal workers in the household remains unchanged.  
In general, we would expect FTR values to range between 0 and 100 percent with higher FTRs 
representing higher financial disincentives generated by the tax and benefit system to enter formal 
work. For example, assuming that following a transition to formal employment earnings would 
increase, an FTR equal to 80 percent would indicates that 80 percent of the change in earnings 
would be taxed away because of increased SICs and tax payments or reduced cash transfers. In the 
case of a negative change in earnings (that is, a decrease in earnings following entry into formality), 
a sign correction is applied to preserve the correct direction of incentives. 
As highlighted by Jara and Tumino (2013) for the case of marginal effective tax rates, some features 
of the tax-benefit system could lead to values of FTRs outside the range of 0-100 percent. An FTR 
above 100 percent could be observed if, facing earnings increases upon formalization, changes in 
household disposable income are negative, for instance due to the loss of an important benefit 
entitlement or to a burdensome tax. On the other hand, a negative FTRs implies that the tax-
benefit system provides financial incentives to enter formal employment for example by means of 
additional benefits after formalization. In our analysis, in order to prevent mean FTRs being af-
fected by such “outliers” we focus our analysis on workers earning more than US$ 1 in Ecuador 
and COP$10.000 in Colombia per month and exclude from our calculations FTRs above the 99th 
and below the 1st percentiles of the distribution.9 
The contribution of different tax-benefit instruments to FTR can be analysed by decomposing the 
indicator. In particular, household disposable income can be expressed as the sum of market income 
(o , ) plus benefits and pensions (b ), minus taxes (t ) and SIC (s  ): 
FTR = ± 1 −
o , + b , − t , − s , − o , + b , − t , − s ,
w − w
  
Following a transition to the formal sector, the only change assumed in household market income 
(o , ) is that of labour income, therefore necessarily ∆o , = ∆w , allowing us to decompose the FTR 
into each of its components. In the case of an increase in earnings after formalization we have:10 
 
9USD$ 5.3 (exchange rate of 20 June 2014) 



















= FTR + FTR + FTR    if    w > w  (4) 
Notice that our definition of FTR is conceptually different from Koettl and Weber (2012). Our 
measure of formalization costs assumes there are earnings changes and computes a marginal tax 
rate over this change. Koettl and Weber (2012) assume earnings are fixed and compute an average 
tax rate. The two indicators are not comparable and therefore we focus on the proposed definition 
and present results for Koettl and Weber’s (2012) definition in appendix A1 and briefly discuss the 
findings in the next section. 
1.4 Empirical results  
This section starts by discussing the relative size of tax-benefit instruments in Ecuador and Co-
lombia and providing a basic portrait of labour formality in the two countries. We then present 
results of predicted earnings for informal workers in the formal sector. Finally, we provide a detailed 
analysis of formalization tax rates in both countries and discuss the implications of formalization 
in terms of distributional and budgetary effects. 
1.4.1 Tax-benefit instruments in Ecuador and Colombia 
Figure 1.1 shows the main results of the microsimulations models for the two countries. For each 
income quintile it presents the contribution of each policy instrument to disposable income. Several 
features of the systems are worth noting. Benefits are progressive in both countries and represent 
a larger share of disposable income in Ecuador than in Colombia. They represent around 18 percent 
of disposable income in the bottom quintile in Ecuador, whereas they account for 14 percent of the 
same group in Colombia. Pensions play a larger role in Colombia, however, their relative size 
increases along the income distribution, representing a larger share of disposable income for richer 
households.  
Personal income tax plays, on the other hand, only a minor role due to the presence of high non-
taxable thresholds and deductions from personal expenditures in the two countries; it represents 
less than 3 percent of disposable income regardless of the quintile. However, property and car taxes 
are burdensome, especially for the first quintile in Colombia. Finally, SICs are more progressive in 
Ecuador than in Colombia. For the first quintile the share is almost 4 percent in Colombia but less 
than 1 percent in Ecuador. This might be related to the fact that Colombian self-employed workers 
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below the minimum wage are required to contribute on the basis of the minimum wage if they are 
affiliated to social security, but contribution is voluntary in Ecuador. It could also be associated 
with the presence of Seguro Campesino in Ecuador, a rural worker social insurance regime for self-
employed rural workers with lower contribution rates than the general regime. 11 
Figure 1.1. Mean share of tax-benefit instruments in household disposable income 
(2014) by quintiles of household disposable income 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the microsimulation models. 
Results from our tax-benefit simulations also highlight the reduced effect of government interven-
tion on income inequality. In line with previous research we found that the redistributive effect of 
the tax-benefit system in Colombia is very small (the Gini coefficient from market income equals 
0.587 compared to 0.561 based on disposable income), whereas the Ecuadorian tax-benefit system 
has a greater impact in reducing inequality (with a reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.501 to 
0.464 when market income is compared to disposable income).12 Alternatively, the P80/P20 ratio 
of disposable income is remarkably higher for Colombia than for Ecuador, amounting to 21.4 
 
11 The amount of SICs paid by members of the rural worker social security regime is equal to 2.5 per cent of 22.5 per 
cent of the minimum wage. 
12 As a point of comparison, for the 28 European countries in EUROMOD, government intervention reduced the Gini 
coefficient 21 percentage points from 0.505 (market income) to 0.296 (disposable income). 
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compared to 10.5, respectively. When applying this measure to market income, results are 26.4 and 
14, respectively.13  
To further analyse the effect of the tax-benefit system on informality, Figure 1.2 presents income 
tax and social contributions as a function of gross earnings for hypothetical workers. We assume 
for simplicity that other sources of income and income tax deductions are zero. From the figure it 
is important to highlight the fixed payment in social insurance contributions required in case formal 
earnings are between zero and the monthly minimum wage in both countries. Considering that 
most informal workers are on this earnings interval, the fixed payment will play an important 
negative role in our measure of incentives to formalize. On the other hand, income tax is not as 
high (relative to earnings) as social contributions and it affects only those workers earning at least 
three monthly minimum wages, therefore, its role will be minor in terms of formalization incentives.     
Figure 1.2 Formal worker’s tax, social contributions, and gross earnings (2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the microsimulation models. Note: SIC: Social Insurance Contributions, IT: 
Income Tax. All other sources of income different than earnings and deductibles were set to zero. The monthly minimum 
wage is shown by the vertical dotted line. 
1.4.2 A portrait of informal employment in Ecuador and Colombia  
Our two countries are characterised by very high levels of informality. The unconditional labour 
informality rate at the population level reaches 58 percent in Ecuador and around 65 percent in 
Colombia. Moreover, there are also marked differences in the structure of the informal economy 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). In Colombia, the majority of informal workers are self-employed 
(67 percent), whereas the composition is more balanced in Ecuador with around 47 percent of self-
 
13 Lustig (2017) assesses the effect of taxes and benefits in Latin America finding similar results for the reduced role of 
government for several countries including Ecuador and Colombia. 
26 
employed workers in the informal sector. In both countries, the largest share of informal workers 
comprises low-skilled workers with low earnings (bottom two quintiles). 
Figure 1.3 presents the distribution of labour income by formality status. The vertical dotted line 
represents the national minimum wage. In most cases there is a natural partition of informal (solid 
distribution) and formal earnings (dashed distribution) below and above the minimum wage re-
spectively, which is consistent with the exclusion perspective.14 There is only one exception to this 
pattern. For self-employment income in Ecuador, both distributions (formal vs informal) are very 
similar and symmetric around the minimum wage, which is consistent with the exit perspective 
and possibly as a result of SICs not being mandatory for the self-employed in Ecuador.  
Figure 1.3 Earnings distribution of formal and informal workers (2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys. Note: the minimum wage is shown by the vertical dot-
ted line. 
Table 1.1 presents probit estimates of the main determinants of labour formality. We include as 
dependent variables those previously used in the literature such as age, gender, dummies for edu-
cation, rural area, industry and occupation, and variables related to the household, namely a 
dummy for living with a couple and the number of children. Our results for most variables are in 
line with the previous literature. For instance, Carneiro and Henley (2002) for Brazil; Uribe et al., 
(2007) for Colombia; Delgado y Navarro (2013) for Costa Rica or Cuevas et al., (2016) for Mexico. 
 
14 It is important to highlight that the unconditional labour income (regardless of formality status) of almost half of 
workers in both countries is below the minimum wage. 
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The models confirm the concave effect of age and the remarkable increase in the likelihood of being 
a formal sector worker with additional schooling. In Colombia rural workers are less prone to 
working in the formal sector, whereas in Ecuador the opposite is observed due to the presence of 
the abovementioned Seguro Campesino. Finally, living as a couple increases the chance of being in 
the informal sector, and the probability of being in the formal sector decreases with the number of 
children in the household. 
Table 1.1 Determinants of Labour Formality: AME of probit estimates 










Secondary education 0.150*** 0.150*** 
 (33.08) (25.73) 
Tertiary education 0.381*** 0.344*** 










Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.267 
# Observations 56,340 27,786 
# Informal Workers 32,776 20,100 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys Notes: delta-method t statistics in parentheses, significance 
level:  *** p<0.01 
1.4.3 Earnings differentials between sectors 
This section briefly discusses the results of our predictions of earnings for informal workers in the 
event of entering formality, based on the estimation of Equation 1. Figure 1.4 summarizes the 
results, presenting the percentage change in earnings by earnings deciles of informal workers before 
the transition. The table distinguishes between employees and the self-employed due to the marked 
differences in the change in earnings obtained from the predictions. Results from the earnings 
estimation are presented in Table A1.2 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1.4 Percentage change in labour income by decile of baseline earnings of each 
type of informal work 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys.  
As depicted in Figure 1.4, changes in earnings resulting from the econometric estimates are positive 
for most informal workers except for those in the last decile of baseline earnings.15 Gains are on 
average larger for workers in Colombia (210 percent) than in Ecuador (132 percent), for the self-
employed (230 percent) compared to employees (80 percent), and for rural workers (203 percent) 
compared to urban workers (142 percent). Most predicted formal earnings for informal workers are 
already above the minimum wage; therefore, the lines with and without the minimum wage are 
frequently on top of each other in Figure 1.4, with the average gains increasing only slightly when 
minimum wage enforcement is imposed. These increases do not imply that earnings gaps between 
women and men or between rural and urban workers disappear. As a matter of fact, these formal 
earnings gaps remain for previously informal workers. 
Figure 1.5 presents the percentage change in labour income after formalization for different groups 
of informal workers. Earnings gains are higher for women than men in the informal employment, 
with the minor exception of employees with tertiary education in Ecuador. In this country, the 
higher the education level achieved the larger the formalization gains; in Colombia the opposite 
 
15 Around 25 percent of the sample in Ecuador and 17 percent in Colombia would experience a decrease in earnings 
according to our predictions. 
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holds. Moreover, when we consider the enforcement of the national minimum wage there is a small 
additional increase in earnings gains for workers with primary or no education, especially for Ec-
uador. Nevertheless, even from this perspective we observe that counterfactual earnings are mostly 
above the minimum wage for most groups of informal workers. Therefore, for simplicity, throughout 
the rest of the paper we use the counterfactual incomes, which include the adjustment for minimum 
wage enforcement.  
Figure 1.5 Percentage change in labour income by groups of gender, education and 
worker type 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys. Note: mw, minimum wage. 
1.4.4 Financial disincentives to formal employment 
This section focuses on the analysis of our FTR indicator (equation 3) measuring the proportion of 
the change in earnings that would be taxed away in the form of increased SICs and taxes or reduced 
benefits following a transition from the informal to the formal sector. We start with an analysis of 
the distribution of FTRs in Ecuador and Colombia, distinguishing between employees and self-
employed informal workers who show contrasting patterns in both countries. We then discuss the 
contribution of different tax-benefit components to FTRs. Finally, we compare how formalization 
costs vary across different population subgroups.  
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Figure 1.6 FTR by quintile of baseline earnings in informality 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
Distribution of FTRs. Figure 1.6 presents mean and median FTRs, as well as percentiles 25 and 
75 of FTR per quintiles of earnings in informality. Our results point to the presence of high FTRs 
in the two countries, but particularly so in Colombia. Mean FTRs equal 60 percent in Ecuador and 
92 percent in Colombia, meaning that in Colombia (Ecuador) 92 (60) percent of the change in 
earnings gained from formalization would be taxed away as a result of increased SICs and tax 
payments or reduced benefits. In both countries, a U-shaped relationship between FTRs and earn-
ings is observed. Mean FTRs are particularly high for workers in the bottom quintile of the earnings 
distribution, with mean FTRs of 69 percent in Ecuador and 120 percent in Colombia for this group. 
In Ecuador, workers in the top earning quintile face the highest FTRs of around 73 percent, whereas 
for Colombia mean FTRs for this group are slightly below 100 percent. The information of median 
FTR and percentiles 25 and 75 of FTR depict that FTRs are skewed to the right, with means 
systematically above the 75 percentile.  
Figure 1.7 presents similar results, but now distinguishing between informal employees and informal 
self-employed workers. The results show very different patterns across these population groups. In 
Ecuador, FTRs increase with earnings of informal employees, whereas the pattern is less clear for 
the self-employed with a U-shaped pattern up to the fourth quintile of the distribution but a fall 
in FTRs for the top quintile. In Colombia, for both employees and self-employed informal workers 
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we observe a somewhat U-shaped pattern between mean FTRs and informal earnings. However, 
the pattern of mean FTRs seems to be driven by observations with high values of FTRs. In fact, 
median FTRs increase with earnings in the case of informal employees and are relatively constant 
for the self-employed. Looking at Figures 1.6 and 1.7, it becomes evident that the pattern of mean 
FTRs for the whole informal population is mainly driven by the pattern of mean FTRs of the self-
employed. 
Figure 1.7 FTR by category of employment by quintile of informal earnings of each 
category 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
Formalization costs are mostly driven by the design of SICs in each country.16 In Colombia, a 
minimum contribution based on the national minimum wage applies to both employees and the 
self-employed, even if their labour income is below the minimum wage. The same applies to full-
time employees and the self-employed in Ecuador, whereas part-time employees contribute on the 
basis of the proportion of the minimum wage based on their working days.17 These features of the 
SICs system pose an extremely high burden on formalization, particularly for low earners who 
 
16 As depicted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, income taxes are not particularly binding and there are no activation clauses that 
prevent formalizing workers receiving means tested benefits; therefore, the effect is driven almost completely by SICa. 
17 For self-employed workers, these minimum contributions are equal to 20.5 and 28.5 percent of the minimum wage for 
Ecuador and Colombia respectively. For employees they are 9.45 and 8 percent respectively. 
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represent the largest proportion of informal workers in the two countries. The higher FTRs for the 
self-employed are the result of lower earnings among this group of informal workers.  
An in-depth analysis of the distribution of FTRs is presented in Figure 1.8, which shows the share 
of workers at different ranges of FTRs. In Ecuador, around 65 percent of informal workers face an 
FTR below 40 percent whereas in Colombia this group is smaller, representing around 50 percent 
of the informal population. On the other hand, the percentage of workers facing high disincentives 
to formalization, that is FTRs above 100 percent, is much higher in Colombia, representing 20 
percent of informal workers, against 15 percent in Ecuador.  
Figure 1.8 Share of workers by range of FTR (2014) 
Employees and self-employed 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
The higher concentration of FTR in the upper part of the distribution for Colombia could be 
explained by the relative share of employees and self-employed in informal work. As we pointed 
out before, self-employed informal workers are predominant in Colombia whereas the divide be-
tween employees and self-employed workers is more balanced in Ecuador. Additionally, self-em-
ployed workers face higher SIC rates than employees in both countries. Therefore, the penalty must 
be larger in Colombia and it is important to analyse formalization incentives separately for these 
two groups.  
Decomposition of FTRs. As previously mentioned, the distribution of FTRs and their differ-
ences across groups are most likely related to the design of SICs in the two countries. A 
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decomposition of our FTRs measures following equation 4 confirms that SICs are the instrument 
contributing the most to the financial cost of formalization.  
The contribution of cash transfers to FTRs is practically null because in both countries, eligibility 
to benefits (that is, conditional cash transfers) does not depend directly on the formal status of the 
person but on composite welfare indexes (being below a certain threshold of the index), with the 
minor exception of the elderly and the disabled in Ecuador who are not part of the sample of 
analysis. The effect of taxes is minimal, with a marginal contribution noticeable only for the top 
decile of the earnings distribution. In Ecuador, taxes contribute 1.5 percentage points of FTR in 
the top decile, whereas their contribution for this group represents 0.16 percentage points in Co-
lombia. The minor effect of taxes is due to the two characteristics of personal income tax mentioned 
before. First, in both countries the non-taxable threshold is very high, meaning that most informal 
workers would not enter the tax brackets to be liable for income tax on entry to formality. Second, 
even if after transition to formal employment, the earnings gain of informal workers results in 
taxable income above the non-taxable threshold, deductions from personal expenditures can be 
made from taxable income, meaning that effectively very few workers would be subject to income 
tax payments. Nevertheless, we do observe a higher contribution of taxes to formalization costs in 
Ecuador than in Colombia, resulting from the higher progressivity of income tax in the first coun-
try, as discussed in Section 1.4.1.   
Heterogeneity across population subgroups. The results from the previous section have al-
ready highlighted the importance of looking at FTRs across different population subgroups. We 
observed important differences in formalization costs between employees and the self-employed. 
However, there could be other patterns for different groups of the population. Figure 1.9 compares 
mean FTRs by gender, education, and type of work status, that is, employment vs self-employment.  
Our results provide a number of interesting findings. First, as previously acknowledged, the largest 
differences in FTRs are observed between employees and self-employed informal workers. Second, 
informal workers with tertiary education face on average lower disincentives to formalization inde-
pendent of their gender, with differences more pronounced for self-employed workers particularly 
in Colombia. Third, differences in formalization costs between male and female employees are small, 
but they are large between male and female self-employed workers. Female self-employed workers 
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without tertiary education face particularly high FTRs compared to their male counterparts. The 
gap in FTRs between these two groups is around 42 percentage points in Colombia, and 23 per-
centage points in Ecuador. 
Figure 1.9 Mean FTRs by gender, education, and type of work (2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models. Note: mean of each component  
Another interesting divide to consider in the analysis of FTRs is the one between workers in rural 
and urban areas. Our results show that there are important differences in FTRs between workers 
in rural and urban areas in Ecuador, but less so in Colombia. In Ecuador, mean FTRs for rural 
workers are 48 percent and for urban workers are 63 percent on average, whereas in Colombia they 
represent 95 and 89 percent for rural and urban workers, respectively. The distribution of FTRs 
for rural and urban workers in the two countries is depicted in Figure 1.10, which presents the 
share of workers at different ranges of FTR. The figure for Ecuador shows that the percentage of 
informal workers facing low FTRs (FTRs below 20 percent) is much higher in rural areas than 
urban areas (50 percent compared to 30 percent of workers). The opposite is observed in Colombia. 





Figure 1.10 Share of workers by range of FTR (2014) 
Rural-Urban classification 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
To better capture the patterns of FTRs across different population subgroups, Table 1.2 presents 
mean and median regression estimates of FTRs on a range of personal characteristics. As expected, 
the beta coefficients of the mean regression are higher in absolute terms than those for the median 
regressions. However, the direction of the effect in both estimations is in most cases the same. Our 
regression results confirm that male workers have lower FTR (mean and median) than female 
workers. The differences in formalization costs between women and men are the result of differences 
in earnings. Informal earnings of female workers are so low that despite a higher increase in (coun-
terfactual) earnings on entry to formal employment compared to male workers, a relatively fixed 
payment of SICs is more burdensome.18 Controlling for other characteristics we observe that FTRs 
decrease with both age and education.  
We find no clear pattern of FTRs depending on the quintiles of informal earnings, when mean and 
median regressions are compared. From the mean regressions a U-shaped relationship emerges but, 
alternatively, from the median regressions the higher the informal earnings the higher the formali-
zation costs. Note that this finding is consistent with the results presented in Figures 1.5 and 1.6.  
 
18 Social contributions are relatively constant due to the above-mentioned fixed contribution based on the minimum 
wage.   
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Table 1.2 Mean and Median regression estimates of FTR 
 Ecuador  Colombia 
 mean median  mean median 
Male -0.126*** -0.053***  -0.374*** -0.100*** 
 (-8.79) (-11.55)  (-12.2) (-12.93) 
Secondary -0.081*** -0.018***  -0.089*** -0.061*** 
 (-5.64) (-4.01)  (-2.76) (-7.53) 
Tertiary -0.246*** -0.071***  -0.473*** -0.204*** 
 (-11.54) (-10.49)  (-8.03) (-13.78) 
Age (25-34) -0.090*** -0.037***  -0.121*** -0.053*** 
 (-4.67) (-6.01)  (-2.68) (-4.65) 
Age (35-44) -0.166*** -0.074***  -0.170*** -0.085*** 
 (-8.08) (-11.35)  (-3.65) (-7.22) 
Age (45-54) -0.213*** -0.084***  -0.222*** -0.097*** 
 (-9.58) (-11.86)  (-4.67) (-8.09) 
Age (55-) -0.244*** -0.092***  -0.281*** -0.097*** 
 (-8.54) (-10.1)  (-4.89) (-6.74) 
Self-Employed 0.366*** 0.183***  0.607*** 0.289*** 
 (25.48) (40.19)  (19.64) (37.22) 
Rural -0.082*** -0.096***  0.095*** 0.070*** 
 (-5.11) (-18.94)  (3.08) (9.08) 
Quintile 2 -0.164*** 0.003  -0.217*** 0.013 
 (-8.02) (0.47)  (-5.15) (1.22) 
Quintile 3 -0.043** 0.082***  -0.220*** 0.064*** 
 (-2.08) (12.54)  (-4.61) (5.31) 
Quintile 4 0.165*** 0.155***  0.022 0.148*** 
 (7.59) (22.52)  (0.46) (12.59) 
Quintile 5 0.149*** 0.137***  0.197*** 0.195*** 
 (6.84) (19.87)  (4.00) (15.76) 
Constant 0.695*** 0.251***  0.981*** 0.280*** 
 (28.73) (32.63)  (16.67) (18.91) 
Observations 28147 28147  16386 16386 
Adjusted or pseudo R2 0.0464 0.0494  0.0389 0.0476 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models Notes: t statistics in parenthesis, significance level: 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 1.2 confirms that FTRs are higher for the self-employed compared to employees. The higher 
formalization costs for this group of workers are explained entirely by the tax and benefit system. 
In fact, counterfactual (predicted) earnings in formal employment for self-employed informal work-
ers are higher than those for employees. However, higher social contribution rates for these groups 
and the abovementioned minimum contribution translates into a higher cost of formalization. Fi-
nally, rural workers have lower mean and median FTRs than urban workers in Ecuador, but the 
opposite is observed for workers in Colombia. As previously mentioned, this is due to the presence 
of the rural worker social insurance regime (Seguro Campesino) in Ecuador.  
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Alternative measures of Formalization costs. In the appendix we present two sets of addi-
tional figures on the formalization burden based on Koettl and Weber’s (2012) original definition 
of formalization tax rates. It is however important to re-emphasise here that this measure is not 
comparable with ours, as their formula measures the change in disposable income on entry to formal 
employment as a percentage of earnings in informality, rather than as a percentage of the change 
in earnings following formalization.  
In the first set of results we compute formalization costs following Equation 2 above (see Figures 
A1.1 A1.2). Using Koettl and Weber’s (2012) definition we find much higher FTRs for low earning 
self-employed workers relative to FTRs with our definition. This is because the burden of SIC 
relative to current self-employed earnings is high whereas the change in earnings after formalization 
is high enough to make our indicator relatively lower.  Notice also that relative to original earnings 
our definition of FTR is U-shaped while Koettl and Weber’s (2012) definition is decreasing. This 
is the case because at the top of the distribution there is a reduced (even negative) change in 
earnings making the denominator smaller than the tax burden. 
The appendix also presents results of an alternative exercise in which we compute the burden that 
formal workers face being in their sector instead of the informal sector (see Figures A1.3 and A1.4). 
For simplicity, we assume no earnings change and use a modified version of Equation 2 that we 
present in the appendix. FTRs for formal workers are consistently lower than for informal workers. 
This is because baseline earnings (the denominator) are higher in the formal sector. FTRs for formal 
workers are mostly clustered on the interval 0 to 30 percent implying that the burden of being in 
the formal sector is not high relative to formal earnings. This is especially true if we consider that 
the benefits associated to SIC are valued by workers. 
1.4.5 Distributional implications of formalization 
An important advantage of tax-benefit microsimulation is that it allows us to study the distribu-
tional implications of counterfactual scenarios. In this section, we consider a counterfactual situa-
tion in which all informal workers would be formalized. Note that this exercise is slightly different 
from the approach used to simulate transitions into formal employment in the previous sections. 
The previous analysis was aimed at calculating the formalization cost of each informal worker in 
the event of entering formal employment. For this, we simulated transitions into unemployment 
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separately for each informal worker in the household, in the case that there was more than one 
informal worker. In this section, our counterfactual assumes that all informal workers would be 
formalized at the same time, meaning that for households with more than one informal worker, we 
would calculate household disposable income when all of them are formal. Notice also that this 
exercise by construction omits the general equilibrium effects on earnings that such a tough exper-
iment will necessarily imply. However, it gives us an important picture of the burden that labour 
informality creates on poverty, inequality and, as will be shown in the next section, government 
finances.   
Table 1.3 Distributional measures for the formalization exercise 



























Gini coefficient          
Market income 0.501 0.466 0.501 0.466  0.587 0.519 0.587 0.519 
Disposable income 0.464 0.432 0.472 0.438  0.563 0.498 0.606 0.524 
          
P80/P20 ratio          
Market income 13.95 12.07 13.95 12.07  26.39 17.71 26.39 17.71 
Disposable income 10.52 9.35 10.98 9.55  21.47 13.95 46.06 17.32 
          
Poverty headcount          
Market income 0.197 0.148 0.197 0.148  0.431 0.28 0.431 0.28 
Disposable income 0.16 0.119 0.187 0.133  0.397 0.248 0.464 0.309 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models. 
Table 1.3 presents some distributional effects of the counterfactual exercise. In particular, four 
different scenarios are evaluated in order to differentiate two different effects when we consider 
formalization of workers in the informal sector. The first scenario (baseline) presents inequality and 
poverty indicators for the economy as it is, without assuming any change in individuals’ circum-
stances. The second scenario (earnings change without transition) considers a counterfactual dis-
tribution in which informal workers would face similar earnings as their formal counterparts but 
would still pay no SICs and no taxes. The third scenario (transition without earnings change) 
represents a situation in which informal workers would start contributing to SICs and paying taxes 
but under the same earnings they currently have in the informal sector. Finally, the last scenario 
(transition with earnings change) considers our main counterfactual scenario, in which informal 
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workers would enter formal employment (pay SICs and taxes) but receiving counterfactual earnings 
based on those observed for formal workers.  
A comparison of the baseline results with our main counterfactual scenario (transition with earnings 
change) shows that market income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, would be reduced 
by 3.5 and 6.8 percentage points in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. The effect on market 
income inequality is driven by the increase in earnings of informal workers on entry to formality, 
because most informal workers are at the bottom of the distribution. In the case of disposable 
income inequality, the Gini coefficient would decrease in both countries but less than the decrease 
observed in market income inequality. Around three-quarters and three-fifths of the reduction in 
market income inequality would not translate into a reduction of disposable income inequality in 
Ecuador and Colombia respectively, because they are offset by high social contributions for workers 
who enter formality. 
Our intermediate counterfactual scenarios allow us to disentangle the two combined effects affecting 
disposable income inequality. Under our scenario in which earnings of informal workers would 
match those of formal workers but without entry to formal employment (i.e. without liability to 
SICs or taxes), the decrease in market income inequality translates almost one to one in a reduction 
of disposable income inequality. On the other hand, under the scenario of a transition to formal 
employment without earnings change, we would observe an increase in the Gini coefficient from 
disposable income of around 1 percentage point in Ecuador and 4.3 points in Colombia.  
Another way to look at this increase in inequality is by means of the ratio of disposable incomes 
for the top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent of the population. This indicator increases by around 
4 percent for Ecuador but more than doubles for Colombia, that is, enforcing social insurance 
payments affects the poor in Colombia disproportionally more.  
Finally, under our main counterfactual scenario, assuming informal workers would enter formal 
employment (i.e. pay SICs and taxes) with earnings similar to those of workers in the formal sector, 
income poverty would decrease by 3 and 9 percentage points in Ecuador and Colombia respec-
tively.19 This positive effect is fully driven by the (counterfactual) earnings gains of informal 
 
19 For poverty measures we apply national poverty lines calculated by the statistics office of each country. In the case of 
Colombia, we apply different lines for rural and urban areas. 
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workers. In fact, assuming that informal workers would experience the same change in earnings but 
without contributing to social security or paying taxes, an additional decrease in poverty of around 
1 and 6 percentage points would be observed in Ecuador and Colombia respectively. On the con-
trary, if informal workers become liable to pay SICs and taxes but under the same earnings they 
receive in informal employment, poverty would increase by 3 and 7 percentage points relative to 
the baseline in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. 
1.4.6 Budgetary implications of formalization 
In this section we present the budgetary effects of the main counterfactual scenario of Section 1.4.5, 
in which all informal workers would enter formal employment (i.e. pay SICs and taxes) and have 
change in earnings based on the labour income of workers in the formal sector. Table 4 presents 
aggregate revenue from SICs and taxes in our baseline and reform scenario. In the case of SICs, we 
differentiate between workers’ and employers’ SICs to analyse who would bear a higher burden 
from formalization. Table 1.4 also compares changes in aggregate earnings, market income, and 
disposable income in our baseline and reform scenarios. 
Table 1.4 Budgetary Effects of different scenarios (2014) 
 Ecuador  Colombia 
 Baseline Reform Change  Baseline Reform Change 
 USD (Millions) per year (%)  COP (Billions) per year (%) 
Worker's SIC 2,721 4,767 75.2%  14.77 33.74 128.4% 
Employer's SIC 1,826 2,991 63.8%  28.77 40.71 41.5% 
Total SIC 4,547 7,758 70.6%  43.53 74.45 71.0% 
Income Tax 724 766 5.8%  3.37 3.42 1.3% 
        
Earnings 39,245 43,221 10.1%  235.67 268.94 14.1% 
Market Income 46,715 50,691 8.5%  258.14 291.4 12.9% 
Disposable Income 45,597 47,486 4.1%  268.51 282.77 5.3% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models. 
Given the high levels of informality in Ecuador and Colombia, aggregate revenue from SICs would 
increase considerably under our counterfactual scenario. In both countries, revenue from SICs would 
increase by around 71 percent. Moreover, because of the large proportion of self-employed workers 
in the informal sector and due to the higher contribution rates for this group of workers, the burden 
from formalization would be larger for workers than for employers. As shown in the table, aggregate 
revenue from workers’ SICs would increase by nearly 75 percent in Ecuador and 128 percent in 
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Colombia. Aggregate revenue from employers’ SICs would, on the other hand, rise by 64 and 42 
percent in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively.  
On the contrary, the increase in tax revenue would be modest due to the high non-taxable thresh-
olds and deductions from personal expenditures characterising the design of personal income tax in 
the two countries. Income tax revenue would increase by 5.8 percent in Ecuador and only 1.3 
percent in Colombia. Finally, formalization of informal workers under our counterfactual scenario 
would represent an increase in aggregate earnings of 10 and 14 percent in Ecuador and Colombia 
respectively. The increase in aggregate market income would fully reflect the increase in aggregate 
earnings, whereas the increase in aggregate disposable income would capture both, the effect of 
increased earnings but also the increase in SIC and tax payments. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Despite recent efforts to encourage formalization by governments in Latin America, a large share 
of the working force in the region still work in the informal sector. Understanding the role of the 
tax-benefit system in creating disincentives to enter formal employment is paramount when con-
sidering potential policies aiming at reducing the prevalence of the informal sector in the economy. 
Focusing on the worker’s perspective, this paper aimed to quantify the costs that informal workers 
would incur in the event of entering formality, due to social insurance and tax payments, as well 
as the potential loss of cash benefits. 
In order to measure the cost of formalization, the approach proposed in this paper is to exploit the 
advantages offered by tax-benefit microsimulation models and simulate transitions from informal 
to formal employment for all workers observed in informal jobs in nationally representative house-
hold survey data from Ecuador and Colombia. Microsimulation models provide a comprehensive 
way to assess the effect of different tax-benefit instruments on individuals’ financial (dis)incentives 
to enter formality. Moreover, in contrast with previous research, we account for the fact that 
informal workers would not necessarily face the same earnings upon entering formal employment 
and this would influence their financial incentives to formalization. 
Our results show that despite potential gains in earnings on entry to formality, formalization costs 
are strikingly high in both countries, mainly due to the design of SICs. In the two countries, most 
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informal workers are at the bottom of the earnings distribution and despite a large gain in earnings 
on entry to formality, the existence of minimum SIC payments represents a significant financial 
burden. On average, around 60 and 92 percent of workers’ change in earnings in a formal job would 
be taxed away in the form of increased taxes and SICs in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. 
Moreover, formalization costs vary widely across different population subgroups with the most 
marked differences found between employees and self-employed informal workers. Finally, under a 
counterfactual scenario in which all informal workers would be formalized income inequality would 
decrease due to a potential improvement in earnings of (previously) informal workers; the burden 
posed by the tax-benefit system is however very important. This is especially true in Colombia, 
where a 6.8 percentage points decrease in market income inequality would translate into a lower, 
4 percentage points, decrease in disposable income inequality. 
From a policy perspective, our analysis highlights that government strategies aiming to increase 
formalization necessarily need to review the design of tax-benefit systems. In Ecuador and Colom-
bia, minimum payments of SICs would represent an important burden to self-employed informal 
workers with low earnings in the event of formalization. The Ecuadorian system represents an 
example of how to account for the specificities of the labour market in the design of SICs. A specific 
social insurance regime (Seguro Campesino) exists in Ecuador to cover self-employed rural workers, 
with lower contribution rates than those in the general regime. Similar designs could be considered 
to target other categories of self-employed workers characterised by low earnings in the two coun-
tries. 
Due to the challenging nature of labour market informality, some caveats are worth noting. First, 
our analysis focuses on the financial disincentives to formal employment embedded in the tax-
benefit system. The choice between the formal and informal sectors are, however, also associated 
with other factors. As stressed by the exclusion perspective, there could be barriers between formal 
and informal activities, and these might vary depending on worker characteristics. Accounting for 
these potential demand-side constraints is important for highlighting the nature of informality not 
only as a choice but also as a lack of opportunities. Second, our analysis has been purely static in 
the sense that payments of SICs are considered a cost in the short-term. However, from a dynamic 
perspective, workers might value benefits derived from SICs. In both countries, SICs entitle the 
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worker to sickness, paternity, and maternity leave, and in the long-run to a pension. As such, our 
measure of FTR might overestimate the cost of formalization. Third, our distributional and budg-
etary analysis of the counterfactual fully formalized economy was purely illustrative and did not 
account for second or higher-order effects of the proposed formalization. As depicted by the large 
budgetary effects of such scenarios, general equilibrium effects should be considered to provide a 
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A.1 Appendix  
Table A1.1 Descriptive statistics for Ecuador and Colombia 
  Colombia Ecuador  
  Formal Informal All Formal Informal All 
Sample of Observations  7,686 20,100 27,786 23,564 32,776 56,340 
Total Population (in thousands) 6,771 12,635 19,406 2,352 3,196 5,548 
Share of Employees 0.86 0.33 0.51 0.88 0.56 0.69 
Share of Self-Employed 0.14 0.67 0.49 0.16 0.47 0.34 
Share of Skilled 0.42 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.11 0.22 
Share of Unskilled 0.58 0.91 0.79 0.64 0.89 0.78 
Share of Rural 0.07 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.25 
Share of Urban 0.93 0.72 0.79 0.78 0.72 0.75 
Share of Female 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 
Share of Male 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 
Share of Ethnic minorities 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14 
Share of Part-Time 0.50 0.76 0.67 0.54 0.79 0.68 
Share of 1st quintile 0.01 0.30 0.20 0.08 0.30 0.21 
Share of 2nd quintile 0.03 0.30 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.20 
Share of 3rd quintile 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.29 0.15 0.21 
Share of 4th quintile 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.18 
Share of 5th quintile 0.40 0.09 0.20 0.33 0.10 0.20 
Average monthly earnings LCU 1,464,720 569,009 881,522 716 346 503 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys 
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Table A1.2. OLS estimates of log hourly wages for formal workers 
  Ecuador Colombia 
Age (25-29) 0.10418*** 0.10225*** 
   (6.36)  (3.79) 
Age (30-34) 0.18238*** 0.12922*** 
   (10.85)  (4.69) 
Age (35-39) 0.20199*** 0.17287*** 
   (11.58)  (6.02) 
Age (40-44) 0.26421*** 0.14890*** 
   (14.44)  (5.08) 
Age (45-49) 0.29047*** 0.19302*** 
   (15.58)  (6.53) 
Age (50-54) 0.26194*** 0.16740*** 
   (11.8)  (4.95) 
Age (55-59) 0.26818*** 0.17958*** 
   (11.68)  (4.88) 
Age (60-64) 0.07484*** 0.19066*** 
   (3.21)  (4.22) 
Men 0.25883*** 0.11442*** 
   (28.55)  (7.56) 
Rural -0.14710*** -0.16682*** 
   (-12.1)  (-8.44) 
Secondary 0.29352*** 0.12711*** 
   (24.23)  (5.15) 
Tertiary 0.66132*** 0.54534*** 
   (46.54)  (19.77) 
Couple 0.09286*** -0,00204 
   (9.75)  (-0.14) 
Mining, Manuf. and Utilities  0.19576*** 0.10264*** 
   (10.78)  (3.09) 
Construction     0.13145*** 0,01353 
   (7.63)  (0.44) 
Wholesale and retail trade  0.34894*** 0.18397*** 
   (20.3)  (5.87) 
Manager 0.70363*** 0.45183*** 
   (34.31)  (23.88) 
Professionals    0.30031*** 0.48408*** 
   (22.08)  (12.71) 
Months in Work 0.00086*** 0.00105*** 
   (19.39)  (10.95) 
Self-Employed -0.02837** 0.05047** 
   (-2.32)  (2.19) 
Employer 0.48996*** 0.62360*** 
   (14.35)  (11.81) 
Region dummies  Yes Yes 
   
Constant -0,03343 7.74958*** 
  (-1.49) (165,74) 
Observations 23564 7686 
Adjusted R2 0.4107 0.3744 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys Notes: t statistics in parenthesis, significance level:        * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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A.1.1 Formalization Tax Rates assuming no change in earnings 
Figure A1.1 Formalization Tax Rates assuming no change in earnings (2014) 
by quintile of earnings in informality of each informal type of work 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
 
Figure A1.2 Share of workers by range of FTR assuming no change in earnings 
(2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
A.1.2 Incentives to formal work for formal workers 
For this section we use the version of the FTR as defined in Equation 2 but move formal workers 
to the informal sector. The equation is: 
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FTR = , , , (A.1) 
where w  represents worker i’s earnings in the formal sector and y ,  represents household disposa-
ble income for worker i. The superscripts 0 and 1 represent time, that is, before and after simulated 
movement to the informal sector takes place, respectively. Notice that we have changed the order 
of the subscripts relative to Equation 2. Given that there are savings associated with moving to 
the informal sector, the positive value should be interpreted as the burden formal workers must 
assume staying in the formal sector relative to moving to the informal sector. 
Figure A1.3 Formalization Tax Rates, assuming no change in earnings (2014) 
by quintile of earnings in formality of each informal type of work 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
 
Figure A1.4 Share of workers by range of FTR assuming no change in earnings 
(2014) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on microsimulation models 
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Chapter 2: The supply of informal labour 
in Colombia: a microeconometric 
approach1 
Abstract 
Labour informality, initially analysed as a segmented market phenomenon, has more recently been 
studied as an optimal choice. Thus, the focus shifted from barriers that prevent informal workers 
from becoming formal, to the determinants of the rational choice of not being formal. This paper 
presents two structural modelling frameworks, The Discrete Choice (DC) and the Random Utility-
Random Opportunity (RURO), and it emphasises an extended version of the RURO model which 
is not only able to capture restrictions on job availability but also introduces sector choice (formal-
informal) allowing us to explore the two conflicting perspectives. We make a comprehensive review 
of the estimation procedure for the two frameworks and employ Colombian data to estimate three 
models of labour supply for single individuals. Overall, we find good model fit and similarities 
between the estimates of the DC and the simple RURO model. In the last part we use the RURO 
model with sectoral choice to set forth the specificities of counterfactual simulations. Using the 
extended version of the RURO model we find significant barriers to sectoral mobility: simulating 
important exogenous increases in education for informal workers or in monetary incentives in the 
formal sector leads to a reduced number of sectoral transitions indicating a high degree of segmen-
tation of labour markets in developing economies.  
JEL: J42, J22, H22 
Keywords: Informality, labour supply, microsimulation. 
 
 
1 I would like to thank Sebastiaan Maes, Bart Capéau and André Decoster at KU Leuven (Belgium) for their guidance 
on the implementation of the RURO Model. All remaining shortcomings are my responsibility alone. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The choice of being informal has received increasing attention since the works of Magnac (1991), 
Maloney (1999) and Pratap and Quintin (2006) provided empirical evidence on the incompleteness 
of classical segmented labour market theory. Hence, recent literature on informality has moved 
from the two-sector Harris-Todaro model (Rauch, 1991 and Loayza, 1996) to analysing conditions 
under which workers choose to be in the formal or informal sector (Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007; 
Bosch and Maloney 2006 and 2010, Lehmann et al., 2012). 
With more than half the workforce in informal activities in Latin America, understanding the 
nature of this phenomenon is crucial for policymaking. As concisely summarised by Bosch and 
Maloney (2010): if workers in the informal sector show similar dynamics to the unemployed, dis-
tortions in the formal sector are indeed large and the need for reform is compelling. However, if 
their dynamics are similar to those of the formal sector, the focus shifts towards the cost-benefit 
analysis agents undertake in choosing among sectors.  
Current structural labour supply models are well suited to analysing individual labour responses to 
simulated exogenous changes, but only under the assumption that workers are not restricted in 
their choices. For instance, Blundell et al., (2000) study the likely effect of introducing the working 
families’ tax credit (an in-work support for families with children) on labour supply in the UK; 
Immervoll et al., (2007) study this type of in-work credits for 15 European countries; Steiner and 
Wrohlich (2004) simulate the potential labour supply effects of changing tax rules for married 
couples in Germany or Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004) study the effects of labour supply 
incentives for low income families in Sweden through a model that extends the labour supply choice 
to account for welfare participation.  
Despite the potential of labour supply models to analyse labour informality, there are very few 
studies using these methods.2 This could be because such models were mainly set up for developed 
economies where the meaningful choice is to participate in the labour market with the underlying 
assumption of full availability of jobs for workers at a fixed wage. Alternatively, it could be the 
case that the identification of the parameters on these models requires “complex” budget sets, 
 
2 Exceptions are Magnac (1991) and Pradhan and van Soest (1997) which will be discussed later. 
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especially regarding mean-tested benefits that are not present in the tax-benefit systems of most 
developing countries, preventing a take-off of the methodology.  
Among the existing labour supply models we find the Discrete Choice (DC) model which assumes 
that wages are fixed and full availability of jobs. We also find the Random-Utility Random-Oppor-
tunity (RURO) model (Aaberge, Dagsvik, and Strøm, 1995 and Decoster, Capeau, and Dekkers, 
2016) represents a more appropriate framework through which to analyse labour choice. This model 
assumes that the relevant variable is not only hours of work but also that agents choose wages and 
other non-pecuniary attributes. More importantly, in this framework the availability of jobs for a 
specific worker is constrained by personal characteristics such as education, skills or experience, 
making the model well suited to analysing labour informality choice. The model has been used 
among others to analyse sectoral choice (Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006), optimal tax-transfer rules 
(Colombino and Islam, 2020), tax credits (Moscarola et al., 2020), involuntary unemployment (de 
Boer, 2018) and labour market participation of the elderly (Capeau and Decoster, 2015). 
This paper proposes the use of structural labour supply models to analyse informality in developing 
economies. More precisely, it presents a detailed overview of the main empirical approaches to 
estimate such models, the DC and the RURO, using cross-sectional data. The paper emphasises a 
version of the RURO model proposed by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and Aaberge and Flood (2013) 
which is able to capture restrictions on job availability and sectoral choice (formal-informal). We 
compare estimates for three types of models: a DC model, a simple RURO model and the RURO 
model with sectoral choice. Our results show that the three models have a good fit to the data and 
that preference estimates are similar for the basic versions of the DC and RURO models. 
Moreover, to illustrate the specificities and the scope of counterfactual simulations within this 
framework, we analyse the effects of exogenous changes in human capital and tax-benefit rules on 
the labour market formal-informal distribution with the extended RURO model. Our counterfactual 
exercise indicates that increasing educational attainment to a tertiary education degree level for all 
young informal workers aged 40 or less in the sample increases both wages and formal job availa-
bility but results in a modest 6.5 percent transition of informal workers to the formal sector. Results 
are even less impressive for monetary incentives to formality. The almost negligible sector shift 
towards formal employment indicates that significant barriers for informal workers do exist. As will 
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be seen, there are important assumptions that we impose, and we estimate the models based on a 
very specific sub-group of individuals that is not entirely representative of the informal and formal 
workforce However, we consider the approach presented here a good starting point to the study of 
informal labour markets and further research with more comprehensive models could be built upon 
the models discussed.  
The document is divided into six sections, this introduction being the first. Section 2.2 provides a 
review of empirical studies on labour formality choice especially on the conflicting nature of infor-
mality at the micro level. Section 2.3 presents the methodological framework of current labour 
supply models: the discrete choice model, the RURO model and an extended version of the latter 
including sectoral choice. Section 2.4 presents the data and results of the model estimates. Section 
2.5 introduces policy simulations and Section 2.6 presents conclusions. 
2.2 Labour formality choice  
Most studies on labour formality choice are based on two-sector equilibrium models that rarely 
resort to microdata (Rauch, 1991; Loayza, 1996; Straub, 2005; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Loayza 
and Rigolini, 2011). More recent papers on informality choice build on this equilibrium framework 
but take market frictions into account following the search and matching approach pioneered by 
Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) (see Zenou, 2008; Satchi and Temple, 2009, 
Albrecht et al., 2009; Bosh and Maloney, 2010 and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2012). However, this 
literature on labour formality choice relies extensively on a priori assumptions on the dynamics of 
labour markets and has not considered the interplay of individual characteristics and sectoral 
choice. In the following we discuss five important microeconometric contributions to the study of 
informality choice that improve on these features.  
Magnac (1991) tests the hypothesis of labour market segmentation between formal and informal 
sectors, comparing estimates of a competitive equilibrium model (free movement between sectors) 
with those of a segmented model with a cost of entry into the formal sector (queuing for a formal 
job).3 Both models are bivariate tobits including sector choice and wages but omitting hours of 
 
3 Formal sector comprises employees and informal sector comprises self-employed workers excluding employers (Magnac, 
1991). 
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work. Using labour data for women in urban areas of Colombia, he finds that the hypothesis of 
competitive equilibrium cannot be rejected. 
Improving on Magnac (1991), Pradhan and van Soest (1995) study labour formality choice with 
ordered probit models (i.e., informal sector is inferior for workers) and multinomial logits (there is 
no ordering of sectors) estimated for Bolivian workers. By explicitly including non-participation 
and modelling the effect of sector selection on wages, they conclude that multinomial logits (free 
movement) are preferred for women while ordered probits are preferred for males (segmentation). 
Using the same dataset for Bolivia, Pradhan and van Soest (1997) study informal-formal allocation 
for couples using an extended version of a structural labour supply model proposed by Ransom 
(1987).4 Sector selection and hours of work are based on sector-specific wages which depend on 
observable characteristics. Non-observable non-monetary returns of being in the formal sector are 
explicitly modelled relative to the monetary wage. The estimated non-monetary returns of formal 
employment are found to be mostly positive. Simulations indicate that a 10 percent decrease in 
wages for men increases hours worked by their partners by around 2.5 percent, but a similar de-
crease in women wages has hardly any effect. On the other hand, a 10 percent decrease in formal 
sector wages moves 2.1 percent of male workers from the formal to the informal sector and increases 
female participation by 0.4 percent.  
The model proposed by Pradhan and van Soest (1997) is the one most in line with ours. We 
improve on it by taking into account job availability and a more flexible and explicitly estimated 
utility function which allows easy simulation of sector responses to exogenous changes.5 However, 
there are two important aspects of their model that we do not incorporate explicitly: non-pecuniary 
attributes and couples’ sector choice. These are known features of labour markets in developing 
economies, where formal workers receive health and risk insurance among other non-monetary 
benefits, but also where working wives tend to benefit from their husbands’ formal status (i.e. they 
are entitled to health insurance) and the flexibility of informal employment arrangements. These 
two aspects represent a future line of research for our framework. 
 
4 Formal sector comprises employees, independent professionals, and self-employed workers with household-related busi-
ness assets greater than 15.000 Bolivianos (USD$ 5500). Informal sector comprises remaining self-employed workers 
(Pradhan and Van Soest, 1997). 
5 Pradhan and van Soest (1997) instead use first order conditions which are more cumbersome. 
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Lastly, Maloney (1999) and Gong, van Soest and Villagomez (2004) use panel data for Mexico to 
explore determinants of transitions between formality and informality with multinomial models. 
The first author uses a multinomial logit for three sectors: self-employed, informal employees and 
formal employees. He suggests that overall, there is a high degree of mobility between sectors. 
Secondly, the length of tenure is similar for all sectors, implying that workers do not arrive in the 
formal sector and stay there until retirement, as would be the case under segmentation. Lastly, 
workers out of formal employment do not seem to be queuing for jobs in this sector because higher 
experience is not observed to determine transition to the formal sector. Improving on Maloney 
(1999), Gong, van Soest and Villagomez (2004) use a dynamic multinomial logit model with random 
effects and explicitly consider unobservable factors. Their study comprises three sectors: non-work-
ing, formal and informal. Despite finding strong state persistence, a test for symmetry of movements 
between sectors (non-segmentation) could not be rejected.  
2.3 Labour supply models 
Throughout this paper, we are interested in introducing new methodological tools to study labour 
supply decisions, especially, in the presence of informal labour markets. Moreover, as we focus on 
a supply perspective, we would like to avoid assumptions on the dynamics of labour markets such 
as those of the equilibrium framework. We are also interested in allowing the model to incorporate 
population heterogeneity by keeping the analysis at the micro level. In that sense, building a struc-
tural model with sectoral choice such as Pradhan and van Soest (1997) seems to be the more 
reasonable approach.  
We build on the current labour supply literature which follows the Random Utility type of models 
(RUM) started by McFadden (1973), with applications to labour supply pioneered by van Soest 
(1995). By focusing on the estimation of the utility function, this methodology avoids the difficulties 
faced by reduced form models (Kosters, 1966, Bowen and Finegan, 1969 and Hall, 1970) and the 
structural ‘marginalist’ methodology (Heckman 1974, Burtless and Hausman, 1978, and Zabalza, 
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1983).6 We could easily classify the papers of Magnac (1991) and Pradhan and van Soest (1997) in 
the latter group. 
This approach has several advantages: (i) it is possible to have non-convexities in the tax and 
benefit system,7 (ii) simulation is possible because the model separates preferences from policies, 
(iii) couples’ joint decision is simpler to analyse, (iv) it is feasible to incorporate preference hetero-
geneity on leisure or consumption, and (v) it is possible to include more than two goods in the 
utility function (Flood and Islam, 2005). 
As highlighted by Aaberge and Colombino (2014), random utility labour supply models can be 
classified into two groups. The first one consists of Discrete Choice (DC) models, which assume 
that wage (productivity) for each agent is fixed, therefore, disposable income is entirely determined 
by the discrete set of working time regimes an agent chooses from. The second group comprises 
Random Utility-Random Opportunity (RURO) models, which assume that there is a stochastic 
process by which jobs packages, consisting of a time regime, a wage, and other attributes, arrive 
to each agent. We now turn to the mechanics of these models and in section 2.4, we present the 
results of their estimation for Colombia. 
2.3.1 Discrete Choice Labour Supply (DC) 
In the basic DC labour supply model, agents have a stochastic direct utility function (U ) over one 
consumption good (C ) and hours of work (L ): 
U = U(V(C  , T − L |X), ε ) (1) 
Where the subscript i represents a possible choice, the functional form of the systematic part of the 
utility function V is defined a priori by the modeller, ε  is an error term with an Extreme (Maxi-
mum) value Type I distribution, one different for each choice.8 T is total available time and X is a 
 
6 The term structural ‘marginalist’ is used by Aaberge and Colombino (2014) in a historical review of labour supply 
estimation. It refers to models that impose the conditions of a constrained maximisation problem of labour supply into 
reduced form estimates.  
7 For instance, those arising from several kinds of benefits. 
8 In the DC model the error term is assumed to be additive. For the RURO model it is assumed to be multiplicative. 
The extreme value type I distribution, also referred to as a Gumbel or double exponential, has pdf: f(ε ) = e e  and 
cdf: F(ε ) = e  Since the distribution has a mean of μ = 0.5772 and standard deviation σ = 1.2825 no further param-
eters need to be estimated. 
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vector of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education or number of children, that could 
directly affect preferences or indirectly affect consumption (i.e. through disposable income).  
The crucial assumption in DC models is that the choice set of hours worked consists of only k 
discrete alternatives: L ∈ [0, T] ∀ i = 1,2, … k. That is, agents cannot vary hours worked continu-
ously but instead, they choose the best option from a smaller set, which is constrained by the total 
time endowment. As a result, none of these alternatives represents the traditional tangency solution 
of a maximisation problem (Creddy and Kalb, 2005). Moreover, DC models assume that each 
worker’s wage is fixed (i.e. hourly wage does not change with hours worked), thus, disposable 
income is a function of hours worked only, and the wage is subsumed into the vector of character-
istics X. 
For simplicity, agents do not save (or equally, savings are considered as a part of consumption), 
therefore, assuming a normalised price for the only physical good in the model, consumption coin-
cides with disposable income. Equation 2 presents consumption (C ) as a function f(. ) that trans-
lates each discrete set of hours worked (L ) and a fixed wage (w) into disposable income for that 
choice by adding benefits and subtracting taxes and social insurance contributions (the function 
TB(. )) from labour (wL ) and non-labour (Y) market income. As most modern tax and benefit 
systems are rather cumbersome, it is almost impossible to directly include f(. ) in the model. Thus, 
without loss of generality, disposable income is computed for each element in the discrete set of 
hours worked by means of a tax and benefit microsimulation model. 
C = f(L |X) = wL + Y + TB(wL + Y|X) (2) 
As shown by McFadden (1973) and Creddy and Kalb (2005) under the previous assumptions, the 
probability that the chosen time regime L  is the observed, is given by the traditional multinomial 
logit expression (Eq. 3) and preference parameters of the utility function could be estimated using 
the maximum likelihood method under the additional assumption that decisions are made by each 
agent independently of others. 







Three additional remarks are in order: first, as is the case with observational data, the modeller 
cannot observe wages for non-workers, thus, their wages are usually imputed. Second, for some 
observations labour supply decisions are not agent-independent, for instance those of couples. In 
this case, a unitary decision-making model is usually assumed, where the utility function of the 
household includes individual labour supplies, one consumption good (equivalent to household dis-
posable income) and the choice set is a combination of the discrete hours of each couple member. 
Lastly, as pointed out by van Soest (1995), the model may require some fixed costs of participating 
in the labour market to provide a better fit to the data.9 These costs are usually added as disutility 
terms in the utility function if working hours are positive.  
2.3.2 Labour supply in Random Utility-Random Opportunity models (RURO) 
The basic RURO model (Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm, 1995 and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, 
1999) can be thought of as a generalisation of the DC framework in which, on the one hand, wages 
are not a characteristic of each agent, but part of a job offer alongside the time regime. On the 
other hand, utilities in the multinomial logit likelihood are weighted with the intensity with which 
job offers and non-market activities are made available to each agent (Decoster, Capeau and Dek-
ker, 2016). In other words, if the DC model focuses on labour supply, the RURO allows us to study 
labour market participation taking into account labour supply and labour demand simultaneously. 
More specifically, in a RURO model each job offer is a bundle consisting of working time (L ) and 
wage offered by the employer (w ). Each non-market activity is assumed to offer a zero wage (w =
0) and to require no hours of work (L = 0). For notational simplicity, these two variables are used 
as the arguments of the utility function V(. ) instead of consumption and leisure. 
The arrival of a job offer with a value of ε  (error term in the utility function in Equation 1) to an 
agent is assumed to depend on personal characteristics, labour demand conditions, but especially 
on the wage and time regime the job offer stipulates. This arrival process is modelled in the RURO 
by an inhomogeneous spatial Poisson process, with intensity parameter given by:10 
 
9 The basic model usually overpredicts part-time hours of work; hence, a penalty for positive working hours could reduce 
the probability of this time regime being chosen (Creddy and Kalb, 2005). 
10 A Poisson process is said to be inhomogeneous if the intensity parameter Λ depends on the moment of measurement t 
(Λ(t)).  
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Λ = λ(ε , q|X )g (w |X )g (L ) (4) 
The intensity function λ of working alternatives has the form: 







where q(X ) is a function of personal characteristics (X ) and labour demand conditions for 
worker’s attributes that increases the availability of job offers relative to non–market alternatives. 
The variables X  are weighted by a vector of coefficients to be estimated β . The function g  is the 
density of job offers paying hourly wages w  which is assumed to be lognormal and to depend on 
personal attributes (X ). The function g  is the density of jobs requiring L  hours of work which is 
assumed piecemeal uniform with peaks in the most frequently observed time regimes: full-time, 
part-time, etc. Analogously, the intensity parameter of arrival of non-work alternatives is Λ =   
As shown by Capeau and Decoster (2015), the resulting individual probability that the time regime 
L > 0 and wage w > 0 are the observed is given by the expression: 
p(w , L ) = 
q X g (w |X ) g (L ) e ( , )
e ( , ) +  
 
  ∈ℍ
q X g w |X  g (L ) e ,  dL  dw
∈𝕎
 (6a) 
where 𝕎 and ℍ are the sets of wage offers and hours of work, respectively. In the case of observing 
a non-working individual, the likelihood has the form: 
p(0,0) = 
e ( , )
e ( , ) +  
 
  ∈ℍ
q X g w |X  g (L ) e ,  dL  dw
∈𝕎
 (6b) 
There is a noticeable resemblance between the RURO likelihood and the multinomial logit expres-
sion in Equation 3. However, some important differences arise. Firstly, in RURO we do not discre-
tise hours of work to k points but consider the entire distribution of hours available. Given the 
piecemeal nature of the hours density, RURO overcomes the DC framework need for utility costs 
of working. It does so by assuming that some institutional exogenous process makes full-time or 
half-time regimes more abundant (likely) than other working arrangements. In other words, if we 
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assume no demand restrictions, some workers would prefer an alternative time regime, but given 
that we consider a lower availability of jobs with atypical time regimes, this choice will reduce 
utility.  
Secondly, in RURO wages are not fixed and instead we consider the entire density of wages. How-
ever, the higher degree of freedom on this side of the model requires aligning wages to each worker’s 
productivity. RURO overcomes this problem by assuming that given some fixed worker character-
istics, a higher wage than the one observed is less likely to be available; therefore, given that 
utilities are weighted by wage availability, worker’s utility will be lower under a different wage 
than under wages more in line with personal characteristics. 
Lastly, given that the model takes non-work into account, the q function captures the availability 
of job offers relative to non-working alternatives. For this function, some personal characteristics 
known a priori to determine participation rates such as age or gender will modify the availability 
of job offers relative to non-work and will improve the model fit between the two options. 
2.3.3 Labour supply and sectoral choice: an extended RURO (RURO-SC) 
Considering that the RURO model takes the availability of job offers into account, we extend this 
framework to include sector choice (z), with  z = 0 (informal) , z = 1 (formal)  and z = . (non −
work). In this way, the sector choice is analysed under possible demand side restrictions, as could 
be the case of labour markets in developing countries. Under the additional assumption that job 
offer intensities, wage and hours densities are sector specific, the intensity parameter of the Poisson 




g w X , g (L )  for z = 0,1 (7) 
The individual likelihood of observing an individual with such a job offer (w , L , z) is: 
 
11 Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) introduce a RURO with sectoral choice between public and private sectors in a model 
estimated for Norway. Aaberge and Flood (2013) also introduce this likelihood under the additional choice of benefit 
take-up for single mothers in Sweden. 
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p(w , L , z) = 
q X ,  g w X , g (L ) e
( , , )
e ( , ,.) +   
∈𝕎
 q X , g w X , g (L ) e




While the likelihood of observing a non-working (0,0, . ) individual is given by:  
p(0,0, . ) = 
e ( , ,.)
e ( , ,.) +   
∈𝕎
 q X , g w X , g (L ) e




Notice that in this very general functional form, we allow sectoral differences for preferences and 
hours densities. We also allow for the covariates entering the intensity function q  and the wage 
offer density g  to be different between sectors. 
2.3.4 Estimation 
In DC models we first define the number of choices or bins (k), the size of each bin and the time 
regime each bin represents. Next, we estimate the wage for non-workers. Most of the time this is 
done with a Mincer equation using a first stage Probit in a Heckman selection model of participa-
tion.12 We compute disposable income for the k hour points using the estimated wage for non-
workers and the observed wage for workers. 13 Lastly, we estimate the likelihood function given by 
Equation (3).  
In the case of the RURO models, hours are not discretised, and wages are not given. However, we 
do not observe the entire set of wages (𝕎) and of hours worked (ℍ). Hence, to estimate the 
likelihood function, we rely on a subset of alternatives 𝔻 drawn from a priori density functions (i.e. 
simulated maximum likelihood). For the next part we focus on the extended version of the RURO 
model, however the simpler version is estimated in a similar manner. Applying the estimation 
insights in Capeau and Decoster (2015) to the sectoral choice model, we first calculate the propor-
tion of each sector in the sample: informal work (π ), formal work (π ) or non-work (1- π − π ). 
Next, we compare these proportions with a random draw from a uniform density to determine the 
 
12 Notice that the selection model for participation presented here differs from the one discussed in the previous chapter 
which focused on the choice between formal and informal work. 
13 In some cases, researchers use predicted wages for the whole sample. 
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sector. Third, in the case of working, we draw hourly wages from a log-normal density specific to 
each sector, with mean μ  and standard deviation σ  observed in the sample. Fourth, in the case of 
working, we draw hours of work from a uniform distribution on the [H , H ] support. Fifth, 
given the wage and hours worked we compute disposable income for each draw. This last step is 
also taken for the observed alternative.  
As highlighted by Train (2009), the observed choice must be included in the set of alternatives. 
Moreover, the probability used to draw a job offer when creating the data for the simulation is 
included in the likelihood to account for a drawing process based on densities different from the 
true ones. More formally, a sampling component (i.e. probability of a job offer being drawn) 
ℙ(w, h, z) contingent on sector is given by: 




1 − π − π  if (w , h , z) = (0,0, . )
Lognormal(w |μ , σ ) if w > 0 & h ∈ [H , H ] & z = 0
Lognormal(w |μ , σ ) if w > 0 & h ∈ [H , H ] & z = 1
  (9) 
The simulated individual likelihood for the observed time regime L > 0 and wage w > 0 becomes:  
p(w , L , z) = 
ℙ(0,0, . )
ℙ(w , L , z )
q X ,  g w X , g (L ) e
( , , )
e ( , ,.) +
ℙ(0,0, . )
ℙ(w , L , m)
q X ,  g w X , g (L ) e
( , , )
, , ∈𝔻
 (10a) 
And in the case of observing non-participation: 
p(0,0, . ) =  e
( , ,.)
e ( , ,.) +
ℙ(0,0, . )
ℙ(w , L , m)
q X ,  g w X , g (L ) e




For simulation and model fit, predicted choices result from the comparison of utilities between 
available alternatives. We follow Duncan and Weeks (2000) and take into account the stochastic 
nature of the model as follows: first, we draw random values from the Extreme Value distribution; 
second, we compute utility U  with the estimated coefficients, vectors of characteristics and the 
stochastic component ε ; third, we find the optimal choice (maximum U ) for each person.  
65 
In the case of the DC model, each option i represents one of the discrete points considered. In the 
case of RURO models, we need a new set of alternatives from which to choose according to the 
parameters estimated for the Poisson process. Therefore, we follow Decoster, Capeau, and Dekkers 
(2016). First, we compute the likelihood of non-working, working as informal and working as for-
mal  (1 − π − π , π , π , respectively) using the estimated q X ,  functions. Notice that these 
probabilities depend on personal characteristics and opportunities estimates as opposed to the pro-
portions used for estimation.14 Second, these probabilities are compared with random draws from 
a uniform distribution. Third, in the case the draw i belongs to a working alternative in sector z, 
we draw hourly wages and hours from the sector specific estimated lognormal and piecemeal hours 
densities, respectively. Fourth, we use these wages and hours of work to compute the values of 
leisure and disposable income. Lastly, for each individual, we compare alternatives and select the 
one with the highest utility, taking into account the unobserved component of utility ε . For com-
parisons between baseline and counterfactual, the unobserved component of each draw remains 
constant.  
2.3.6 Overview 
Note that in the DC framework we estimate a utility function, and we use it to measure to what 
extent each individual is willing to exchange leisure for consumption assuming an exogenous wage. 
Simulations in the DC model are thus restricted to exogenous changes on the wage or other ele-
ments of the budget set or in rare occasions to estimated taste-shifters. In the RURO model, on 
top of preferences, we additionally estimate the process by which alternatives arrive to each indi-
vidual, a process that we assume to be stochastic. An individual must choose one element from a 
set of opportunities (possible activities to do including non-working and different job offers) that 
is available to him. In that sense, simulations in the RURO framework are extended to include 
changes in the estimated parameters that govern the job arrival process (the elements of this set), 
that could be considered as changes in the labour demand.   
 
 
14 Recall that the q function for non-working alternatives is 1. We define  π =  . 
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2.4 Data and empirical results 
2.4.1 Data and definitions 
Our analysis is based on representative household survey data from Colombia. Like many Latin-
American and other developing countries, a large share of the workforce in Colombia is in informal 
employment with an unconditional labour informality rate at the population level of around 63 
percent for 2016.15 Most of the economic literature for the country points to the effect of market 
regulations reducing labour demand as the factor responsible for the high share of informal work. 
Based on this notion, important policy reforms benefitting firms were carried out in the country 
recently with limited success. 
The data used in our estimation comes from the Great Integrated Household Survey for 2016 (Gran 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, GEIH). The survey contains detailed information on employment, 
income from different sources, as well as household and personal characteristics needed for the tax-
benefit model (COLMOD) employed to measure disposable income for each alternative.16 GEIH is 
the main labour force survey in the country and is carried out on a monthly basis. The data for 
2016 comprises 774,693 individuals with 81.1 percent of them of working age (12 years or more in 
Colombia) and 49.3 percent of them participating in the labour market. There are 339,929 individ-
uals working with 38.7 percent of them working in the formal sector. 
We focus on single people aged 18-60, not in education nor disabled, and living in urban areas. 
Despite its empirical attractiveness, we omit couples given the difficulty of estimating a unitary 
decision model involving two sectors and non-work. Single people must be living without other 
working age household members. They are either working as employees (formal or informal) or not 
working, that is, the self-employed are excluded.17 If working, they report only one job of less than 
 
15 In what follows we define informality as non-affiliation to social security because of the connection of social insurance 
contributions to the design of the tax-benefit system, and more directly to disposable income as defined in Equation 2. 
16 COLMOD combines detailed coded policy rules with microdata via the EUROMOD software to simulate direct taxes, 
social insurance contributions and cash transfers, see Rodriguez (2018). For the model using GEIH, expenditures were 
imputed given the lack of data in the GEIH. This imputation has negligible effects on disposable income as expenditures 
only affect income tax, which in turn is almost non-binding for the whole population. 
17 Despite more than 50% of informal workers in Colombia observed as being in self-employment, the lack of adequate 
data on earnings for those self-employed and also, the lack of a robust method to capture their working choices is well 
established in the labour supply literature.  
67 
120 hours per week. Lastly, we exclude households with unreliably low income.18 Under these con-
ditions, 15,347 observations remain for the estimation, 4.5 percent of the original sample.  
Admittedly, the abovementioned sample selection is restrictive in important ways: as discussed in 
the empirical literature, an important dimension when analysing labour informality is the couple’s 
decision (Pradhan and van Soest, 1997) whereas we focus on singles. Note also that the models are 
estimated for employees who are a very specific sub-group of workers that is not entirely repre-
sentative of the informal and formal workforce, especially considering that in developing countries 
(including Colombia) informality is mainly associated with self-employment. However, the purpose 
of the analysis presented here is to set up the basis for the study of segmented labour markets using 
structural labour supply models, which could serve to build more comprehensive models including 
self-employed workers and couples in the future. 









Observations 3,236 3,268 8,843 15,347 
Average age (years) 39.3  36.5  37.6  37.7  
Share Male 0.205  0.361  0.403  0.352  
Share having 0-2-year-old children 0.114  0.054  0.043  0.060  
Share having 3-4-year-old children 0.071  0.058  0.044  0.052  
Share having 5-10-year-old children 0.212  0.183  0.163  0.178  
Share having 11-18-year-old children 0.205  0.217  0.202  0.206  
Share in Bogota 0.029  0.064  0.086  0.069  
Share with Higher Education 0.278  0.145  0.526  0.393  
Share with Primary Education or less 0.202  0.263  0.056  0.131  
Share Vulnerable 0.040  0.048  0.009  0.024  
Hourly wage* (COP**) - 3,660 7,576 5,145 
Weekly hours of work - 48.46 48.21 38.1 
Disposable Income (million COP**) 0.84 0.96 1.72 1.37 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) *Conditional on working, **Colombian pesos. 19 
Table 2.1 present some descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. Most of these variables will 
help the identification of the model. We observe that the target group is composed predominantly 
 
18 We exclude households with observed monthly disposable income per person below half the extreme poverty line. That 
is $57.000 COP (approx. US$19 per month). This reduces the original sample by around 2,455 observations or 16% of 
the final sample. Without this assumption we are not able to identify the parameters of the RURO-SC model, possibly 
because these extremely poor households do not align with the setup of the model.  
19 1 $USD= 3.038 COP (exchange rate of 1 June 2016). 
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of females (65 percent) especially given their high share of the not-working category (80 percent). 
Workers are on average younger than non-workers and have fewer children. For the entire survey, 
Bogota (Colombia’s capital) represents 19 percent of total workers, for the sample, a lower share 
lives in the city (6.9 percent of the sample: 6.4 percent of informal and 8.6 percent of formal 
workers).20  
The sample is on average more educated than the other survey respondents. In the survey, 19 
percent of those aged 18 or over had higher education relative to 39.3 percent in the sample. Hourly 
wages are on average almost twice as high in the formal sector than in the informal, with disposable 
incomes following a similar pattern. In the sample, non-workers have an average income slightly 
below that of informal workers. Lastly, there is a significantly lower share of vulnerable individuals 
in the formal sector relative to the informal and not-working groups.21     
2.4.2 Estimation assumptions 
Based on the distribution of hours worked observed in the country, for the DC model we assume 
10 hours points: [0, 10.5, 27.5, 40, 50, 60, 72.5, 85, 95, 110] with cutting points at [0, 1, 20, 35, 45, 
55, 65, 80, 90, 100, 120] and the total available time to be T = (24hr)(7days) = 168. We estimate 
wages for non-working individuals using a Mincer equation within a two-stage Heckman estimation 
that corrects for selection into work.22  
We make 100 draws for the RURO and 200 draws for the RURO with sectoral choice, twice as 
many to account for the two sectors. We also assume the hours support is in the interval 
[H , H ] = [1,120]. Lastly, we assume three peaks in the piecemeal uniform density at 40, 48 
and 60 hr/w, trying to capture the most common available time regimes observed in the Colombian 




20 This result is mainly driven by population weights. 
21 We define as vulnerable population those observations belonging to the first quintile of a composite life quality index 
usually employed in Colombia (ICV). The index includes 12 well-being dimensions such as: quality of roofs, walls and 
floors, access to sanitation and water, and human capital of the household.  
22 Estimates of these models are shown in the appendix. In this case  
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Deterministic utility function  
For the three models, we assume the deterministic component of the utility function to be of the 
Box-Cox type given the high flexibility of its functional form but also because of other important 
properties highlighted in the literature.23 The utility function follows the specification: 








Where X  and X  are a vector of parameters that shift the intensity of preference for leisure and 
consumption, the exponents α  and α < 1 determine the curvature of the indifference curves, with 
lower values implying less substitutability between leisure and income. α , α , β , β  are parameters 
to be estimated. Y  is monthly disposable income in millions of Colombian pesos and L  is weekly 
hours of work. Notice that sector does not enter utility because we were not able to identify the 
parameters of the model when we included sectoral preferences. We acknowledge that the omission 
of the sector in the utility function is important because non-monetary benefits of a formal job are 
valued by workers and future research should address this point. The analysis in this paper should 
therefore be considered as a first step for the development and improvement of future RURO 
frameworks for the analysis of labour supply in the presence of informality. 
2.4.3 Estimation results  
The estimated coefficients for the three models are presented in Table 2.2 below. We observe a 
lower preference for leisure for single males, but higher for single people with children aged 0-2. 
The intensity of preference for leisure decreases with age. For the three models, most of the taste-
shifters are statistically significant. The α  and α  coefficients are always negative and statistically 
significant, being the lowest for the RURO-SC model. This implies that taking restrictions in job 
availability into account dramatically changes preferences, making leisure and income less substi-
tutable. For the DC model the utility cost of work decreases with age, but this effect is marginally 
decreasing. Both coefficients for age are statistically significant. 
 
 
23 See Dagsvik (2006). 
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Variable DC RURO RURO-SC Variable RURO RURO-SC
constant 17.8697*** 22.5285*** 2.8119*** constant -32.7137***
(5.3) (4.85) (4.72) (-8.01)
          male -0.5428*** -0.7807*** -0.0604***      age 15.0365***
(-11.26) (-10.74) (-5.81) (6.51)
          age -8.9689*** -11.8294*** -1.5861***      age2 -2.1278***
(-4.71) (-4.5) (-4.68) (-6.55)
          age2 1.314*** 1.7518*** 0.2325***      lower edu. 0.8612***
(4.9) (4.71) (4.81) (7.07)
          child 0-2y 0.1077 0.2332* 0.1596***      higher edu. -1.5509***
(0.997) (1.67) (4.09) (-9.37)
          child 3-4y -0.2693*** -0.3274** 0.0365      male -0.4328***
(-2.73) (-2.54) (1.46) (-5.4)
          child 5-10y -0.2611*** -0.3192*** 0.0402***      form rate 3.7024***
(-4.26) (-3.86) (2.79) (9.36)
          alfa -2.6465*** -1.9972*** -5.1191***      vulnerable -0.4778***
(-35.44) (-20.87) (-33.2) (-3.11)
constant 2.4429*** 2.2202*** 0.0025* constant -29.6702***
(52.39) (41.45) (1.63) (-9.05)
           alfa -0.1486*** -0.0614*** -2.4294***      age 14.612***
(-13.16) (-3.52) (-9.39) (7.86)
constant 53.058***      age2 -2.1391***
(13.83) (-8.16)
              child 0-5y -0.1099      lower edu. 0.2125***
(-1.37) (2.96)
              age -28.8029***      higher edu. -0.6137***
(-13.27) (-8.96)




     age 35.9483***
(20.63)
     age2 -5.034***
(-20.6)
     lower edu. -0.4583***
(-4.98)
     higher edu. -0.1307 
(-1.29)
     male 0.8899***
(15.96)
     form rate 3.1778***
(13.24)





























































Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) Notes: t statistics in parenthesis, significance level:  * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In the RURO type of models, coefficients for wage offers, hours densities and opportunities are 
mostly statistically significant. In the case of wage offer densities, all the signs are as expected. For 
the three densities, the effect of experience on wages is concave, living in Bogota or having tertiary 
education increases hourly income, and, in the case of the simpler RURO, being in the formal sector 
Variable RURO RURO-SC Variable DC RURO RURO-SC
constant 7.0504*** peak 1 (40 h/w) 3.1234***
(273.79) (96.49)
experience 1.6632***         peak 2 (48 h/w) 3.936***
(8.94) (148.93)
experience2 -2.7171***         peak 3 (60 h/w) 2.1086***
(-6.85) (47.77)
        lower edu. -0.2589*** peak 1 (40 h/w) 2.6071***
(-11.31) (41.79)
        higher edu. 0.5706***         peak 2 (48 h/w) 3.3911***
(40.79) (72.48)
        male 0.0311**         peak 3 (60 h/w) 2.4818***
(2.49) (36.57)
        Bogota 0.1189*** peak 1 (40 h/w) 3.678***
(5.58) (108.92)
        formal 0.5466***         peak 2 (48 h/w) 4.7126***
(37.31) (173.5)
        rmse 0.5839***         peak 3 (60 h/w) 2.6041***
(123.12) (49.93)
constant 7.7636*** Observations 15,347 15,347 15,347





        lower edu. -0.2446***
(-8.43)
        higher edu. 0.4775***
(15.78)
        male 0.2453***
(11.1)
        Bogota 0.2121***
(4.96)








        lower edu. -0.3288***
(-9.33)
        higher edu. 0.6246***
(41.54)
        male 0.0668***
(4.53)
        Bogota 0.0842***
(3.32)
















































increases wages.24 Hours peaks are very significant in both models with a higher peak for full-time 
(48hr/w) and a higher dispersion of hours in the informal sector as in the data.  
Turning to the opportunities function, in all cases the effect of age on the availability of job offers 
is positive but marginally decreasing. A similar concave effect is found for education; a higher 
availability of working relative to non-working opportunities is found for those who completed high 
school; those who only completed primary or completed a degree or vocational training receive 
fewer working opportunities relative to the former group. The effect is similar across all RURO 
models, albeit the negative effect of higher education on opportunities in the formal sector is not 
statistically significant. Lastly, a higher group-specific formalization rate increases opportunities in 
the formal sector while being in a vulnerable household decreases formal opportunities.25 
Model Fit 
Figure 2.1 presents the fit of the model for hours worked. All models do a good job predicting 
weekly work time. However, the DC model seems to underpredict full-time relative to RURO 
models, putting more weight into time regimes around 30hr/w and 70 hr/w. This could be a result 
of the discretisation of hours of work around these points.  
Figure 2.1 Hours worked fit 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) 
 
24 (Potential) experience is defined as age in years minus years of education minus 5 years.  
25 In this case, the group-specific formality rate varies for groups of gender, education, and region. Following Decoster, 
Capeau and Dekkers (2016), such a variable will help to identify the distinction between opportunities in both sectors.  
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Figure 2.2 presents wage and consumption (income) fit for the three models. As discussed before, 
in the DC model, most wages are not estimated but taken from the data. Discrepancies arise 
because wages are estimated for non-workers, therefore, the density shift to the right is a result of 
higher estimated wages for non-workers than observed wages for workers.  
Figure 2.2 Wage and Consumption fit 
Wage (hourly) Consumption 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) 
In the case of RURO, the first part of the distribution seems to be captured quite well. However, 
there is a higher dispersion of the predicted relative to actual data. This is a result of the bunching 
of wages around the minimum wage (represented by the vertical dotted line) which is not captured 
by RURO estimates. Consumption translates this wage feature, with the three models predicting 
more dispersed disposable income than the actual data.  
 Figure 2.3 Indifference curves 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) 
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Indifference curves for the three models are presented in Figure 2.3. We fix utility at full-time 
(48hr/w) and one million Colombian pesos (around 1.45 times the monthly minimum wage in 
2016). As expected from the estimated coefficients, the RURO model with sector choice displays a 
high degree of complementarity between leisure and consumption. However, omitting the differ-
ences between the two sectors provides more substitutability between them. The indifference curves 
in the former case greatly resemble those of a Leontief (minimum) function. Admittedly, the dif-
ferences could be arising from a misspecification of the functional form of the utility function in-
cluding a possible lack of utility differences for each sector. A further exploration of these issues is 
an important line of future research. 
Figure 2.4 Sector and sectoral wage fit in RURO-SC 
Sector Sectoral wage 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) 
Sector fit in the RURO model with sector choice 
The sector fit of the more comprehensive version of the RURO model is presented in Figure 2.4. 
Despite the dramatical change in preferences for the RURO with sectoral choice, the extension of 
the model to capture formal and informal employment does a good job fitting the distribution 
between the two sectors and the non-working alternative. The model slightly overpredicts formal 
employment and underpredicts informal employment, but the differences with respect to actual 
data are negligible (around 1 percent). On the other hand, sectoral wage fit resembles the simpler 
RURO results: the model captures the mean but fails to capture the concentration of data, around 
the minimum wage (represented by the vertical line), especially for formal workers. This sectoral 
fit alongside the overall fit discussed previously and the sign of the coefficients in Table 2.2 gives 
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us some reassurance about the proposed model. Nevertheless, additional work is necessary to un-
cover the explanation behind the drastic change in preferences.  
2.5 A simulation exercise 
In this section we use the extended version of the RURO model to make three simulations that 
test the hypothesis of segmentation. We simulate exogenous variation of variables known to deter-
mine the likelihood of being formal. We hypothesise that if markets in developing countries are 
indeed segmented, the availability of job offers in the formal sector for workers that are currently 
in the informal sector (that the RURO model captures via the Poisson process in Equation 4) will 
change slightly. On the other hand, if workers are relatively free to move between sectors, a suffi-
ciently high exogenous change will increase the attractiveness of formal employment and move a 
significant share of informal workers to the formal sector. Note that from the model’s perspective 
the two alternatives could coexist, that is, for a group of workers the availability of alternatives 
could increase, while for the rest of them the availability could change little. Therefore, what we 
are trying to measure here is which alternative is more prominent in aggregate terms.   
The first simulation (S1) assumes an increase in the level of education for all observed informal 
workers aged 18-40 to a tertiary education level. The simulation affects 13.3 percent of the sample 
and implies an increase in the share of informal workers with higher education from 14.5 percent 
to 67.5 percent and a reduction in the share of workers with primary education or less from 26.3 
percent to 16.4 percent. As seen from the estimated coefficients in Table 2.2, such a change will 
reduce opportunities in the informal sector with an ambiguous effect on opportunities in the formal 
sector, given that both education coefficients are negative. The effect on wages is unambiguously 
positive, with wages increasing substantially more in the formal sector because both the penalty 
for having primary education or less, and the premium of higher education are higher. Overall, 
based on previous literature and on our parameter estimates, we expect the simulation to increase 
the attractiveness and availability of jobs in the formal sector relative to the informal sector.  
In the second simulation (S2) we eliminate social insurance contributions for formal workers earning 
less than three monthly minimum wages. This simulation only operates via income and implies an 
8 percent increase in labour earnings in the formal sector with the respective increase in disposable 
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income for workers in this sector. Undoubtedly, this represents an increase in the attractiveness of 
jobs in the formal relative to the informal sector.  
Notice that given the magnitude of changes in the two exercises proposed, the simulations will 
necessarily affect the job offer arrival rate; in other words, there are general equilibrium effects that 
we are not able to capture in the RURO model that could affect the results obtained. 
2.5.1 Simulating changes on education and social insurance contributions 
Figure 2.5 presents the change in simulated wages alongside the change in opportunities for informal 
workers aged 18-40 for the first two simulation exercises. For the graph in the right pane, oppor-
tunities are defined as the estimated probabilities π , π , 1 − π − π . In the graph they are pictured 
for different age values and evaluated at the average of other covariates. The concave relationship 
between age and opportunities in the formal sector (captured by the red lines) is in line with 
previous Probit estimates for formality in Latin America such as Carneiro and Henley (2002) for 
Brazil or Cuevas et al., (2016) for Mexico. The availability of non-market opportunities (captured 
by the green lines) follows the pattern of a typical participation model: it decreases from age 18 
onwards and increases at around 50 years old. As depicted with the dashed lines corresponding to 
the first counterfactual (S1), opportunities in the informal sector decrease by 10.7pp for informal 
workers. Correspondingly, their opportunities in the formal sector increase by 5.6 pp, with the 
difference (5.1pp) being an increase in the availability of non-market alternatives. Opportunities 
do not change for the second simulation by construction. 
Figure 2.5 Simulated wage and opportunities changes 
Wage Opportunities 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) Note: Workers aged 18-40 years observed in the informal sector in 
the sample. Vertical line represents the minimum wage. 
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For the wage graph in the right pane of Figure 2.5, we first determine the best alternative among 
the 200 draws as detailed in section 2.3.5. Next, for the best alternative, we pick the corresponding 
hourly wage rate in the baseline (red line) and counterfactuals (dashed and dotted red lines). We 
observe that the average hourly wage for workers in the target group increases by around 68 
percent, moving the wage distribution considerably above the minimum wage. Wages are not ob-
served to change for the second simulation. 
Figure 2.6 Sectoral Movement 
 
  Simulation 1 Simulation 2 





e Not Working 0.998  0.000  0.002  Not Working 0.996  0.000  0.004  
Informal 0.002  0.934  0.065  Informal 0.000  0.997  0.003  
Formal  0.009  0.003  0.988  Formal  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016)  
Despite considerable increases in education that in turn increase simulated wages in both sectors 
and job availability in the formal sector, there is a reduced movement of workers from the informal 
to the formal sector as seen in Figure 2.6. Only 6.5 percent of informal workers are observed making 
a transition between the two sectors. In the case of Simulation 2, only 0.3 percent of informal 
workers make a transition as a result of the increase by 8 percent of labour earnings for formal 
employees with low incomes. We observe that both simulations create incentives to work for those 
not working, resulting in some individuals moving from not working to working as formal. Lastly, 
hours worked do not change significantly for the two simulations relative to the baseline, average 
hours of work decrease 0.06 and 0 percent for the target group in each simulation, respectively. 
This effect could be a result of the reduced availability of time regimes at hours other than full-
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time, 40 h/w or 60h/w but also due to the extreme complementarity estimated between leisure and 
consumption.   
2.6 Conclusions 
This paper proposed the study of labour informality with structural labour supply models estimated 
for a developing country such as Colombia. We presented an overview of the literature on structural 
labour supply and compared model fit and preferences for the most common models available for 
developed economies. As a motivating exercise for the scope of counterfactual simulations available 
with this type of models, we use our more comprehensive model and simulated exogenous changes 
in variables known to increase the likelihood of being in the formal sector: we increased education 
attainment, reduced worker social insurance contributions, and increased formal disposable income.  
Overall, we find good model fit and the expected sign of most estimated coefficients. We find that 
preferences drastically change for different specifications of the labour supply models. Lastly, sim-
ulation of pro-formality policies results in a modest to null effect on the composition of the pool of 
workers between sectors, in line with the hypothesis of labour market segmentation. We argue that 
there are some unobserved factors that determine a great deal of formal job availability. Future 
research should explore which other variables not accounted for in our estimation contribute to 
enhancing formal opportunities for informal workers. 
Although our modelling framework is built under some restrictive assumptions that future work 
should try to address, our results suggest, from a policy point of view, that governments should be 
more concerned about the determinants of opportunities in the formal sector such as education 
than about monetary incentives to formal employment. More importantly, education not only 
makes formal jobs more attractive from a monetary perspective (because it increases wages), but 
it also increases formal job availability for informal workers. In Colombia, as in many other Latin 
American countries, access to tertiary education has increased mostly as a result of higher house-
hold incomes. However, without substantive changes in education policies, only households which 
are already better off will be able to benefit from higher education and its earnings and opportuni-
ties premia in the formal sector.  
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We consider the labour supply framework presented in this paper as an important avenue for future 
research into informality. This is especially true given the lack of panel data for developing coun-
tries, but also the lack of a testable dynamic choice model of labour supply. Some advantages of 
our framework are the detailed treatment of individual budget sets; the inclusion of choice at the 
intensive and extensive margins; and the most detailed treatment of heterogeneity between workers 
which contrasts with the excessive number of behavioural assumptions in macroeconomic models. 
However, given the cross-sectional nature of the data and the restrictions on the sample, it is hard 
to generalise that the predicted movement between sectors of our model after exogenous changes 
will correspond to the reality of all informal workers, and our results should be taken with caution. 
Some features worth improving for this framework are the inclusion of utility preferences over 
sectors, the inclusion of couples and the self-employed. While the first two have been previously 
considered in the literature (see Pradhan and van Soest, 1997), they require substantial additional 
computational efforts. In the case of self-employment, most labour supply models for developed 
countries omit them from estimation given the lack of reliable data on incomes, but also, because 
the incentive framework, including a wage might not seem appropriate in this case. Given that 
most informal workers are self-employed in countries such as Colombia, modelling their labour 
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Age 0.086*** 0.018*** 
 (9.27) (4.63) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000* 
 (-9.9) (-1.67) 
Higher education 0.316*** 0.652*** 
 (9.99) (54.03) 
Lower education  -0.309*** -0.446*** 
 (-7.35) (-23.54) 
Bogota 0.561*** 0.136*** 
 (8.31) (6.64) 
Male 0.089** 0.148*** 
 (2.51) (12.52) 
Other Earnings -0.143***  
 (-51.55)  
Property -0.157***  
 (-4.28)  
Child 0-2y -0.235***  
 (-4.58)  
Child 3-4y 0.096*  
 (1.69)  
Child 5-10y 0.127***  
 (3.44)  
Child 11-18y 0.221***  
 (6.19)  
inverse Mills-Ratio  -0.012 
  (-0.58) 
Constant 0.391** 7.640*** 
 2.29 104.97 
Observations 15,347 12,111 
Adjusted or pseudo  
R-squared 
0.329182 0.308396 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GEIH (2016) 
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Chapter 3: The role of job contact 
networks on formal-informal labour 
dynamics1 
Abstract 
This paper explores the potential use of agent-based models in the informality literature, and to do 
so it uses this methodology to study the effect of contact networks as a job-search mechanism on 
an economy with a substantial informal sector. We extend a model capable of replicating a large 
number of stylised facts from the macroeconomics literature to incorporate firm heterogeneity, and 
more importantly, the endogenous formation and use of job contact networks. Given that model 
intractability has resulted in few networks studies, the proposed framework allows us to disentangle 
the effect of networks, especially in the presence of a large share of small firms as in most developing 
economies with an informal sector. Estimating most of the technology and job-search parameters 
of our model using Colombian household data, we find a high degree of sectoral homophily in 
contact networks: informal and formal workers have on average 70.3 and 81.5 percent of connections 
in their sectors, respectively. However, the current propensities of direct and indirect (that is, with 
contacts) search do not prevent workers from changing sectors and, only under extremely high 
propensities of indirect search do we notice effects on the real variables of the economy and on the 
formality-informality divide. Based on our exploratory analysis, we argue that the proposed frame-
work could complement traditional macroeconomic models of informality, especially when model-
ling complex phenomena.  
JEL: E26, C63, C69 
Keywords: Job contact networks, informality, agent-based models, computable macroeconomics  
 
1 I would like to thank Simone Giansante for introducing me to the Lengnick (2013) model and the JAS software. I 
extend my thanks to Matthias Lengnick for valuable advice on the baseline model. Also, to Ross Richardson and Matteo 




Given the contrasting differences in labour market outcomes between developing and developed 
countries, there is still a great need for analysis and policy recommendations on the ongoing failure 
to expand formal employment in the first group of countries. Informal labour markets are usually 
deemed as segmented, and therefore, models incorporating the demand for labour alongside the 
availability of information on job openings are the most appealing for this task. Literature on 
informality from a macroeconomic perspective has focused on general equilibrium models in dual-
market (formal and informal) economies, in which, a representative agent (worker and/or firm) 
chooses between sectors based on the comparison of expected utilities. Counterfactual experiments 
allow the researcher to analyse how exogenous variables such as the minimum wage, preferences or 
other policies affect the size of informal activities, but also, whether reforms that decrease infor-
mality improve welfare. Ideally, these insights would translate into policy recommendations. 
Building on the seminal works on equilibrium in dual-market economies of Rauch (1991) and Lo-
ayza (1996), we find the more elaborated models of Straub (2005), Amaral and Quintin (2006) or 
Loayza and Rigolini (2011) which introduced among others: the effects of payroll taxes, and firm 
and worker heterogeneity. More recently, literature on informality has moved this equilibrium 
framework to the search and matching approach pioneered by Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999). In this line, we find the works of Zenou (2008), Satchi, and Temple (2009), 
Albrecht et al., (2009), Bosh and Maloney (2010) and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) introducing 
search frictions, endogenous job destruction and wage bargaining, among others. 
One unexplored topic in the informality literature is the role of job contact networks in the job 
search. This could be the case because networks are intractable objects in an already mathemati-
cally complicated general equilibrium problem, to the point that most theoretical job network 
studies resort to numerical simulation given the impossibility of obtaining analytical expressions 
for employment in the presence of even simple network structures (Krauth, 2004, Calvó-Armengol 
and Jackson, 2004, Arrow and Borzekowski, 2004). The lack of economics literature on job contact 
networks in general is pervasive, despite networks being important sources of job information. To 
put things into perspective, according to data from the Statistics Office, in Colombia, half of em-
ployees obtained their job through friends, colleagues and relatives, and 2/5 of the unemployed are 
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looking for a job using contacts.2 Similar magnitudes but higher heterogeneity in the use of contact 
networks have been observed for very different economies such as the US and Europe but also 
within different socioeconomic groups (Ioannides and Datcher, 2004, Pellizzari, 2010). Moreover, 
the effect of job contact networks on employment inequalities is a contested topic. Although net-
works reduce asymmetries of information, increasing overall employment rates, wages, and the 
quality of worker-employer matches (Bayer et al., 2008, Caliendo et al., 2011, Brown et al., 2016); 
it is also known that network homophily decreases the quality of employment outcomes for disad-
vantaged groups (Battu et al., 2011; Holzer, 1987; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson; 2004, Krauth, 
2004).  
The overall objective of this paper is to explore how agent-based models (ABMs) could be intro-
duced in the informality literature and to highlight the advantages of this methodology, especially 
to model complex phenomena where mathematical solutions are not easily available. Moreover, our 
paper seeks to contribute to the limited, but growing, literature on networks in labour economics 
by studying the endogenous formation of job contacts on the job. Such a mechanism could poten-
tially lead to a higher segmentation of labour markets in developing economies as information on 
job openings in the formal sector could not reach the informal sector. We develop a model of an 
economy consisting of households offering homogenous labour and firms with heterogeneous produc-
tivities producing a single consumption commodity in the spirit of Lucas (1978). However, we 
depart from traditional equilibrium models to overcome the problems of introducing contact net-
works. In our economy, production, work, and consumption decisions are based entirely on local 
knowledge and heuristics and therefore, there is not an a priori market-clearing mechanism. Our 
macroeconomic model is an extension of the ABM of Lengnick (2013) that additionally considers 
formal and informal activities, differences in firm size between these sectors and introduces the 
formation of job contacts on the job as a novel feature. We build from an existing ABM instead of 
starting a model from scratch for three reasons: to capture general equilibrium effects, to contribute 
to dissemination of the simple framework proposed by Lengnick (2013), and to allow for compara-
bility between our model and the recent informality literature that has a macroeconomic perspec-
tive.       
 
2 Data sources are presented in detail in section 3.3.1. 
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To better motivate the use of ABM and particularly the Lengnick (2013) model in the informality 
literature we present a detailed overview of our modified version of the model. We also discuss at 
length the introduction of job contact networks and their potential effect on labour market seg-
mentation. We estimate most of the technology and job-search parameters of the model for the 
Colombian economy and take other parameters from the original Lengnick work, especially those 
concerning the demand for the consumption commodity. Our exploratory model indicates that job 
contact networks display a high degree of sectoral homophily, however, the current propensities of 
direct and indirect search do not prevent workers from changing sectors. We observe workers vis-
iting formal and informal firms regardless of initial job conditions and network size. Moreover, we 
find that, controlling for firm size and number of job contacts, a 10pp increase in the propensity of 
use of contact networks increases the probability of making a sectoral transition by 9.1 percent. 
This positive effect is, nonetheless, marginally decreasing because of congestion in the use of net-
works. 
In the following, Section 3.2 revises the most important features of macroeconomics models of 
informal markets, previous studies on the role of job contact networks and introduces ABMs. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents some stylised facts of informality in Colombia. Section 3.4 discusses the model in 
detail. Section 3.5 presents some counterfactual exercises. The sixth and last section presents con-
clusions. 
3.2 Informality, labour dynamics and job contact networks 
In this section, we review some models on labour dynamics in the presence of informality, we 
explore how job contact networks are accounted for in labour economics and lastly, we introduce 
ABMs, especially as applied to labour economics. We argue that ABMs are an important tool that 
complements traditional equilibrium models and increases our understanding of labour dynamics, 
especially when dealing with mathematically intractable structures such as networks. 
3.2.1 Equilibrium models of informality 
Most of the research on labour informality at the macro level has a two-sector equilibrium perspec-
tive. The pioneering work of Rauch (1991) proposes a theoretical model with a continuum of agents 
endowed with different levels of “managerial talent” that allow them to create a firm and hire 
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workers. Depending on a simple comparison between wage as an employee with earnings as an 
entrepreneur, agents choose one or the other role. After the introduction of a minimum wage en-
forced only for big firms, a continuum of firms paying wages below the minimum (informality) 
appears. In the same spirit, Loayza (1996) develops a growth model in which agents transform an 
endowment of capital into output and decide whether to be formal, which implies paying taxes and 
benefiting fully from a positive externality of public goods, or to be informal and pay a penalty 
proportional to output, receiving only a reduced effect of the externality. Equilibrium is determined 
when returns in both sectors are equal. He concludes that institutions and policies that increase 
the informal sector size will reduce growth. 
More recently, Ulyssea (2018) studies informality with a general equilibrium model encompassing 
the extensive (that is, firms decide whether being formal or not) and intensive (firms decide the 
combination of informal/formal workers to hire) margins of informality. To account for the inten-
sive margin, he assumes that labour costs are a marginally increasing function of the number of 
informal workers, but a linear function of the number of formal workers (with the slope given by 
the payroll tax). The nature of the costs functions implies that formal firms first hire workers 
informally up to a threshold over which every additional worker is hired formally. The introduction 
of such a convex cost function for informal hiring, with no theoretical basis, is a recurrent feature 
of this strand of the literature. Lastly, potential entrant firms decide the sector, or no entry, based 
on a noisily productivity signal that is fully revealed ex-post, allowing for the overlapping of produc-
tivities between formal and informal firms observed in the data. 
Recent research on informality builds on this equilibrium framework but introduces market frictions 
following the search and matching approach pioneered by Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999). The seminal work of Zenou (2008) proposes a model comprising identical firms 
and workers within formal and informal sectors. A matching function determines the meeting pro-
cess between unemployment and formal vacancies. 3 The informal sector does not display such a 
queue process but works as a competitive market; therefore, if workers decide to work in the infor-
mal sector, they find a job instantaneously with a wage equal to the marginal product of labour. 
 
3 Informal workers must stay unemployed for one period to queue for a formal job. Moreover, formal workers will not 
look for informal jobs, preferring to remain unemployed. 
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Firms enter the formal market until the value of a filled job is equal to search costs, with wages 
determined following a Nash bargaining process. After calibrating the model to a hypothetical 
economy, some policy simulations show that reducing unemployment benefits, subsidising firms’ 
entry costs or imposing wage subsidies will decrease the size of the informal sector. 
In the same vein, Albrecht et al., (2009) assume workers with heterogeneous productivities and 
endogenous job destruction.4 They find that increasing payroll taxes and severance payments in-
creases the size of the informal sector at the expense of workers in the formal sector. The effect of 
these variables on unemployment is opposing, higher severance payments reduce unemployment 
because they increase employment duration in the formal sector while higher payroll taxes increase 
unemployment. 
Lastly, Meghir et al., (2015) extended the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model of wage differentials 
to an informal economy populated by homogenous workers and productivity heterogeneous firms 
deciding to post jobs in the informal or formal sector. The model is estimated for groups of unskilled 
males and females in the Sao Paulo and Salvador regions in Brazil. In a counterfactual exercise, it 
is found that increasing the cost of operating in the informal sector (firm enforcement) increases 
welfare by moving workers to higher productivity jobs.  
Despite the importance of job contact networks and the growing study of them for developed 
economies, their analysis in informality models is, to our knowledge, non-existent. We now turn to 
the literature on networks, mostly for developed countries, and their effects on labour market 
outcomes. 
3.2.2 Job contact networks and labour markets 
The role of contact networks for job search has been studied extensively by sociologists, while 
economists’ understanding of them is much less developed (Ioannides and Datcher, 2004). Three 
recurrent topics have caught most of attention in our profession: link strength, network structure 
and formation, and the use of contact network for referral job application. Although the literature 
suggests that the use of contacts improves the quality of outcomes, it also highlights that disad-
vantaged groups could be better off attempting a direct job search because network homophily, 
 
4 Separation is of mutual interest for firm and worker. 
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that is, the tendency of individuals to have ties with others similar to themselves, could prevent 
them from receiving information on better paid job openings. These contrasting results have not 
yet been analysed for another disadvantaged group of workers such as the informal in developing 
economies. 
In an early analysis of link strength, Granovetter (1973, 1983) classified links as strong (close 
friends) or weak (acquaintances), establishing that social systems without weak ties are fragmented 
as individuals are “deprived of information from distant parts of the system” (Granovetter, 1983, 
p. 202). In this sense, information regarding job openings from close friends usually overlaps with 
the information an individual already has, but as acquaintances move in different circles, they have 
better access to new information. Empirical literature on the strength of the weak ties assertion 
has delivered mixed results, especially given the lack of data and problems measuring link strength 
(Aral, S. 2016).  
Two interesting findings are provided by Battu et al., (2011) analysing job search methods for 
minorities in the UK. First, foreign-born ethnic groups initially rely heavily on strong ties relative 
to direct job search, possibly as a result of gradual assimilation. However, in the long-run they tend 
to use direct search methods as much as native-born populations. Second, controlling for job search 
mechanisms, minorities are less likely to find a job, or in the case of finding one, the position is of 
inferior quality than that for similar native-born workers. The authors consider that minorities in 
the UK have poor quality personal networks or that they use them inefficiently. 
Regarding network formation and structure, Calvó-Armengol (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson (2004) study job information flows in games of strategic contact network formation, where 
keeping contacts is costly. Their models establish the existence of equilibrium and the prevalence 
of worst outcomes for groups initially in worst-employment status. Using a similar methodology, 
Galeotti and Merlino (2014) found that there is a U-shaped relationship between investment in job 
contacts and the separation rate: workers do not expand their connections if a) there are very low 
separations, because it is less likely they lose their job; b) there are high separations, because it is 
more likely others are also looking for a job. The authors also found this relationship empirically 
for the UK. 
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Literature on referral hiring highlights that firms approximate an applicant’s productivity with 
that of an employee referring him. This could be a result of perceived network homophily. Brown 
et al., (2016) use firm-level data to test some hypotheses for referral hiring. They found that referred 
workers are more likely to be hired than non-referred, to have higher initial wages and longer 
tenure, but that most differences decrease over time. Krauth (2004) proposes a dynamic setup in 
which firms discover potential workers’ productivity by exogenous referral networks. Using different 
network structures and sometimes resorting to simulations, his model supports Granovetter’s (1973) 
weak ties assertion but also, that social isolation leads to high unemployment for disadvantaged 
groups. Pellizzari (2010) uses panel data from Europe and the US to show that there are wage 
premiums and penalties of using job contact networks, where penalties could be the result of mis-
matches between firms and workers. Lastly, Arrow and Borzekowski (2004) explore the effects of 
networks on earnings differentials through a model in which firms bid for homogenous workers in 
a second-price auction. Firms base their offered wage either on a productivity signal in the case of 
a referral, or a “common knowledge” ability level in the case where there is no such connection. 
Calibrating the model to the US distribution of wages, they found that around 1/6 of wage variance 
could be explained by networks. 
From the ABM literature, Tassier and Menczer (2001) study contact networks in an evolutionary 
labour market in which individuals search for jobs directly or through contact networks, both 
alternatives being costly. Wages and layoffs are random, and agents die or multiply depending on 
the fitness of the individual effort placed on each strategy for obtaining jobs, which in turn changes 
at random, guaranteeing that only the best strategies and networks structures are used by the 
remaining agents in the long-run. They find that agents create many more links than is socially 
desirable.5 Additionally, Gemkow and Neugart (2011) propose an ABM of referral networks in 
which agents adjust their costly network size depending on the payoffs obtained. Similarly to Gale-
otti and Merlino (2014), they find that network size decreases when labour market volatility in-
creases, because keeping friends is expensive if they are also searching for jobs themselves. Below, 
we turn to a more in-depth analysis of ABM in the labour economics literature. 
 
5 That is, more links than those that maximise population size. 
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3.2.3 Agent-based model in labour economics  
In a typical ABM, a large number of agents are introduced into a simulation environment. Each 
agent is characterised by a set of simple rules of behaviour of the “if-then” type, including interac-
tion with other agents that could potentially alter their state variables. It also incorporates ran-
domness via Monte Carlo methods. At the first simulation time-step, agents are called to perform 
their predefined rules based on initial values for their control variables. At the end of the first time-
step, the state of the simulated economy could be analysed at the micro (that is, agent) level or at 
the macro level (by aggregating agents’ results). The second time-step of the simulation starts 
based on the first-step results for control variables and so on. Most of the time, the researcher is 
interested in the long-run effects of changes in the parameters governing the rules of behaviour, 
but also in the long-run properties of the model, the most important being ergodicity, a condition 
under which a model with the same parameter values will always converge to the same statistical 
equilibria, that is, regardless of the initial conditions of control variables the model will exhibit a 
similar long-run behaviour. If a model is ergodic, a time series derived from one model run gives 
information for estimating the underlying laws of motion of the ABM (Delli Gatti et al., 2010, 
Grazzini and Richiardi, 2015, Grazzini, Richiardi and Sella, 2018).  
An ABM has several advantages over traditional economics models. Firstly, it overcomes “repre-
sentative agent” restrictions by allowing individual heterogeneity for a large number of agents. 
Dynamics do not require rational expectations or extreme rationality assumptions for model trac-
tability; instead, simple heuristic rules based on local knowledge result in “emergence” of observed 
phenomena at the macro level.6 7  Market equilibrium is not imposed ex-ante but is achieved by 
the interaction of different types of agents with opposing interests, for instance, households and 
firms. On the other hand, ABMs have some important weaknesses. Model flexibility usually goes 
hand in hand with excessive freedom, and proliferation of models, which are usually tailored only 
to the problem at hand (Turrel, 2016). Moreover, while an ABM requires substantive computational 
 
6 With rational expectations we refer to the assumption that all individuals in the model have unlimited computational 
ability and are fully informed about the structure of the model. Moreover, all agents know that other agents possess the 
same knowledge. This assumption usually implies that individuals make no systematic errors in their choices. 
7 Emergence could be defined as unintended and unplanned aggregate outcomes from the model resulting from individual 
human actions and dispersed interactions (Delli Gatti et al., 2010).  
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skills, its code is rarely reused, which has prevented a more rapid take-off of the methodology 
(Leombruni and Richiardi, 2005). 
In the case of the labour market ABMs, there have been two main approaches (Neugart and Richi-
ardi, 2018): the first simulates the labour market only, similar to partial equilibrium analysis (Richi-
ardi, 2006, Neugart, 2008, Boudreau, 2010, and Ballot and Taymaz, 2001); the second incorporates 
the labour market into a macroeconomic model (Gaffeo et al., 2008, Russo et al., 2007, Lengnick, 
2013, and Dawid et al., 2016). 
Richiardi (2006) proposes a labour market model in which agents with different productivities and 
preferences decide between working as employees, employers and not working. They compare the 
average wage in the economy with the payoff of starting a new business, which in turn depends on 
the average productivity and the prospective number of workers. The costs of the start-up are 
wages, which are an idiosyncratic share over the productivity of workers, and a fixed cost of posting 
vacancies. If agents decide to be employees, they randomly ask firms for open positions, while each 
firm keeps the most productive applicants. The model reproduces some of the macroeconomics 
stylised facts: Beveridge, Okun and wage curves, but only finds support for a negatively sloped 
wage curve and a constant returns to scale matching function when the model is “out of equilib-
rium”.8  
Neugart (2008) evaluates the effects of government-financed active labour market policies in a 
market with different sectors. After a sectoral negative shock, all workers become unemployed and 
must acquire job-specific skills to apply for jobs in similar sectors. Governments could provide 
training, which is financed by taxing the employed. It is found that government intervention re-
duces the unemployment rate by increasing the outflows from unemployment to employment for 
those receiving the training subsidy, but it reduces the outflows of those not receiving it.  
Turning to labour market modules embedded in macroeconomic models, Gaffeo et al., (2008) pro-
pose a model with firms, households and banks in which productivity is raised by investment in 
R&D.9 Workers supply one unit of labour each period. They apply to a list of firms including their 
current employer and accept the one offering the highest wage. Wages are individually tailored and 
 
8 This is, after the model has received an exogenous shock and re-accommodates towards equilibrium again. 
9 Based on the same model as Russo et al., (2007). 
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cannot go below a minimum wage (established by law), updated for inflation each period. The 
model replicates most macroeconomics stylised facts for developed economies including the co-
movements of aggregate variables with output usually observed. 
Lastly, the EURACE model (Dawid et al., 2016) presents a very detailed ABM of the European 
economy with hundreds of millions of interacting agents of three types: households, firms, and 
banks. The model includes five markets: consumption and investment goods, labour, credit, and 
financial assets, with most of them working at the local level, that is, each one of the 268 NUTS-2 
regions in the EU. The model’s labour market module comprises a search and matching algorithm 
in which firms post vacancies for different skill levels. Unemployed households and a fraction of 
employed households (on-the-job search) look for jobs and apply to those firms offering a wage 
above their reservation wage. Firms rank applications by skill level and send job offers that are 
considered by households. If firms do not fill their positions or households remain unemployed, they 
adjust the wage and the reservation wage, respectively. The model has been used among others by 
Dawid et al., (2012) to study the integration process of Eastern European labour markets to the 
European Union, where it is found that the highest output gains come from opening the labour 
markets, but at the cost of increasing regional disparities in economic outcomes.  
3.3 Informality: some motivating facts for Colombia 
3.3.1 Data  
Throughout the remainder of the paper we use information from two household surveys representa-
tive of the entire Colombian population: 1) the Great Integrated Household Survey (Gran Encuesta 
Integrada de Hogares, GEIH), a cross-sectional labour force survey with a monthly sample size of 
around 28,000 workers, from which we use information spanning a nine-year period (2010-2018); 2) 
The Social Protection Panel Study (Encuesta Longitudinal de Protection Social, ELPS), a house-
hold survey for 2012 with work history information for 41,049 working-age individuals. 
3.3.2 Stylised facts 
Informality has been a pervasive feature of the Colombian economy and more importantly, a known 
determinant of low tax revenues and low social security coverage in the country. Despite the lack 
of consensus on its definition, informality is high in the country by any measure. Figure 3.1 presents 
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firm and worker informality rates for recent years, with firm formality defined in terms of a firm’s 
registration and worker formality defined in terms of workers’ contribution to health insurance, to 
a pension fund (legalistic view) or alternatively the official ILO definition comprising workers in 
firms with more than five employees.10  
Figure 3.1 Firm and worker informality rates in Colombia. 
Firm Informality Rate Worker Informality Rate 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on GEIH 2008-2018, Quarterly Moving Averages. For the firm informality rate 
we divide firms by size in workers. For the worker informality rate, Health(pension) measures the proportion of workers 
not contributing to Health Insurance (Pension). ILO: measures the proportion of workers in firms with five employees or 
less. 
The share of informal workers in Colombia declined by around 5 percentage points from 2008 to 
2014 but has been relatively stable at values ranging from 60 to 65 percent since then. On the other 
hand, firm informality has been relatively constant over time, and as expected, is higher for smaller 
firms: above 80 percent for firms with one worker (which account to nearly 40 percent of total 
firms) and around 70 percent for firms with 2-5 workers. It is still positive but low for large firms: 
around 10 percent for firms with 20 workers or more.  
Another important feature of informality is earnings precariousness. Informal employment is usu-
ally observed at the bottom of the earnings distribution with formal employment usually better 
remunerated even after controlling for individual and job characteristics. In Figure 3.2 the earnings 
gap resulting from an Oaxaca decomposition for each occupation is depicted alongside the share of 
workers with monthly earnings below the poverty line in each sector.11 The earnings gap, despite 
being heterogeneous across occupations, is always positive, ranging from 2 percent for technicians 
 
10 Professional self-employed workers are also considered formal by ILO.  
11 The decomposition uses a Mincer estimate of log hourly earnings on age, age squared, gender, education, industry, 
region, urban and year dummies. The decomposition is applied for workers in each occupation depicted in the horizontal 
axis of Figure 3.2. 
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to 58 percent for managers. Correspondingly, the share of workers with extremely low incomes is 
higher in the informal sector (around 22 percent with incomes below the national poverty line) 
than in the formal sector (less than 4 percent). 
Figure 3.2 Earnings gap and poverty incidence by occupation 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on GEIH 2008-2018, monthly earnings include: employee wages and bonuses 
and self-employment net profits. 
Figure 3.3 Worker stocks and flows in the Colombian Labour Market in millions 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ELPS 2012, transitions at quarterly level.12 
 






































This informal-formal earnings gap is the workhorse of economists arguing that there are important 
barriers preventing informal workers from formalizing. However, recent research partially dismisses 
this conclusion, pointing out that there are significant worker flows between the two sectors and 
that their coexistence can be thought of as the natural result of workers benefiting from compara-
tive advantages in each one (Maloney, 1999). As depicted in Figure 3.3, each quarter 1.7 percent 
of informal workers move into the formal sector in Colombia and 1.3 percent of formal workers 
enter informality. These figures are much lower than in countries such as Mexico: 24.4 and 7.8 
percent respectively (del Angel, 2013) and Argentina: 9 and 4.2 percent respectively (Albertini et 
al., 2019), possibly an indication of segmentation of the two sectors in Colombia. 
How does the use of job contact networks affect the depicted worker flows and employment out-
comes? To partially address this question, Table 3.1 presents three linear probability models, and 
one earnings estimate as functions of personal and job characteristics, all involving the degree of 
use of contacts for job search. More specifically, the first and last models capture the determinants 
of the probability of finding a job using contact networks for those previously employed or of 
searching for a job with contact networks while unemployed, respectively. The second and third 
model estimate the effect of personal characteristics, including whether contact networks were used 
to obtain the current job, on the probability of being informal and on log-earnings, respectively.  
From models 1 and 4, high values for intercepts indicate that the probability of using or obtaining 
a job through contact networks for unemployed and employees respectively is high. Additionally, 
the proportion of jobs obtained using contacts is higher than the frequency of use for those unem-
ployed, indicating a high degree of efficiency of contacts in getting jobs. Moreover, males resort the 
most to contacts, while the effect of age on their use is not clear. Lastly, education is strongly 
negatively correlated with the use of contact networks: having higher education is associated with 
a decrease of around 26 percentage points in the probability of obtaining a job (or searching for a 
job) through contacts for those employed (unemployed).  
From models 2 and 3, it is also clear that obtaining a job using contacts implies worse employment 
outcomes: a higher probability of the job being informal and lower earnings. Despite this suggestive 
evidence of the negative effects of resorting to contact networks on employment outcomes, our 
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estimates do not take into account the potential sorting of workers into using job contact networks 
and therefore, the interpretation of these coefficients could be misleading. 
Table 3.1 Job contact network use, informality, and earnings 
   Employment Unemployment 
  
Dependent Variable 
(1)                       
Job Networks 
(2)                
Informality 
(3)                  
Log-Earnings 
(4)                             
Job Networks      
Age [18-30] 0.005*** 0.126*** -0.145*** -0.198*** 
 (3.3) (100.81) (-67.07) (-73.37) 
Age (30-50] -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.063*** -0.131*** 
 (-12.29) (-7.78) (-32.34) (-46.93) 
Male 0.009*** -0.036*** 0.013*** 0.061*** 
 (9.72) (-46.73) (9.89) (40.24) 
Skilled -0.263*** -0.216*** 0.357*** -0.279*** 
 (-297.01) (-264.59) (238.73) (-177.86) 
Informal   -0.183***  
   (-124.53)  
Job Networks  0.276*** -0.043***  
  (338.46) (-33.12)  
  Constant 0.853*** 0.137*** 7.703*** 0.641*** 





s Region YES YES YES YES 
Time YES YES YES YES 
Occupation NO NO YES NO 




1.19 1.19 1.19 0.375 
Adj. R-squared 0.093 0.208 0.462 0.133 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on GEIH 2010-2018, t statistics in parentheses, significance level:  *** p<0.01 
Even if these estimates are correct, there are important questions that could not be answered within 
this simple framework. In the absence of comprehensive information on the networks of friends and 
colleagues for job search, in Section 3.4 we turn to a more elaborated model that tries to capture 
most of these informality facts to disentangle the real effects of the use of job contact networks. 
We turn to a macroeconomic model because, as we will see, most networks studies have neglected 
the effects of firm size on network formation, but this feature seems important in economies with 
large informal sectors characterised by an over-abundance of small firms, where the possibility of 
making job contacts on the job is greatly reduced. 
3.4 Methodology 
From section 3.2, it is clear that ABMs capture most of the features of the search and matching 
literature used in recent research on labour informality. Moreover, the time-step nature of ABMs 
allows for the incorporation of networks, in stark contrast to mathematically-driven models. The 
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model we propose next follows the macroeconomic perspective discussed for ABMs but encompasses 
firm-household and household-household networks of agents, with households taking advantage of 
their job contacts to discover better labour opportunities. In this regard, firm size pays a crucial 
role in the formation of contact networks and consequently, special efforts are taken to properly 
capture this feature in the Colombian economy we simulate.  
Our macroeconomic model is an extension of the macroeconomic ABM of Lengnick (2013) that 
additionally considers formal and informal activities and differences in firm size between these 
sectors. There are several reasons for modifying an existing macroeconomic ABM instead of creating 
a “partial equilibrium” ABM from scratch. First, the model allows us to include the feedback of 
the goods market (general equilibrium effects) especially considering that when firms adjust out-
put/inventories after changes in demand they necessarily readjust their payrolls. In a “partial equi-
librium” model we would have to exogenously assume a stochastic process of job creation and 
destruction. Second, as discussed, an important problem in the ABM literature in economics is the 
lack of model recycling. Given that the Lengnick (2013) model is relatively simple yet comprehen-
sive, its description and the release of the implementation code could allow the creation of different 
extensions in future research, whether in the informality literature or other macroeconomic simu-
lations. Third, as previously discussed, the current literature on informality consists mainly of 
general equilibrium models and, therefore, a partial equilibrium will be more difficult to compare 
against those models and also more prone to criticism. 
3.4.1 The model   
The macroeconomic ABM developed by Lengnick (2013) features a two-market exchange economy 
in which firms produce a single physical commodity using homogenous labour as input.13 In our 
version of this model, firms are labelled formal or informal, with differences between the two types 
in terms of productivities only. Households are single-member and offer one unit of labour per day 
inelastically to firms in exchange for a wage that allows them to buy the physical commodity. 
Given the agent-based nature of the model, knowledge for firms and households is local, that is, 
 
13 We restrict the model to homogenous labour because of the lack of firm data to derive production functions using 
different types of labour. However, considering that the Colombian economy has important differences in educational 
attainment, including skilled and unskilled labour, this seems like an important avenue of future research.  
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they only relate to a small network of agents from which they obtain information about current 
prices or jobs. It is assumed that there are a fixed number of firms n  and households n  living for 
the entire simulation period and that agents are endowed with liquidity to trade with each other. 
For simplicity, no exogenous growth of technology is assumed. 
The model defines a day as the basic time unit, with 21 days as a month. From a time perspective, 
there are three important events in a month: on the first day, each firm and household plans 
activities, decides prices, consumption, and changes connections to better exchange partners (that 
is, labour market and good market connections) depending on results from previous periods. House-
holds also search for jobs, potentially using their contact network in the process. Throughout the 
entire month, each firm produces with its current number of workers, and households buy the single 
commodity using their available liquidity. On the last day of the month, each firm pays wages and 
profits to households. And lastly, households adjust the reservation wage depending on their labour 
status and update their job network. 
It is also assumed that, at any time, each household has three types of connections: the first type 
(Type A connection) consists of links with seven different firms for buying consumption goods; the 
second type (Type B connection) consists of one link to a firm to supply labour in exchange of a 
wage14; the last type (Type F connection) consists of connections between households with up to 
ten job contacts. Firms are not limited in the number of goods or labour market connections 
possible, but given that their number is fixed, which precludes firm creation and destruction, it is 
assumed that the minimum number of workers a firm has is equal to one. No interaction between 
any two firms is assumed. Stochasticity enters the model via Monte Carlo methods in three ways: 
agent’s rules are performed conditional on random draws; the adjustment rates of prices in the 
model are drawn from uniform densities; and agents are taken randomly to perform some action, 
for instance buying goods, changing their job network or searching for jobs. A detailed description 
of the rules governing the model is presented below, while Figure 3.4 presents a summary of them 
from a time perspective. 
 
14 The properties of the model under different Type A and Type B network sizes are explored at length in Lengnick 
(2013). It is shown that the results of the model only change for very extreme network scenarios.  
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We keep the model simple and abstract from government intervention, neglecting the role of min-
imum wages, income, and payroll taxes, and also those fringe benefits associated with a formal job. 
More importantly, we also assume that only workers change between sectors, not firms. Despite 
being typical in similar informality studies, we consider the omitted features to be of less im-
portance, our focus being on the effects of using contacts for job search on the formal-informal 
divide for workers.15  
Preliminaries and Timing 
When introducing firm heterogeneity, previous literature assumes a continuum of firms and work-
ers, with productivities drawn from probability density functions following the seminal paper of 
Lucas (1978). This approach is usually applied to make models mathematically tractable. When 
the model is applied to the data, these densities are assumed with as few parameters as possible 
while mimicking the features of the productivity distribution of the economy they represent. For 
instance, Ulyssea (2018) assumes that pre-entry productivity is governed by a Pareto density, while 
post-entry productivities are distributed as Pareto-Log Normal; Meghir et al., (2015) assume a log-
normal productivity distribution. The three and two parameters governing technologies in each 
paper respectively are estimated using Brazilian data.  
Given that firms and workers in our model are finite objects taking decisions based on their current 
individual statuses, we depart from continuous densities and consider productivities as discrete 
random variables with conditional probabilities over size (in workers) and sector (that is, whether 
the firm is formal or not):  
P tfp = tfp , = P ,   
 sector = {informal, formal}   size = {size , size , size , size , size } 




where tfp ,  is the total factor productivity of a firm of size j in sector i., size  stands for firms with 
number of workers in the interval j. Naturally, each firm’s size is endogenous to the model, there-
fore, the estimation will recover the values of each of the parameters tfp ,  such that long-
 
15 Additionally, the data used in most of the recent research is richer than ours, therefore, it is harder to identify the 
parameters of a more complex model with Colombian data. 
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run firm size is approximated, based on the observed distribution of sizes within each sector 
(P , ). Moreover, we do not impose any structural differences between formal and informal 
firms of the same size within sizes 1-10 workers, therefore, for these firms, it must be satisfied that: 
tfp , = tfp ,   ∀ size = {size , size , size , size } (2) 
For firms with 11 or more workers we allow for potentially different productivities for formal and 
informal firms to account for large firms’ size differences in each sector. These assumptions imply 
a set of six possible tfp ,  unique values but also allow for the overlapping of productivities 
between sectors and higher wages on average in the formal sector. 
Figure 3.4 Timing of activities of each month 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Lengnick (2013) 
Initially, Type A and Type B connections are created at random assuming that all households are 
employed. If workers are assigned to a(n) (in)formal firm, then they receive the firm’s (in)formal 
status. After this random allocation of goods and labour connections is done, up to ten Type F 
connections are created between households based on their Type B connections. More specifically, 
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for each worker i, a co-worker j is picked at random to establish an undirected connection. In this 
case, the adjacency matrix capturing the connections (g), besides being symmetric (that is, g =
g ), is weighted, with weights equal to the number of months remaining for the connection to 
expire (g ).  
After objects and connections have been set up, activities begin following the monthly schedule in 
Figure 3.4, which we describe in detail next.  
Firms- Rule 1 (Wage setting) 
At the beginning of each month, firms decide their wage (w ). A firm increases w  if there are 
unfilled vacancies from the previous month. Conversely, the firm decreases w  if all vacancies have 
been filled successfully for more than γ months. If none of these conditions are met, there is no 
wage change. The adjustment is given by:  
w , =
w , (1 + μ )
w , (1 − μ )
w ,
    if vacancy , = TRUE
if γ , > γ
else
      μ~U(0, δ) (3) 
where the random variable μ is uniformly distributed in the interval (0, δ) and γ ,  captures the 
months the firm has been filling its vacancies. 
Firms- Rule 2 (Labour Demand setting) 
At the beginning of a month and after wages are adjusted, firms decide their workforce size de-
pending on their inventories (i , ). Each firm has upper (i , = ϕd , ) and lower levels for invento-
ries (i , = ϕd , ) which depend on the previous month’s demand (d , ). If inventories have fallen 
below the lower bound, i , , a vacancy is created (vacancy , = TRUE). 
If inventories are above the upper bound, i , , a randomly chosen worker is fired by the end of the 
month (tofire , = TRUE). If inventories are between the lower and upper bounds, the firm cancels 
all previous firing and hiring decisions (tofire , = FALSE and vacancy , = TRUE).  
Firms- Rule 3 (Price setting) 
At the beginning of a month and after labour demand has been adjusted, each firm decides its price 
(p , ) depending on its level of inventories (i , ) but also on profit margins for each good sold. If 
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inventories (i , ) are below the lower bound (i , ) the firm considers increasing p  and conversely, if 
they are above the upper bound (i , ) the firm considers reducing p , . Each firm has upper 
p , = φcmg ,  and lower  (p , = φcmg , ) levels for p , which depend on marginal costs (cmg , ) 
In this case, given the daily production technology of each firm (see Firms-Rule 4), marginal costs 
are given by cmg , = , L ,  , where λ   is the total factor productivity (TFP). Prices are raised 
as long as they do not exceed the upper level (p , ), and decreased as long as they are above the 
lower level (p , ). Lastly, following Calvo (1983), a price change only takes place with a probability 
θ < 1. The adjustment is given by: 
p , =
p , (1 + ν)
p , (1 − ν)
p ,
  if i , <  i ,   and  p , < p ,   and θ ,  < θ
 if i , > i ,    and  p , > p ,   and θ ,  < θ
else
      ν~U(0, ϑ) (4) 
Where ν~U(0, ϑ)  and θ , ~U(0,1) are uniformly distributed random variables.16   
Households- Rule 1 (Search for cheaper firms) 
At the beginning of a month, and after firms have adjusted prices, each household is picked in 
random order to search for firms offering cheaper consumption goods. Each household picks one 
random firm from those it has a Type A connection with, it also picks a random firm from those 
outside its Type A connections, with the probability of picking one proportional to the firm’s size 
measured in employees. The household compares if p ,  of the new firm is ε percent lower than that 
of the existing firm and changes the connection if that is the case. The entire process is only carried 
out with a probability ψ < 1. 
Households- Rule 2 (Change firms that constrained demand) 
At the beginning of a month, and after households have searched for cheaper firms, each household 
is picked in random order to change firms that restricted their demand over the previous month 
because of low inventories. Each household picks one random firm from those with whom they have 
a Type A connection, with the probability of picking one firm proportional to the extent of the 
 
16 Assuming the profit function of each firm is  π , = p , λ L , − w , L ,  at the optimum labour demand p , = cmg , =
, L ,  . 
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constraint in the previous month. The link is changed to another new random firm from those 
outside its Type A connection. The entire process is only carried out with a probability ψ < 1. 
Households- Rule 3 (Look for a job if unemployed) 
At the beginning of a month, and after households have changed firms that constrained their 
demand, each household is picked in random order to look for more beneficial labour market links. 
If the household is currently unemployed (off the job search), firstly, it decides whether to perform 
a direct search or an indirect search using their job contact networks. The latter is chosen with a 
probability ρ < 1. If the search is direct, a random firm is visited. Alternatively, if the search is 
through colleagues, contacts are visited at random until a vacancy outside its own firm appears or 
the Type F list has been exhausted. If a firm has a vacancy and its wage w ,  is above the house-
hold’s reservation wage (rw , ), a new Type B link is created between household and firm, the 
household status is changed to formal or informal depending on the status of the firm it is linking 
to, and the household stops its job search. If this is not the case, the search process is repeated up 
to five times.17 18 
Households- Rule 4 (Look for a better job if unsatisfied) 
If the household is working but because of a wage cut, its reservation wage (rw , ) is above its 
firm’s wage (w , ), a job search is carried out (on the job search): with probability ρ < 1, contacts 
are visited at random until a vacancy appears or the Type F list has been exhausted. Alternatively, 
a direct search is attempted: a random firm is visited. If a firm has vacancies and w , > rw , , a 
new Type B link is created between household and this new firm while the previous link with its 
old firm disappears. As before, the household status is changed to formal or informal depending on 
the status of the firm it is linking to. 
Households- Rule 5 (Look for a better job if satisfied) 
 
17 In reality, individuals resort to a direct and an indirect search simultaneously. In the model we assume that both 
search mechanisms are perfect substitutes, and one mechanism is randomly selected to easily introduce the propensity of 
search with contacts that we found in the data. As will be discussed later, the propensity to use contacts in the Colombian 
economy is crucial for the results we find. More realistically, one could assume that individuals learn which type of search 
to implement from the size and composition of their own network or from their success in previous job search. Such an 
approach will increase the difficulty of the model by adding a higher degree of path dependence for job-search decisions.     
18 Note that the model omits for simplicity the use of Public Employment Service or online job intermediary platforms 
for job search. The first is almost irrelevant in Colombia and the second is not as prominent as in developed countries.  
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If the household is working and its current wage (w , ) is above its reservation wage (rw , ), the 
household looks for a better job only with a probability π < 1. If the household decides to search 
(on the job search), the process is exactly the same as if the household was unsatisfied. If the firm 
has vacancies and its wage (w , ) is greater than its current wage (that is, it satisfies w , >
w , ), a new Type B link is created between the household and this new firm, while the previous 
link with its old firm disappears. As before, the household status is changed to formal or informal 
depending on the status of the firm it is linking to. 
Households- Rule 6 (Plan monthly consumption) 
At the beginning of a month, and after households have looked for more beneficial labour market 
links, households decide how much of their liquidity (m , ) to spend on consumption goods.19  It 
is assumed that monthly consumption, c , is a function of real money holdings m ,  /p , : 
c = min
 m ,  
p ,
,
 m ,  
p ,
 (5) 
where the price deflator p ,  is the average price of goods in the seven firms the household buys 
from (that is, the seven firms each household has as Type A connection) and the parameter α, 
satisfies  0 < α < 1.  
Households- Rule 7 (Buy goods) 
After all the adjustments of the beginning of the month have finished, each household is selected 
at random to buy goods. A random firm from the set of firms the household has a Type A connec-
tion with is selected. If the firm’s inventories are enough to satisfy the household’s daily demand 
(c , /21) and the household has enough liquidity to pay for the purchase, the household’s liquidity 
is reduced by p , (c , /21) while the firm’s liquidity is increased by the same amount. The firm’s 
inventories are reduced by c , /21, and the firm’s demand is increased by the same amount. In 
the case of the household not having sufficient liquidity to pay for the purchase, its demand is 
reduced to the maximum amount it could buy: m , /p , , and the previous steps are completed. If 
on the other hand, the firm’s inventories are not enough to satisfy the household’s daily demand, 
 
19 The function minimum is introduced to account for consumption plans outside the budget constraint in the case real 




the purchase is reduced to the level of available inventories: i . The transaction is completed, but 
the household registers the amount of its constrained demand by the firm lacking inventories and 
the firm registers the intended demand of the household instead of the actual demand. Lastly, the 
constrained household picks another firm from its Type A connections to satisfy the remaining 
demand. This process of searching for another firm to satisfy remaining demand is carried out until 
all seven firms are visited or 95 percent of the daily demand plan has been satisfied. The buying 
goods process is carried out on each one of the 21 days of the month. 
Firms-Rule 4 (Production) 
After all households have bought goods, each firm increases inventories using a concave production 
technology: 
i , = i , + λ L ,  (6) 
where L ,  represents the number of households (workers) the firm has a Type B connection 
with, λ > 0 is a firm specific technology parameter (TFP) and η a common elasticity of output to 
labour. This production process is performed on each one of the 21 days of the month.20 
Firms-Rule 5 (Pay wages) 
At the end of the month, each firm pays wages to each household (workers) the firm has a Type 
B connection with. The firm’s liquidity is reduced by w , L ,  while each household increases its 
liquidity by w , . If a firm’s liquidity is below its payroll cost (that is, w , L , > m , ), the firm 
reduces its wage to w , = ,
,
, all households accept this emergency wage cut and wage payment 
proceeds as before.  
Firms-Rule 6 (Precautionary savings) 
At the end of the month and after wages are paid, if each firm’s liquidity is positive, the firm keeps 
a fraction of its liquidity as precautionary savings for paying wages in an adverse market. This 
fraction is equivalent to χw , L ,  with χ > 0. 
 
20 The strictly concave production function is a modification from the original Lengnick (2013) paper. It is an assumption 
made to reduce wage and price dispersion by making the marginal product of labour high when employment in each firm 
is low. 
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Firms-Rule 7 (Pay profits) 
At the end of the month, after wages are paid and precautionary savings have been made, each 
firm’s remaining liquidity is distributed among households as profits. The share of each household 
in a firm’s profits is proportional to each household’s liquidity relative to all households.  
Households-Rule 8 (update reservation wage) 
At the end of the month, and after wages and profits are paid, each household updates its reserva-
tion wage rw , . If the household is currently unemployed, it reduces its reservation wage by rw  
percent. If the household is employed and its current wage is above the reservation wage (that is, 
rw , < w , ) the household updates its reservation wage to its current wage; in the opposite case 
(rw , ≥ w , ), the household does not change its reservation wage. 
Households-Rule 9 (update job network connections) 
At the end of the month, and after households have updated their reservation wage, each household 
checks each one of its job contact connections. If a contact j is no longer in a household i′s firm or 
household i is unemployed, the weight g  in the adjacency matrix is reduced by one unit (month); 
if any weight reaches zero, the connection disappears. After household i ages its job contact net-
work, if it has less than 10 Type F connections and it is working, it randomly picks a co-worker j 
to create a new connection with. Provided that j is not already in i's Type F connections and that 
j has less than 10 Type F connections as well, an undirected link is created between both households 
and the weight in the adjacency matrix (g ) is set to ζ months, with ζ~U(0, ζ). 
An overview of networks in the model 
Notice that Type A and B connections change according to the profitability of the link for house-
holds, that is, whether a firm is offering a required amount of goods at a comparatively low price 
or offering a comparatively high wage in exchange for labour. Type B ties could also be severed by 
a firm depending on profitability, that is, if inventories are higher than expected, a random worker 
is fired. On the other hand, no economic incentive determines the updating process of Type F 
networks. Given that job contacts are usually acquired on the job, new links with other households 
(workers) at the same firm are made at random. The only requisite for mutual consent in the link 
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formation is bilateral room for a new contact in each worker Type F list.21 Notice that within the 
model, Type F connections are assumed as weak ties: they suffer a process of aging that could 
potentially lead to link destruction, with the time the connection is alive after one of the households 
(workers) moves to another firm being uniformly distributed. This setup allows new links to be 
created, while keeping the size of Type F connections manageable and disciplined by firm size. In 
practice, the aging process captures the fact that when looking for a job, an individual is more 
likely to turn to acquaintances they have seen more recently as opposed to connections they have 
not interacted with for several years. Lastly, it is worth noting that networks are not used for 
referral hiring as in some of the economic literature discussed, but for the discovery of job openings.  
When two connected households i and j are no longer in the same workplace, their link could gen-
erate positive and negative externalities. The connection works as a bridge to a potential better 
employment outcome (higher wage or employment in case unemployed) or in the case i or j are 
unemployed it could lead to an unsuccessful job search. Suppose worker j moves to a better paid 
job, this movement generates a positive externality for its contact i: if the firm is expanding and i 
is either unsatisfied or randomly decides to search for a job despite being satisfied, worker i could 
end up in a better paid job in j’s firm. An opposite result arises if j moves to unemployment. Given 
that households look for a vacancy within their entire Type F list, and that those households are 
also looking for a better outcome themselves, we could think of job-contact networks as an indirect 
way of searching for a better labour market outcome. Lastly, increasing the time duration of the 
link ζ or the number of Type F connections increases information inflows for any worker, making 
job contact search with networks more effective. However, it is expected that these additional 
benefits are marginally decreasing because of congestion in the use of networks. 
In our model, there are two additional aspects to consider, firm size and the informality divide for 
firms and workers. Higher productivity implies higher wages for formal relative to informal firms 
but also, formal firms will have bigger payrolls on average, and consequently a bigger pool of job 
contacts for its workers. Two extreme cases highlight the main implications of the model setup for 
these dimensions. Suppose that all firms are unipersonal on average. The scope of network 
 
21 Notice that in our ABM, keeping contacts is not costly but there is an upper bound on their number. This assumption 
departs from models of strategic network formation that require positive costs to bound the number of contacts.  
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formation in this case is null and job search through contacts will be useless given the size of job 
networks. Alternatively, suppose that the only search mechanism available is that of job contacts. 
This setup will reduce the movement of workers between firms and sectors to zero, de facto seg-
menting both markets as workers will only be connected to other workers in the same firm. Addi-
tionally, the lack of movement implies a greater divergence of wages between the two sectors as 
information on formal/informal wages will be transmitted for formal/informal households only. In 
the spirit of Granovetter’s (1983) strength of weak ties, a varied pool of job contacts delivers better 
employment outcomes. However, the effect of the two search mechanisms (that is, direct and 
through job contacts) operating simultaneously remains to be seen. The above-mentioned features 
will guide our estimation decisions in the next section. 
3.4.2 Estimation 
To recreate the labour market in the Colombian economy, a set of 20 technology and job-search 
parameters from the model are applied to the data. The main goal is to capture those features that 
affect labour market outcomes and job contact networks, namely: firm size, worker flows, and the 
use of job contact networks. Admittedly, a high proportion of the model’s parameters do not cor-
respond to the Colombian economy and this might bias the parameters estimated and the conclu-
sions drawn. However, considering the lack of data, we hope that, given the nature of the parame-
ters not estimated (that is, mostly related to the clearing of the goods market), the bias will be 
minimal and will not considerably affect our findings.  
To accommodate the labour market setup in the model, in which wage-earners constantly change 
firms, we exclude workers living in rural areas, self-employed workers without a business, domestic 
workers and workers without earnings. Regarding the informal sector, we follow a legalistic view 




22 Around 10% of workers belong to rural areas. 37% are self-employed, however, we keep those self-employed workers 
with a business to include the employer population equivalent to 8% of the worker force. Domestic workers account for 
around 3% of workers. The workers without earnings group comprises family workers and workers in private firms 
without earnings. The group accounts for 3.5% of workers     
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Table 3.2 Distribution of workers and firms by size (in workers) and formality status 
 Informal Sector Formal Sector Total 
D
at
a Number of work-
ers per firm 
1 2-3 4-5 6-10 11+ 1 2-3 4-5 6-10 11+  





Workers 80 164 66 46 62 8 25 23 36 490 1000 
Firms 80 66 15 6 3 8 10 5 5 11 209 
Share of Firms 
(P , ) 
38.3% 31.6% 7.2% 2.9% 1.4% 3.8% 4.8% 2.4% 2.4% 5.3% 100% 
Worker  
inf/form rate 
41.8% 58.2% 100% 
Firm  
inf/form rate 
81.3% 18.7% 100% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on GEIH 2010-2018 and Confecamaras (2016), for the model, numbers are 
rounded to the nearest integer. *average monthly shares for the 9-year period.  
Given the lack of comprehensive firm data for Colombia, we use each worker’s reported firm size 
to compute the share of workers within each type of firm as presented at the top of Table 3.2. 
Notice that answers to the firm’s size question are in interval form in the survey. 23 Assuming that 
firms are composed entirely of formal or informal workers, we can use this worker information to 
recover the number of firms of each size by dividing the number of workers in each category by the 
reported size.24 At this point, we arbitrarily assume 1,000 households employed for the model and 
distribute them according to the observed shares. Next, we divide the number of workers within 
each cell by the reported size to obtain the approximate number of firms shown in Table 3.2. More 
specifically, for the closed intervals we use their mid-point as the effective number of workers.25 
Considering the right-open interval nature of the size of the largest firms, we make the following 
assumptions: for the formal sector, we use a register of formal firms (Confecamaras, 2016) to obtain 
the number of firms with 11 or more workers (small, medium and large firms in Colombia) and 
 
23 In the survey, each worker is asked: How many people are employed at the firm, business, or industry where you work? 
With the answer restricted to the intervals 1 worker, 2-3 workers,4-5 workers, 6-10 workers, 11-19 workers, 20-30 workers, 
31-50 workers 50-99 workers and 100 or more workers. 
24 Ulyssea (2018) employs Brazilian firm data to show that this assumption is not necessarily the case, but that firms 
also decide on an intensive margin of informality, that is, how many formal and informal to hire. The opposing assumption 
in our model, despite being crucial for the behaviour of the network, is done to keep things simple given the lack of firm 
data. Additionally, having firms deciding whether to hire a worker as formal or informal would imply an additional 
mechanism to make this decision, such as the increasing cost of non-compliance in Ulyssea’s (2018) work.  
25 The number of workers and firms was rounded to the nearest integer; this will result in small discrepancy in the average 
size of firms within each category. 
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approximate their number in the model to 11 firms.26  Given the lack of data for large informal 
firms, we estimate a Pareto distribution of firm size for firms with 10 or less workers. With the 
resulting distribution, we estimate at three the number of large informal firms in the model.27 
From the worker perspective, the distribution by firm’s size and formality status is correct by 
construction given the representativeness of the GEIH. The number of firms (n = 209) and distri-
bution is in line with previous literature. For instance, Fernandez (2018) found that there are 
almost 2 million businesses in the country (equivalent to roughly 200 in the model), with most of 
them (63 percent) comprising single person firms (42 percent in the model) and an informality rate 
of around 60 percent using the firm’s registry as an indicator of formality (81.3 percent in the 
model using pension contribution of workers as indicator of formality).28 
We define the vector of model’s parameters as Θ ={ Θ , Θ , Θ } consisting of three components: 
parameters fixed, with values taken from the original Lengnick (2013) model,29 parameters observed 
and parameters estimated. The vector Θ = {P , , ρ, n , n } comprises 13 parameters: the distri-
bution of firms by size and sector, the probability of using job contacts in on the job search and 
the number of firms, which are taken from the data and directly plugged into the model.30 Given 
that the model comprises working and unemployed households, we fix n = 1,014 taking into ac-
count 1,000 workers and a frictional rate of unemployment of around 1.4 percent. Without loss of 
generality, we normalise tfp , = tfp , = 1. This assumption and the one in Equa-
tion 2 give us a vector of 7 parameters to estimate, comprising five productivities and the proba-
bilities of on the job search and the maximum time-length of each connection Θ = {tfp , , π, ζ}. 
 
26 Confecamaras registered 106,267 firms with 11 or more workers. This roughly corresponds to 11 firms in the model 
given the ratio of one worker in the model to 10,000 workers in the survey. For the model, there are 491 workers in firms 
with 11 workers or more and therefore the average formal size for this group is 45 (rounding 44.63) workers. 
27 We use the information on the distribution of firms by size up to 10 workers to estimate the shape parameter (α) of a 
Pareto distribution. We obtain α = 1.74, with this, and the pdf we observe that the firms remaining account for 1.7% of 
the firms (3 firms) corresponding to an average firm size of 21 for the 62 workers in this category. 
28 This is a less stringent definition of firm informality as paying payroll taxes such as pension contribution is more 
expensive for firms than registering the firm (Fernandez, 2018). 
29 Ideally, one would estimate the entire set of parameters for the model, however, the high number of them entering the 
model makes it almost impossible to do it. We stick with some of the parameter values from the original Lengnick model 
because in the theoretical exercise the parameters used gave sensible results on the behaviour of the macroeconomic 
model.   
30 In the data we observe the proportion of unemployed households using job contacts, whereas in the model we use this 
as the individual probability of using job contacts for both off and on the job search. 
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These parameters are estimated using simulated minimum distance (Grazzini and Richiardi, 2015) 
while the remaining comprises the vector of parameters fixed Θ  (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). 31  
Table 3.3 Fixed parameters and initial conditions 
Parameter Value Description Parameter Value Description 
Household parameters Household initialisation 
α 0.9 Parameter consumption function rw  0 Reservation wage 
ε 0.01 Par. to check price for changing Type A connec. m  100 Liquidity for households 
ψ  0.25 Prob. of checking type A con. (cheaper firms) employed  TRUE All households are employed 
ψ  0.25 Prob. of checking type A con. (constrained) Firm initialisation 
β 5 Number of firms to check if unemployed p  1 Price 
n  7 Number of Type A connections w  50 Wage 
n  10 Maximum number of Type F connections m  0 Liquidity for firms 
n 7 Number of firms to visit i  500 Inventories 
rw  0.1 Perc. reduction in reservation wage unemployed γ  0 No months with filled vacancies 
Firm parameters d  500 Demand from last month 
δ 0.019 Parameter random increase or decrease wage vacancy  FALSE No vacancies 
ϕ 1 Parameter in upper bound in inventory tofire  FALSE No firing decisions 
ϕ 0.25 Parameter in lower bound in inventory hired  0 No new hires 
φ 1.15 Parameter in upper bound in price Model initialisation 
φ 1.025 Parameter in lower bound in price burn_in 300*12*21 Burn-in periods (in days) 
ν 0.02 Parameter random increase or decrease price end_time 800*12*21 End of simulation (in days) 
θ 0.75 Parameter to proceed with price change  
η 0.9 Parameter of elasticity of output to labour 
χ 0.1 Wages-buffer ratio 
γ 1 Limit months to decrease wage 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Lengnick (2013) 
Admittedly, we have omitted two important parameters from the estimation process: the elasticity 
of output to labour (η) and the maximum number of Type F connections (nTypeF). For the former, 
we do not have additional information on the returns to scale of Colombian firms. We observe an 
inverse relation of this parameter and the five firm productivities ( tfp , ), but we have not been 
able to identify it and we assume a value of 0.9 and do some sensitivity analysis. More importantly, 
for the maximum number of job contacts we also do not have additional information. We expect 
that the efficiency in the use of contacts increases with nTypeF and also, with the maximum time-
length of each connection (ζ). After some exploratory analysis with the model, we found that at 
least seven contacts are necessary to reach the efficiency in use of contact implied by the Colombian 
data and therefore, we fix nTypeF = 10  allowing a sensible (not too high) value of ζ to be recovered 
from the estimation. We further discuss this matter in Section 3.5. 
 
31 In practice, we re-estimate the parameters of the model for integer values around n = 1014 to make sure the long-
run number of employees is as close as possible to 1,000. This manual estimation is carried out given the integer nature 
of the variable n  which complicates its estimation by simulated minimum distance. We also check that variables to be 
estimated do not considerably affect the frictional unemployment rate. 
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The estimation process of Θ  is as follows: we create a vector of 7 moments. Total number of 
workers within each size excluding firms of 1 worker (5 moments).32 33  The probability of job-to-
job transition, and the probability of a new position found through networks.34 35 The moments 
chosen are informative of the parameters to be estimated: the values of the tfp ,  are identi-
fied from the distribution of firm sizes, while the probability of on the job search and the length of 
each connection (that is, π, ζ) are identified from the observed job-to-job transition rate and the 
share of new jobs found through contacts respectively. For the former, a higher π (probability of 
on the job search) implies, ceteris paribus, a higher job-to-job transition rate. On the other hand, 
increasing the maximum length of each connection (ζ) makes the use of contact networks more 
effective, bringing a higher volume of job opening information from workers with very divergent 
work trajectories (that is, working in different firms), implying a higher share of new jobs obtained 
through networks.  
From the model’s point of view, the vector of simulated moments M (Θ) is an unknown function 
of the vector of parameters Θ including the random seed. We numerically approximate these mo-
ments by computing long-run averages of the underlying variables at each model run. An observed 
vector of moments M is estimated from the survey data to compute the objective function Q(Θ):  
Q(Θ) = M − M (Θ) W M − M (Θ)  (7) 
where W is a positive semi-definite matrix. An estimator for the set of parameters Θ  is obtained 
by minimising the objective function in 7 changing Θ : 
Θ = argmin Q(Θ) (8) 
We assume that W is a diagonal matrix in which W = , this implies Q(Θ) is the unweighted 
sum of the squares of the percent deviations of each moment from its observed value. 
 
32 The reason behind this exclusion is the model assumption of no entry or exit of firms that does not allow for firms of 
this type to exhibit less than one worker. This makes the use of this moment inadequate. Notice that the inclusion of 
this moment is not necessary as the system is identified. 
33 We omit the share of formal workers from the list of moments, as its value will be achieved by targeting the size 
moments.  
34 These are computed at a monthly interval in the data and the model. 
35 From the data, this includes networks of relatives, friends, and colleagues, in the paper the focus is on friends and 
colleagues, this equates to the Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) assumption that information on job openings of relatives or 
very close friends overlaps with the information one already has. 
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The minimisation process of Q(Θ) is as follows: firstly, the vector of parameters Θ , Θ  and the 
initial values of control variables are set to their respective values. Next, for an initial (arbitrary) 
value of the vector of parameters to be estimated Θ , the model is run for 800 years (9,600 months) 
including an initial burn-in of 300 years to reduce the effect of arbitrary initial condition for control 
variables.36 The number of periods (500 years) is sufficiently long to compute the long-run mean of 
variables, especially considering that some moments are outcomes at the meso-level, that is, groups 
of firms. The vector of moments M (Θ ) and objective function Q(Θ ) are computed and jointly 
determine the next vector of parameters to be evaluated Θ . The process is repeated until a 
stopping criterion is met.  
The estimation procedure is carried from different initial points to avoid convergence to any local 
minima.37 Given that each model run is computationally expensive and the unknown nature of the 
objective function, especially regarding differentiability, we use the derivative free minimisation 
algorithm BOBYQA (Powell, 2009) to minimise the function. The algorithm computes a quadratic 
approximation of the objective function for a user-provided number of interpolation points. It also 
accepts bounds on variables.38 39 
3.4.3 Results 
The estimated parameters and moments for the Colombian economy are presented in Table 3.4 
and Figure 3.5, respectively. For the set of parameters, we observe that productivities increase with 
firm size, including higher productivities for large formal firms relative to large informal firms. We 
also find that the average duration of a connection is around 4 years, assuming the underlying 
variable ζ is uniformly distributed (that is, ζ~U(0,98.06)). If workers are satisfied with their job, 
they must search for a better one almost ½ of the time. The targeted moments are relatively well 
matched by the estimation, with minor differences in the firm size moments. For both data and 
 
36 An overview of the effects of arbitrary values for variables on the behaviour of the model in the burn-in period is 
discussed in the appendix.   
37JAS-mine, a Java platform that aims to provide a unique simulation tool for discrete-event simulations is used for the 
exercise. See Richiardi and Richardson (2017) for more information. 
38 Each one of the 800 years run of the model takes 310 seconds on a W10 machine with an Intel Xeon processor E5. 
39 The version used is included in the Java Library Apache Commons Math. 
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model, close to 52 percent of jobs are obtained with contacts, and the probability of making a job-
to-job transition is 0.88 percent. 
In the long-run, the model reaches a state close to a general equilibrium regardless of initial condi-
tions for control variables.40 Almost all demand for goods is satisfied, there are simultaneously a 
positive number of unemployed households and vacancies, and prices converge dynamically to a 
well-behaved distribution of values instead of a single point as in traditional general equilibrium 
models. The model exhibits endogenous business cycles because agents only possess local infor-
mation of the price formation and therefore, coordination failures lead to temporary mismatches in 
both markets. 
Table 3.4 Parameters observed and estimated for the Colombian Economy 
Variable Value Status Description 
n  1014 Fixed Number of households in the model41 
n  209 Observed Number of firms in the model 
P ,  0.383 Observed Probability of picking an informal firm with one worker 
P ,  0.316 Observed Probability of picking an informal firm with 2-3 workers 
P ,  0.072 Observed Probability of picking an informal firm with 4-5 workers 
P ,  0.029 Observed Probability of picking an informal firm with 6-10 workers 
P ,  0.014 Observed Probability of picking an informal firm with 11 or more workers 
P ,  0.038 Observed Probability of picking a formal firm with one worker 
P ,  0.048 Observed Probability of picking a formal firm with 2-3 workers 
P ,  0.024 Observed Probability of picking a formal firm with 4-5 workers 
P ,  0.024 Observed Probability of picking a formal firm with 6-10 workers 
P ,  0.053 Observed Probability of picking a formal firm with 11 or more workers 
ρ 0.406 Observed Probability of using job contact networks when searching for jobs 
π 0.524 Estimated Probability of checking type B connection if satisfied 
ζ 98.06 Estimated Maximum length (months) of each Type F connection 
tfp ,  1.000 Estimated TFP of a firm with one worker (Fixed) 
tfp ,  1.337 Estimated TFP of a firm with 2-3 workers 
tfp ,  1.414 Estimated TFP of a firm with 4-5 workers 
tfp ,  1.492 Estimated TFP of a firm with 6-10 workers 
tfp ,  1.652 Estimated TFP of an informal firm with 11 or more workers 
tfp ,  1.790 Estimated TFP of a formal firm with 11 or more workers 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
The first moments of important variables of the model such as employment, output or prices are 
ergodic. The moments used for estimation are ergodic and stationary. Small changes in the value 
of parameters lead to significant changes in the objective function implying that the seven estimated 
 
40 See Appendix 1. 
41 The original Lengnick (2013) paper proposes  n = 1000 and n = 100, our numbers try to accommodate the structure 
of the model to these sizes. 
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parameters are disciplined by the moment set chosen. All these checks and the methodology used 
to make them are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 3.5 Estimated and observed moments 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations, probabilities are expressed in a 0-100 scale. Notice that firms with one worker were 
not targeted.  
Other model moments not targeted are also similar to observed values in the data as presented in 
Figure 3.6. The probability of making a transition between sectors or the worker formality rate are 
near the values observed. Nevertheless, we observe a slightly higher movement from the informal 
towards the formal sector, while the model generates cross-sector movements of similar magnitude. 
Differences in firm productivities generate a wage gap at worker level of around 10 percent, with 
the actual value using the methodology described in Section 3.2 standing at close to 20 percent for 
the period analysed. This implies that half the wage gap is accounted for by unobserved worker 
characteristics.  
Figure 3.6 Fit of not targeted moments 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations, probabilities are expressed in a 0-100 scale. 
Networks 
The network of job contacts (Type F connections) distinguished by the labour status of households 
for the last simulated period is presented in Figure 3.7. The average number of connections is 8.37, 
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being higher for formal (9.60) than for informal workers (6.96). We observe 71 unconnected nodes, 
with 92 percent of them in the informal sector. This result is expected, given that this sector 
captures most firms with just one worker in the data. It also highlights the importance of taking 
firm size into account in the setup of job contact networks. While the average number of contacts 
for workers in firms with 1 and 2 workers is 1.8 and 6.0, respectively, the average number of 
contacts is above 9.5 for workers in firms with 11 or more workers. 
We also find clustering of nodes by sector, with informal workers having 70.3 percent of connections 
in their sector on average, and formal workers with 81.5 percent of connections in their sector on 
average. Additionally, the share of cross-status links is around 24.3 percent; in the case of non-
homophily (that is, a completely random network) this value should be around 51.6 percent, indi-
cating a relatively high degree of homophily in the job contacts network, that is, workers’ contacts 
mostly work in the same sector.  
Figure 3.7 Job contact networks 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations for last period of one simulation 
Despite the high degree of homophily, workers move relatively freely between sectors in search of 
better job opportunities. If we take an informal worker at the beginning of the simulation period 
(that is, at year 300) and follow him for 500 years, we observe that, on average, he works 52.8 
percent of the time for a formal firm, and 45.7 percent of the time for an informal firm. These 
values roughly coincide with the proportion of households in each sector in the economy. Results 
for an initially formal worker are 59.2 and 39.48 percent respectively, indicating some advantage 
of formal workers in getting formal jobs. Lastly, if we focus on households working initially in firms 
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sized 1-3 workers, the movement of workers across sectors is almost unchanged, implying that, 
despite having few job contacts, workers eventually move to better paid jobs in bigger firms. In the 
next section, we go further and simulate the economy for different values of the parameters affecting 
the job contact network to test if the use of contacts has some effect on the real economy. 
3.5 Counterfactual exercises  
With our ABM that approximates the labour market and production in the Colombian economy, 
we now study the effects of network features and its use on the formal-informal divide. We explore 
the effects of changes in the propensity of use of contacts in the job search (ρ), but also, the 
substitutability of the maximum number of contacts (nTypeF) with the maximum duration of 
connections (ζ) given the impossibility of identifying both values simultaneously in the estimation. 
For the remaining, we focus on long-run means for model variables using the same run time as in 
the estimation (800 years), unless otherwise stated. 
3.5.1 Changes in the propensity of use of contacts 
We begin by simulating a 10 percent (4.06 pp) increase in the probability of using contacts for job 
search (ρ). We observe that the probability of obtaining a job with contacts increases around 6.2 
percent implying congestion of using job contacts. The probability of a job-to-job transition in-
creases by 2.7 percent and conversely, the average tenure of a job decreases from 82.4 to 81.3 
months. The long-run value of variables such as output, employment, the wage gap between sectors 
and the worker formality rate remains almost unchanged.  
An extension of the analysis for the entire range of values ρ ∈ [0,1) is presented in Figure 3.8. From 
the first pane, we observe that increasing the probability of using contacts increases the probability 
of finding a job with them. However, the relation is far from linear: the efficiency of indirect search 
increases when the use of contacts is low, but decreases with higher usage, it being more effective 
to attempt a direct search when usage of contacts is above 73 percent. From the second pane, we 
observe that the exit rate from a job is always increasing in ρ. More specifically, the job-to-job 
transition rate, and the formal to informal job transition rate seem to be marginally increasing for 
high values of ρ. However, this result is greatly affected by changes in the composition of sectors 
(that affects the denominator) and not by increases in the number of transitions (numerator), as 
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described below. The variations in transition rates result in changes in real variables, especially 
wages. 
Figure 3.8 Effects of changes in the probability of using contact networks (𝛒) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Probabilities are expressed in a 0-100 scale. Fitted value at the vertical dotted line. 
Figure 3.9 presents the effect of changes in the use of contact networks on aggregate variables of 
the Colombian economy. From the right pane, we observe that for higher values of ρ, further 
increasing this variable considerably increases the average wage for the economy, especially in the 
informal sector. The availability of more information on job openings makes transitions more fre-
quent and puts pressure on firms to attract workers by increasing wages, which in turns increases 
transitions even more. We observe that for most values for ρ, output and employment do not 
change at the aggregate or sectoral level. However, the share of informal workers increases for very 
high values of ρ, and for values of this parameter above 90 percent the worker informality rate 
surpasses that of formal work. The key takeaway from this result is that more information increases 
the chances of moving to better paid jobs, and informal firms try to catch-up with higher wages in 
the informal sector increasing, in the end, their share of employment. This re-composition of the 
economy towards informal activities leads to a (marginal) drop in total output, as a result of lower 






Figure 3.9. Effects of changes in the probability of using contact networks (𝛒) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Wages averages at worker level. Fitted value at the vertical dotted line. 
An important advantage of ABMs over traditional equilibrium models is that our methodology 
enables the study of the effect of exogenous changes at the micro-level for a heterogeneous popula-
tion. In Table 3.5 we study the effect of changes in the probability of using contact networks (ρ) on 
the probability of making a transition between formal and informal sectors. More specifically, we 
create 20 counterfactual scenarios in which we increase ρ in 5pp steps over its entire domain. Based 
on these scenarios, we create a sample consisting of monthly labour information for each one of the 
1,014 households over the 10-year period, starting at the end of the burn-in period. For each em-
ployed household we compute one month ahead transitions: between sectors (Model 1), from infor-
mal to formal sector (Model 2) and from formal to informal sector (Model 3). 
Table 3.5 Linear probability models of sectoral transitions  
 (1) Transition 
(2) Transition In-
formal to  
Formal 
(3) Transition 
Formal to  
Informal 
ρ  0.00402*** 0.00215*** 0.00572*** 
 (26.63) (9.61) (27.89) 
nTypeF 0.00075*** 0.00096*** 0.00029*** 
 (42.3) (45.19) (6.39) 
Firm size -0.00016*** -0.00031*** -0.00013*** 
 (-44.73) (-28.0) (-29.5) 
Initially formal 0.00322***   
 (23.88)   
Constant -0.00147*** -0.00101*** 0.00394*** 
 (-9.76) (-5.79) (9.94) 
Observations (Millions) 2.44 1.06 1.38 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0015 0.0020 0.0014 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Based on 20 counterfactual scenarios for ρ. Notes: t statistics in parenthesis, signifi-
cance level: *** p<0.01  
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Our preferred specification for the models indicates that the effect of ρ on the probability of making 
a sectoral transition is positive, linear, and statistically and economically significant. A 10pp in-
crease in ρ results in a 0.0402 pp increase in the probability of making a transition. To put things 
into perspective, at our baseline, the unconditional probability of making a sectoral transition stood 
at 0.44 percent, therefore, a 10pp increase in ρ increases by 9.1 percent the probability of a sectoral 
transition. As expected, the effect of firm size is negative, larger firms provide higher wages and 
therefore, the incentive to move is lower; having more contacts increases the chances of making a 
transition; and controlling for these two variables, those initially formal are more likely to move to 
the informal sector. Note that although the coefficients are statistically significant (probably be-
cause of the sample size) the proposed models only explain between 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent of 
the variability of sectoral transitions and there are other parameters or endogenous variables dif-
ferent than those related to networks that affect transitions considerably more. 
3.5.2 Changes in the number and duration of connections  
The estimation of the model was carried out under the assumption that the maximum number of 
contacts a household has is nTypeF=10. This allowed the maximum time for a TypeF connection 
(ζ) to be recovered from estimation by targeting the share of new positions found through networks. 
Figure 3.10 shows that for a given usage of contacts, ρ, both parameters, nTypeF and ζ are substi-
tutes in the production of matches using contact networks (that is, the moment targeted at esti-
mation). The model also imposes some restrictions on the values of nTypeF that allow us to par-
tially identify its value: from the graph, it can be seen that there is no value of ζ that could result 
in a probability of obtaining jobs through contacts observed in the data (that is, 51 percent) if 
nTypeF is below seven contacts.  
Despite the substitutability of the two variables, their effect on aggregate outcomes is dissimilar as 
observed in Figure 3.11, which presents the effects of changes in nTypeF and ζ parameters on the 
main variables of the macroeconomic model. We observe that if the maximum number of contacts 
falls below three, there is a (marginal) drop in output and employment and an increase of wages. 
This could be the case as vacancies are left unfilled because using contacts is inefficient; firms 
increase wages in response to attract workers. For higher values of the variable, there are no im-
portant effects on output or wages. 
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Figure 3.10 Complementarity between nTypeF and 𝛇 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Fitted value in red square. 
Figure 3.11 The effect of changes in nTypeF and 𝛇 on the real economy 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Wages averages at worker level. Fitted value at the vertical dotted line. 
On the other hand, the value of ζ has no important effect on aggregate output or employment, but 
for values of ζ below a hundred (that is, 8.3 years) it has a reduced effect on the sectoral composi-
tion of these variables and on wages. Increasing ζ from nil to its estimated value increases the share 
of informal employment by 1pp and wages in the formal sector by 1 percent. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This paper explored the effect of job contact networks on the informal-formal divide in Colombia, 
by means of a model able to capture the endogenous formation of contacts on the job. Previous 
studies on networks have highlighted the negative effects of job search through contacts for disad-
vantaged groups, resulting from their higher network homophily. We were mostly interested in the 
potential segmentation effects of the network homophily of Colombian workers. 
Our exploratory ABM and its estimated parameters indicate that a higher use of contacts for job 
search is associated with a higher chance of being in the informal sector and having lower earnings. 
However, data limitations do not allow us to establish a causal relation between these variables. 
Our model, on the other hand, assumed homogenous households employed in heterogeneous formal 
and informal firms. Households have identical intensities for using networks for job search and 
could add contacts on the job. After adjusting the model to replicate the Colombian labour market, 
we found that acquiring contacts on the job creates segmented job networks and consequently a 
high degree of sectoral homophily: for the average household more than 70 percent of contacts are 
in the same sector. However, these conditions do not prevent workers from moving between sectors 
in search of better job opportunities because the observed propensity of using contacts is not rela-
tively high. The current levels of direct and indirect job search allow workers to find jobs in distant 
parts of their own network through a direct search; this in turn benefits their contacts with infor-
mation on better job openings.  
There are several limitations of our framework that future research should address. First, we have 
not estimated some important parameters for the model, and this could potentially alter our find-
ings. Admittedly, given the high number of the model’s parameters and the lack of a data counter-
part, this represents a huge challenge. Second, we have not introduced the heterogeneities of house-
hold surveys into the model. This is especially true for two important dimensions: skill level and 
differences in the propensity of the use of job contact networks. Improving on this could unite the 
ABM model developed here with the dynamic microsimulation approach that usually has a real-
world database with information for model’s agents as input. Lastly, we have not evaluated the 
uncertainty of our parameter estimates beyond a simple visual inspection. The introduction of an 
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optimal matrix of weights (W) for the objective function and computing the variance-covariance 
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A.3.1 Stationarity and Ergodicity  
In this section we investigate the stationarity and ergodicity properties for the main aggregate 
variables of the model and for the moments used for estimation. Firstly, we describe the statistical 
test we use, then we present some descriptive statistics of selected variables for several simulation 
runs and results for the tests.  
We follow Grazzini (2012) and extensively use the Runs Test, a non-parametric test usually em-
ployed to examine autocorrelation. Our strategy for each variable is as follows: we create monthly 
data for two model runs for 8,000 years based on two different random seeds. This large number 
of periods is needed to increase the power of the Runs Test. For each time series, we define windows 
(segments of the time series) of 1,000 months in length. Thus, the series is transformed from 96,000 
months to 96 windows. Each observation in the new variable captures the mean of the underlying 
variable in that window.  
Stationarity 
With this new series, we create a dummy variable capturing whether the window mean is above or 
below the overall mean of the variable. Next, a Run is defined as “a succession of one or more 
identical symbols (i.e. 0 or 1) which are followed and preceded by a different symbol or no symbol 
at all” Gibbons (1985). For instance, in the series {0,0,1,0,0,1} there are 4 Runs 
{{0,0},{1},{0,0},{1}}.  The Z statistic for the number of Runs is compared with its hypothetical 
value under a stationary series (Grazzini, 2012). If we fail to reject the null hypothesis the under-
lying series is stationary. Additionally, we use a parametric test to evaluate stationarity: the 
Dickey-Fuller test. This test is applied to the entire original series. 
Ergodicity 
To check ergodicity, we use the Runs Test again. On this occasion, we use the two series for the 
same variable that were obtained with different random seeds. More specifically, we take the two 
windows series for the same variable and combine them, that is, we create a vector of 192 observa-
tions with the means of each window. Next, we sort the vector in ascending order. Lastly, we create 
a dummy version of the vector assigning a value of 1 or 0 if the window corresponds to the first or 
134 
second series, respectively. We reject the null-hypothesis of ergodicity if the Z-value for the number 
of runs is too low (left-one tailed test), that is, if there are important bunches of zeros or ones in 
some regions of the combined series, indicating the two series come from different distributions. 
Results 
Figure A.3.1 Mean and 95 percent CI for the main aggregates of the model 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ten simulation runs of the model. The vertical dotted line represents the end 
of the burn-in period. Output in thousands. 
Figure A.3.1 presents series for the mean and 95 percent confidence interval for the four variables 
– average price, average wage, total employment, and total output in the economy – resulting from 
ten simulation runs of the model with different initial seeds.42 We observe that following the wide 
range of initial values for the four variables these variables converge to specific values in about 200 
years. By the end of the burn-in period (i.e. 300 years) all variables are near their statistical equi-
librium. These results suggest that the model is ergodic and that the burn-in period is necessary 
for erasing the effect of initial values for control variables. 
Figure A.3.2 presents the two-window series for the average price, average wage, total employment 
and total output in the economy. The horizontal line represents the overall mean of the underlying 
series. For the four variables the overall mean roughly coincides between the two series, indicating 
 
42 We initialize with random values (anchored to the random seed) the following variables: p , w , i , d . 
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Ergodicity for the series. In fact, we find that all the four variables are stationary using both the 
Runs and Dickey-Fuller Tests. The series are also Ergodic using the Runs Test. 
Figure A.3.2 Window series for the main aggregates of the model 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
Figure A.3.3 presents the two-window series for the moments used for estimation: total employment 
in firms with workers in the intervals 2-3,4-5,6-10, total employment in firms with 11 workers or 
more in the formal or informal sectors; probability of obtaining a job using job contact networks 
and probability of job-to-job transition. For the seven variables, the overall mean of each one of 
the two series coming from different random seed are similar. The only exception being total em-
ployment in large informal firms, where the means are somewhat different. Nevertheless, almost all 
moments are stationary using both tests, with the exception of one of the job-to-job transition 
series for which we reject the null for the Runs Test (the same series is stationary under the Dickey 
Fuller test).  
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Figure A.3.3 Window series for the moments used for estimation
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
A.3.2 Sensitivity of the estimated parameters  
Figure A.3.4 presents the value of the objective function Q in Equation 7, in the vicinity of the 
parameter estimates. We observe that, ceteris paribus, small changes in one of the parameters 
dramatically increase the value of the Q function. The only exception seems to be ζ which seems 
to be imprecisely estimated. This graphical inspection indicates that the parameters estimated are 








Figure A.3.4 Evaluation of parameter estimates 
 







Informality has been a recurring negative feature of most developing economies for a long time. As 
it was discussed throughout this thesis, informality represents one of the greatest obstacles to 
reducing poverty and inequality, to increasing revenue, and to bringing citizens the public goods 
they deserve. This thesis introduced microsimulation as a novel methodology to analyse informality 
in developing countries. Such an approach has the advantage of exploiting the heterogeneity of the 
population captured in household survey data, which is nowadays available in most countries 
around the globe. This methodology has the potential to improve our understanding behind the 
persistence of informality and the type of policies that could reduce the size of the informal sector 
while increasing workers’ wellbeing. 
As a motivation for the potential of the proposed methodology, throughout the chapters of this 
thesis, we carried out several simulation exercises using different types of microsimulation tech-
niques: static, behavioural, and dynamic. On these exercises we explored the effects of variables 
such as taxes, social insurance contributions, education and job contact networks on the segmen-
tation of labour markets in a developing economy such as Colombia. We also shifted the focus from 
labour demand, as it is common in the informality literature, to the determinants of the supply of 
labour in the formal and informal sectors.  
In the first chapter we introduced the use of tax-benefit models to empirically assess the financial 
disincentives to supply formal work at the individual level and their consequences at aggregate 
level. Given that the formal-informal divide usually includes an important earnings gap, we econ-
ometrically estimated the potential income of informal workers upon entry to formal employment. 
We find that, in the event of formalizing informal workers, formalization tax rates, defined as the 
proportion of the change in earnings that is taxed away upon formalization, are high for Colombia, 
especially given the requirement for employees and self-employed workers to contribute to social 
insurance at least based on a minimum wage. On average, around 92 percent of workers’ additional 
earnings in formality would be taxed away in the form of increased taxes and social insurance 
contributions in Colombia. At the aggregate level formalizing the entire economy implies that 
around 50 percent of the inequality and poverty gains (resulting from earnings improvements after 
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a hypothetical transition to the formal sector) are lost because social insurance contributions reduce 
disposable income. Unsurprisingly, the social security system would see revenues increase by as 
much as 71 percent in the event of this across-the-board formalization of workers. Although this 
far-reaching formalization exercise will necessarily have second order effects, our results shed light 
on the burden the tax system places on the economies of developing countries and how formalization 
policies have to consider labour supply incentives.   
If monetary incentives are positive but low, what could incentivise workers to transit to the formal 
sector? And more importantly, do they have the possibility of doing so? In the second chapter we 
estimated several models of labour supply, some of them including demand side restrictions to move 
the discussion from accounting to behavioural responses. We argue that there are unexplored pos-
sibilities of using the cross-sectional household microdata available in countries such as Colombia 
to simulate labour supply responses in informal markets. To better motivate the potential of coun-
terfactual simulations using labour supply models, we based the main exercise in the chapter on a 
comprehensive labour supply model that includes sectoral choice (formal-informal) on top of de-
mand side restrictions. Our simulations indicate that neither reducing the tax burden nor increasing 
education would trigger an important move of informal workers to the formal sector.  
In our last chapter we extend an existing agent-based model to study the effect of direct and 
indirect (using contact networks) job search in an economy with an important informal sector. We 
estimate most of the technology and job-search parameters of the model for the Colombian econ-
omy. We argue that this modelling framework could prove useful when dealing with complex phe-
nomena, where mathematical solutions are not available, such as the endogenous creation and 
destruction of contact networks. Although the use of contacts for job search have been found to 
reduce the quality of jobs for disadvantaged workers in the literature reviewed, this negative effect 
does not seem to apply to informal workers in our model. The available data indicates that the 
observed probability of using job contacts is around 40 percent, implying that, despite the high 
degree of homophily of contact networks found by our exploratory model (on average more than 
70 percent of contacts are in the same sector), workers are able to obtain better paid jobs in the 
formal sector, benefiting from the positive externalities that keeping a contact network offers.  
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Although the three chapters presented a basic version of different microsimulation models, there 
are important avenues of future research to exploit the potential of this technique to study infor-
mality. For instance, the static tax-benefit microsimulation model could include labour market 
responses to account for potential changes in wages and employment that will necessarily alter the 
static results obtained. An improved structural labour supply model could include couple’s decisions 
and take into account self-employment, these two features being of importance in the household 
supply of formal work decision in developing economies. Lastly, the setup of the job contact network 
in the macroeconomic ABM model could be improved to better recreate the formation and destruc-
tion of links and the use of other direct search mechanisms such as the internet.  
From a policy point of view, this thesis indicates that governments should accommodate the social 
insurance system to the reality of labour activities in developing economies. Previous research has 
highlighted the role of payroll taxes on the formal-informal divide exclusively from a demand point 
of view. Our findings highlight similar concerns must be borne in mind in the case of formal labour 
supply. The social insurance system is not the only thing to worry about. Our findings also indicate 
that there are important barriers for currently informal workers to offer their abilities in the formal 
sector. Despite the fact that tertiary education, a variable potentially under government’s control, 
is the only observed variable that has an important effect moving workers to the formal sector, 
there are other unobserved variables that prevent a higher availability of formal jobs for informal 
workers. Lastly, one of the variables that should not worry policy makers much is the use of job 
contacts for job search. Our results indicate that the current propensity of use of contacts allows 
for an important dissemination of job availability information among networks of contacts. How-
ever, the effect of contacts on referral hiring (not captured by our model) remains to be analysed. 
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